THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 MARCH 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976691
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 27, 1969

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11!
The President's Daily Brief
27 March 1969
1 9
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LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF 27 MARCH 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
28 March 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
27 MARCH 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The deputy leader of the Soviet delegation to the
ENDC has told a member of our delegation that Moscow has
not yet decided whether to ratify the NPT before the Bonn
government signs but that he personally thought his govern-
ment would follow a "cautious policy of waiting" for the
West German signature. He admitted this was inconsistent
with the Soviet appeal for an early entry into force of
the NPT, but said "many elements in Moscow are not flexible
when it comes to West Germany."
area.
There is nothing significant to report on any other
FOR TI-JE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
The pattern of Israeli air attacks on Jordan over the
past two weeks indicates that the Israelis have adopted a
policy of "preventive" attacks on Arab commando bases and
concentrations. The objective is apparently to keep the
Arab guerrillas on the move, to interfere with training,
break morale, and make terrorist activity generally more
difficult.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET AFFAIRS
2
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Failure of Large Booster Deals Setback to Soviet Space Program
30 Ft.
20 Ft.
30 Ft.
60 Ft.
66 Ft.
J__
Payload
4th Stage
3rd Stage,
2nd Stage
SOVIET SL-12
Lift off thrust
Earth orbit payload
(pounds)
Payload on lunar trajectory
(pounds)
1st Stage
2.5 million lbs
45,000
13,000
SOVIET SL-12 RECORD
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DATE
10 March 1967
8 April 1967
EVENT
Cosmos 146
Cosmos 154
RESULT
Partial failure
Partial failure
REMARKS
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22 November 1967
Circumlunar attempt
Failure
2 March 1968
Zond 4 simulated cir-
cum lunar mission
Success
22 April 1968
Circumlunar attempt
Failure
14 September 1968
Zond 5 circumlunar
mission
Success
10 November 1968
Zond 6 circumlunar
mission
Success
16 November 1968
Proton 4
Success
20 January 1969
Circumlunar attempt
Failure
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27 March 1969
Attempted Mars probe
Failure
94294 3-69 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Soviet space program suffered a major setback yes-
terday when its largest operational booster--the SL-12--
failed during an attempt to launch a probe toward Mars.
The Soviets probably intend the SL-12 to be the work-
horse for their space program in the 1970s, but it has been
plagued with problems throughout its development, having
fully performed its mission only four times in ten attempts.
So far, the SL-12 has been used primarily in the circum-
lunar program--this latest attempt was the first time it has
been tried in the planetary exploration effort. Its poor
performance probably is the principal reason that the Soviet
circumlunar program is at least one year behind schedule;
this denied Moscow the opportunity to attempt a manned cir-
cumlunar flight before the US Apollo 8.
Apart from its effect on the space effort, the dismal
record of the SL-12 seems likely to have caused considerable
disappointment within the Soviet hierarchy. This could, in
turn, arouse questions, and attendant political controversy,
about the allocation of scarce resources.
VIETNAM
The Liberation Front has turned aside Thieu's public
bid for private talks with the Front, but has not rejected
the idea outright. The response was negative in tone and
shot through with propaganda attacks, but it carefully
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
avoided closing the door to the possibility, of such a dia-
logue.
For example, after attacking both the US and the GVN,
the Liberation Front statement went on to assert that the
Front delegation came to Paris with the "serious intention
of helping, with the other sides, the conference to achieve
positive results." Of even more significance is the Front's
failure explicitly to refuse Thieu's offer.
The Communists clearly realize that Thieu's statement
has put them on the spot. They almost certainly consider it
to have been a clever propaganda move, and their reply was
aimed at attempting to counter Thieu's success. At the
same time, the Communists wanted to avoid locking themselves
into a totally negative position. The Communists realize
they will eventually have to deal with the Thieu government,
and they do not want to close out any options on the form
such meetings will take.
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LAOS
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Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
Plei
5,0 100 Miles
CAMBO 4A
Tonle
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
II, OTHER IMPORANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
Souvanna has now asked US officials for air strikes
against Communist centers in the Plaine des Jarresareathat
previously have been relatively immune from attacks. Bomb-
ing restrictions have been lifted from military targets in
and around Xieng Khouang Ville and the eastern portion of
The request to hit these prime Communist bases followed
a gloomy cabinet meeting yesterday on the enemy threat in
the northeast. There has in fact been little change in the
situation since our last review in the Brief of Monday after-
noon. One more government position has changed hands--we
suspect through withdrawal rather than enemy action--and
there is still the possibility of a? Communist thrust against
friendly guerrilla headquarters at Sam Thong.
BRAZIL
The long-pending deal for Brazil to purchase two Brit-
ish submarines appears to be nearing conclusion.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Last August the Brazilian foreign minister was told
by the US ambassador that if Brazil bought new submarines,
it would risk incurring penalties under the Conte Amendment.
The warning was received calmly.
Application of penalties would probably strengthen the
hand of those nationalists in the military who have advised
the government to assume a more neutral posture in world af-
fairs. Moreover, the Brazilians would probably not be dissuaded
from making whatever military equipment purchases they thought
were necessary.
IRAQ - EAST GERMANY
There are rumors that Iraq will soon recognize East
Germany; it would be the first non-Communist state to do
so. If the East Germans get recognition, they undoubtedly
will step up their pressures on other Arab states.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Top Secret
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