THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 MARCH 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992541
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 22, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
22 March 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
22 March 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The unexpected appointment of a long-absent polit-
buro member gives .a new fix on the balance of forces
in China's unsettled leadership. (Page 1)
In Laos, government troops have abandoned a number
of defensive positions northeast of Luang Prabang.
(Page 3)
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South VietnaM // (Page 4)
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COMMUNIST CHINA
The unexpected appointment of long-absent politburo
member Hsieh Fu-chih to the top party post in Peking
city gives us a new fix on the balance of forces in
China's unsettled leadership which was last reported
in The President's Daily Brief of 19 March.
Hsieh was the first of a trio of important politburo
members to have dropped from sight in the past year.
Although the regime never acknowledged that he was
in disgrace, there were a number of strong indica-
tions that he was involved in behind-the-scenes in-
fighting within the politburo. Peking's sudden an-
nouncement on Friday that he had been "elected" first
secretary of the new municipal party committee sug-
gests that he has undergone a political resurrection
after a concerted effort to oust him from the Chinese
leadership. The fact that Hsieh did not deliver the
major address at the municipal congress which
"elected" the new party committee and that he has
not yet been identified again as politburo member
and minister of public security, however, may indi-
cate that he is not yet completely out of the polit-
ical woods.
The precise reason for Hsieh 's lengthy disappearance
is still obscure, but he may have been a temporary
victim of "leftist" pressure within the politburo.
In his position as head of public security he was
almost certainly involved in the investigation begun
in January 1970 to ferret out officials who had sup-
ported the ultraleftist supporters of the Red Guard
organization. According to Red Guard accounts, these
people were backed by a number of leaders on the pres-
ent politburo, including Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng,
both of whom may have felt politically endangered by
the investigation.
China's present politburo is composed of individuals
who were often bitter rivals during the Cultural
Revolution and who must necessarily be concerned with
securing tenable political positions for themselves
and their followers in anticipation of the death of
77-year-old Mao Tse-tung. Indirect evidence suggests
that these rivalries have been extended and renewed
by the process of rebuilding the nation's party and
government apparatus--a process in which some of the
militant ideologues who have been closest to Mao ap-
pear to have been losing ground. They seem to have
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been unable to form many bases of power in the re-
constructed party organs which, like the new Peking
committee, are Zed in most localities by military
men and veteran officials. Many of the latter were
once victims of political attacks inspired by radical
leaders such as Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. Indeed,
the formation of party committees at the important
provincial level did not begin until the disappear-
ance of Chen and Kang.
The confirmation of Hsieh Fu-chih in an important
party job while Kang and Chen remain sidelined sug-
gests that the balance within the politburo has now
swung in favor of a loose grouping of relative mod-
erates which includes Chou En-Zai and some of the
powerful central and regional military leaders. It
also raises serious questions as to the present power
of Mao himself. Since he has close personal and
philosophic ties with Chen and Kang, a setback to
them seems to tarnish his image and suggests there
are constraints on his authority.
Neither of these important leftist leaders has been
denounced in public and it is possible that, given
the fluid state of Chinese politics, they may be
eventually "rehabilitated" much like Hsieh Fu-chih.
Nevertheless, even their reappearance would not be-
Zie the impression that the "leftists" on the polit-
buro have lost a round in the ongoing struggle and
have even less chance than before to carry much po-
litical clout in the post-Mao era.
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THAILAND
? Government-held location
? Communist-held location
Vientiane
? 5511 81 3-71 CIA
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LAOS
Government troops have abandoned a number of
defensive positions northeast of Luang Prabang fol-
lowing a series of coordinated Communist attacks
yesterday. For the first time this dry season the
Communists placed rocket fire on the Luang Prabang
airfield. One attack early this morning destroyed
an ammunition dump, but otherwise damage to the
field and aircraft was light. The rocket attacks
underscore the continuing vulnerability of the city,
however.
? The US Embassy thinks that_a Communist attack
against Luang Prabang is unlikely, but .US dependents
have been temporarily evacuated to Vientiane as a
precautionary measure. Steps have also been taken
to send three additional irregular battalions to the
area if they are needed.
This is not the first time Luang Prabang
has been threatened, but the Communists
are now closer to the city and in larger
numbers than ever before. As in the past,
the North Vietnamese could move into the
city almost at will, but this would mark
?a major departure in their strategy in
Laos. Almost without exception, the Com-
munists have refrained from direct attack,
harassment, or terrorism against major
population centers in the country. It
seems more likely, therefore, ?that the
current campaign near Luang Prabang is to
further Communist objectives in the coun-
tryside and to demonstrate once again to
Lao leaders the essential precariousness
of their country's situation.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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NOTE
Pakistan: President Yahya Khan and Mujibur.
Rahman. apparently made some progress in the last
three days, but both sides are being very tight-
lipped about the substance of their talks. The
Western press speculates that Yahya will give in to
Mujib's .demands, which would mean that Pakistan
would remain one country but almost all power would
be in the hands of the provincial governments. The
two leaders are scheduled to meet again today, and
Z,A. Bhutto, in a complete about-face, flew to Dacca
yesterdayto participate in the discussions.
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