THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992598
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 21, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
21 April 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
21 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Influential elements in Phnom Penh have petitioned
Cambodian Chief of State Cheng Heng to retain Lon
Nol as prime minister. (Page 1)
South Vietnam
Cambodia
(Page 2)
Nationalist China
(Page 3)
The speech given by Fidel Castro on Monday night is
discussed on Page 4.
Ceylon. (Page 5)
Communist China is expanding its launch complex at
Wu-chai into a major missile rangehead. (Page 6)
South Korean President Pak is expected to win next
week's election, but by a much narrower margin than
in 1967. (Page 7)
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CAMBODIA
? Influential elements in Phnom Penh, including
a number of important military officers closely as-
sociated with Prime Minister Lon Nol's brother, Lon
Non, have petitioned Chief of State Cheng Heng to
retain Lon Nol. Among the petitioners was the chief
of the capital's special military region and one
field commander with troops in or near the city.
In apparent response to this pressure, Heng
called off an address to the nation yesterday, dur-
ing which he supposedly _would have designated a new
prime minister. He has asked National Assembly
President In Tam to solicit Lon Nol's reaction to
the petitions.
Senior military officers in Phnom Penh--includ-
ing some who signed the petition--have told US offi-
cials that there is common agreement that Lon Nol
must retire.
Lon Non has been convinced for some time
that "royalist" elements would mount an
effort to oust Lon Nol, and it is likely
he views the events of the past few days
as supporting his worst fears. Lon Nol's
assertion on Monday that he has been
"obliged" to resign--not, by implication,
solely for reasons of poor health?will
only increase Lon Non's reluctance to ac-
quiesce in a political shakeup. He has
in fact been assuring the press that his
brother will remain as prime minister.
As for Lon Nol, although there have been
signs that he no longer wants to play a
major political role, he also is said to
have told Lon Non that he was willing to
continue to be prime minister if Cheng
?Heng did not accept his resignation.
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SOUTH VIETNAM - CAMBODIA
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NATIONALIST CHINA
on 10. April
Chiang Kai-shek told a group of senior security of-
ficers that he would 'certainly withdraw voluntarily"
from the UN "if and when we are, or are about to be,
deprived of our opportunity to fulfill our obliga-
tions." He said Taipei's membership was not impor-
tant.becauSe the UN is a world organization in name
only, and claimed that he had not withdrawn years
ago only because of Nationalist obligations as a
founding member.
Chiang's decision to withdraw rather than
face a humiliating expulsion or acquiesce
in a compromise representation formula is
not new. He threatened such action over
a relatively minor issue in 1966, and his
attitude almost certainly will not be mod-
ified in the face of a more serious chal-
lenge to Taipei's credentials this year.
Chiang's restatement of his position on
this matter will probably end discussion
at lower levels of his government--which
may have been undertaken without his au-
thorization--about possible "compromises"
on the UN issue.
Chiang is aware that the Nationalist posi-
tion in the UN is growing more precarious
as additional states recognize Peking and
break relations with Taipei, and he appears
to be personally preparing his government
for a vote against Taipei in the General
Assembly either this year or next. The
Taipei press has also begun to disparage
the importance of UN membership.
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CUBA
In a fiery speech Monday night, Fidel Castro
concentrated on three major and oft-repeated themes:
rejection of any reconciliation with the US; repudi-
ation of the Organization of American States; and
reaffirmation of support for "the revolutionary
peoples of Latin America." The only significant de-
parture from past statements on these themes was a
considerable broadening of the definition of "revolu-
tionary peoples" to, include "revolutionary govern-
ments." Castro placed the present governments of
Chile and Peru. in this category. He also expressed
satisfaction with political developments in Bolivia-.
The absence of the usual buildup for the
speech--Castro's first major foreign pol-
icy address in?a year--suggests that it
may have been scheduled hastily, perhaps
because Castro felt obliged to respond to
remarks on Cuba' at the current OAS 'meeting.
Castro, who views the trend of events in
Latin America as shifting inexorably in
his favor, can See no benefit to Cuba in
returning to the OAS. Indeed, he said in
his speech that the OAS should "disappear"
and called for its replacement by a "union"
of revolutionary Latin American states;
presumably he sees himself as the leader
of such a Union.
Castro has not forsaken violent revolution,
however, and regards it as essential in
countries such as Brazil and Argentina.
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CEYLON
The Soviet airlift of military equipment to
Ceylon began yesterday with the arrival of four
AN-12 medium transports.
The transports are bring-
ing in a total of five MIG-17s and two KA-26 light
helicopters--all to be flown by Soviet pilots--as
well as maintenance equipment required to service
the aircraft. Other military equipment may also be
included in the shipments. The USSR has not pre-
viously provided military aid to Ceylon.
There has been little further progress,
meanwhile, in the government's campaign
to put down the "Che Guevarist" insurgents
Security forces seem content to remain in
static, defensive positions, and the in-
surgents appear to be avoiding major
clashes./
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VIlu-chai Launch Complex Being Expanded
MONGOLIA
Ho-fien
NEPAL
EAST
CHINA
SEA
INDIA
PAKISTAN
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TAIWAN
BURMA
NORTH
VIETNAM
SOUT/I CH/NA SEA. ?:
'THAILAND
:HAINAN
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PHILIPPINES
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COMMUNIST CHINA
'Satellite photography shows that the Wu7chai
launch complex 200 nautical miles southwest of Pe-
king is being expanded into a major missile range-
head. Construction is continuing on a second. launch
site--a silo--which may be completed this year. ?Near
Wu-chai, three permanent instrumentation sites have
now been identified.
The missile to be fired from the silo can-
not be determined as yet.
The only missile system detected thus far
in firings from Wu-chai has been an IRBM
which has been launched several times from
a surface pad to a 1,400-nm range, In No--
vember 1970, .satellite photography of the
Wu-wei missile training school showed that
troop training on the IRBm had begun. This
suggests that it could be ready for deploy-
ment late this year.
A new airfield about 15 nm from the missile
complex evidently is now ready to support
missile operations. Ta-tung airfield--some
50 nm from the rangehead--has been perform-
ing this function.
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SOUTH KOREA
President Pak Chong-hui remains favored to win..
theelection on 27 April,-but observers in Seoul now
believe that the outcome may be considerably closer_
than in 1967 when Pak led his closest rival by some
one million votes out of 11,600,000 cast. Opposition.
candidate Kim Tae-chung is drawing overflow crowds
in most cities; he is an effective orator and is
willing to speak Out on sensitive domestic and for-
eign policy issues. Seoul is generally conceded to
him, as well as the populous southwest, his home re-
gion.
Many of those who relish hearing Kim tear
into the administration may nevertheless
prove reluctant on election day to risk
trading the security Pak has provided for
the untested abilities of Kim. This is
especially true in the countryside, where
Pak can already count on the pervasive gov-
ernment bureaucracy to deliver him votes.
Pak also appears certain to get most of
the large military vote. Moreover, govern-
ment authorities have now generally suc-
ceeded in isolating student demonstrators
from the election campaign, and students
of at least one major Seoul university
have called a moratorium on street demon-
strations until after the election.
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