THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014943
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 1, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
November I, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(11,121(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 1, 1975
Table of Contents
Angola: Portuguese authorities now expect an attack
on Luanda by forces of the National Front for
the Liberation of Angola before November 11.
(Page 1)
Portugal: Leftist elements in the military continue
to resist demobilization procedures, and re-
portedly have petitioned army chief Fabiao to
allow dismissed soldiers to stay in the mili-
tary until at least next March. (Page 2)
Lebanon: Sporadic fighting continued yesterday in
the southern suburbs of Beirut, following dis-
agreements over the conditions of the latest
cease-fire. (Page 3)
Notes: Azores; USSR - South Korea - North Korea;
Israel (Page 5)
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NGO
K shasa
Areas controlled by:
?(MPLA) Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MI (NFLA) National Front for the Liberation of Angola
A (UNITA) National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Cabinda
AIRE
24
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN
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utile I
Henrique
Carvalho
Port Amboim
NG OL
Lobito
Benguela
ilea P r to
Mocanlodes
orto Alexandre
SOU -WEST AFRICA
(Intern lona! Territory)
Miles
200
16
558750 11-75 CIA
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ANGOLA
Portuguese authorities now expect
an attack on Luanda by forces of the
National Front for the Liberation of
Angola before November 11.
Forces of the National Front, assisted by sev-
eral hundred Zairian troops, are now concentrated
at Quifangando, some 12 miles northeast of the cap-
ital. Their advance has been delayed temporarily
by lack of supplies and the destruction of two key
bridges by the Popular Movement.
Tensions are running high in Luanda. The
morale of Popular Movement forces in the capital is
low, and recent military reversals may be causing
some shake-ups in the Movement's military command
structure. Large numbers of black residents of the
city are fleeing into the countryside, many of them
to escape the mass mobilization of all men between
the ages of 18 and 35 ordered by Popular Movement
leaders last week.
The National Front also is massing a sizable
force and large amounts of equipment near Carmona
in preparation for an assault on Lucala. The Front
and its military ally, the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, are continuing to
press the Popular Movement in the central coastal
area as well. The Movement's forces there are
stretched thin and may be forced to pull back into
defensive positions around Benguela and Lobito, the
territory's major port and rail complex.
the force that took
Popular Movement earlier this
week is now moving toward Benguela.
Mocamedes from the
The force reportedly consists of 500-600
troops from the National Union and the National
Front
It
includes some highly trained special
forces troops who fought with the Portuguese during
the insurgency. A detachment from the force is ad-
vancing southward on Porto Alexandre.
The Popular Movement apparently has made some
progress, however, in its advance on the National
Union stronghold of Nova Lisboa. The Movement
claims to have recaptured Alto Catumbela, site of
the hydroelectric project that supplies power to
Nova Lisboa.
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PORTUGAL
Leftist elements in the military
continue to resist demobilization pro-
cedures. They reportedly have peti-
tioned army chief Fabiao to allow dis-
missed soldiers to stay in the military
until at least next March.
A top aide on the
that the government is con-
cerned that many of the politicized troops will not
leave after they are discharged. Some may refuse
for political reasons, but others--according to the
source--are not anxious to return to civilian life
at a time when unemployment is on the rise.
is prepared to meet
such contingencies by cutting the pay and food for
the discharged troops. He points out, however, that
left-wing parties could offer to support those who
remain in the barracks.
All of this turmoil within the military has
spawned a barrage of warnings about coup attempts
from the right and left. One prominent antigovern-
ment newspaper has taken this a step further and
asserts that a right-wing coup has already occurred.
Other press rumors indicating that various military
elements are planning live-fire maneuvers are adding
to the overall tension in Lisbon.
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LEBANON
Sporadic fighting continued yester-
day in the southern suburbs of Beirut,
following disagreements over the condi-
tions of the latest cease-fire. Muslim
forces reportedly refused to leave a
building as specified in the cease-fire,
and the Phalangists were reported to
have moved back into the three hotels
in the Qantari area.
The Phalangist move could again involve the
major fedayeen organizations in the fighting. Since
Wednesday, when the cease-fire was arranged, Fatah
and Saiqa appeared to have been reverting to their
usual role of attempting to calm the situation.
According to our embassy, the involvement of the
less radical fedayeen organizations in the battle
in the Qantari area, which began last weekend, came
about largely because they were already present in
the area as part of the Palestinian-leftist force
set up to enforce a previous cease-fire. Their
participation in the fighting, in the opinion of
the embassy, does not mean the abandonment by Pal-
estine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat
of his policy of attempting to avoid direct involve-
ment in the conflict.
The violations of the latest cease-fire may be
attributable, at least in part, to leftist Muslim
and Palestinian "rejectionist" elements who believe
their best interests are served by continued con-
flict.
One result of the latest fighting has been the
emergence of Nasirist leader Ibrahim Qulaylat as
a significant figure on the Lebanese internal scene.
Qulaylat, who controls the Ayn al-Muraysa area near
the embassy, is estimated to have 500 militiamen
and 1,000 other supporters under his control. The
(continued)
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embassy reports that most of the fighting in the
Qantari area and adjoining areas involved Qulaylat's
followers, members of the Lebanese Communist Party,
and supporters of leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt.
Efforts on the political front to find a solu-
tion appear to have slowed. The embassy reports
that parliament has no plans to meet and that the
"national dialogue" committee is inactive, with no
sessions scheduled for any of the three subcom-
mittees. The new ten-man security committee es-
tablished last weekend is continuing to meet, but
without the participation of the major protago-
nists, Jumblatt and Phalangist leader Pierre Jumay-
yil. The continuing fighting raises the possibil-
ity that Prime Minister Karami may actually carry
out his threat to resign.
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NOTES
Our consulate in Ponta Delgada has received a
report that a faction of the Azorean Liberation
Front might attempt a move for independence early
this month.
The source of the report said that the plotters
would agree to drop their plans if the Portuguese
government consented either to a referendum on in-
dependence or to "very extensive autonomy." He also
asked the US to "discreetly counsel" Portuguese
leaders to accept one of these alternatives. Lis-
bon recently rejected an appeal by the Front for a
referendum on independence, but successive Portu-
guese governments have made major concessions in
an effort to meet the Azoreans' demands for a
greater voice in their own affairs. Although this
threat cannot be dismissed entirely, it is most
likely part of the Liberation Front strategy to
wring maximum concessions from Lisbon.
The USSR's decision to allow an official to
visit South Korea is a measure of Soviet pique with
North Korea, but it does not presage any radical
departure in Moscow's policy toward Seoul.
This and other gestures toward Seoul reinforce
indications that Soviet relations with North Korea
are not good. Military and economic assistance to
North Korea has declined markedly in the past two
years.
The Soviets made
modest conciliatory gestures to Seoul in 1971 and
1972 to show Pyongyang that they also had policy
options. Moscow backed off in 1973, however, after
North Korea protested and took steps to assuage
Soviet concerns.
The Greek freighter carrying a cargo of cement
for Israel arrived too late to join the southbound
convoy that transited the Suez Canal yesterday.
The ship is scheduled to sail with today's convoy.
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Top Secret
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