THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 JANUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007928
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 29, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
January 29, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
'ar t.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 29, 1975
Table of Contents
Cyprus-USSR: President Makarios is considering
greater Soviet participation in the Cyprus
problem. (Page 1)
NATO: The allies have accepted, in principle, our
suggested reply to the Soviet freeze proposal
of last November. (Page 3)
Laos: Major steps are finally being taken to re-
settle refugees. (Page 4)
Notes: Israel; USSR; China; China; Canada; Ecuador
(Pages 5 and 6)
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CYPRUS-USSR
The Zack of progress in the inter-
communal talks has reportedly prompted
President Makarios to consider greater
Soviet involvement in the Cyprus prob-
lem. Makarios' interest follows 3n 'the
heels of a Soviet demarche to the inter-
ested parties calling for a solution sim-
ilar to the Greek Cypriots' proposals.
The Soviet demarche, made recently in Athens,'
Ankara, and Nicosia, opposes the Turkish proposal
for a biregional federation with a weak central gov-
ernment, and supports instead a cantonal or multi-
regional solution under a strong central government.
Moscow also backs the Greek side's demand that all
refugees be allowed to return to their homes.
Makarios is reported to be consulting with his
advisers on how to make the best use of Soviet sup-
port.
Makarios
is certainly aware that there is a limit to the
amount of pressure Moscow is willing to put on
Ankara. He probably believes, however, that he
can still get a better deal by internationalizing
the talks and giving the Soviets a larger role.
To gain a role for itself, Moscow had earlier
pressed for a wider forum to deal with the Cyprus
issue instead of direct negotiations between the
interested parties. More recently, the Soviet am-
bassador in Nicosia hinted to Makarios that Moscow
would be interested in some sort of guarantor role,
perhaps indirectly through the UN Security Council.
Makarios might press for a guarantor role for Mos-
cow if he decides to abandon the intercommunal
talks in favor of "internationalizing" the Cyprus
issue. He may also press London to give up its
Cyprus bases, which Moscow would like to see dis-
mantled.
(continued)
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Makarios' consideration of a greater Soviet
role rises out of frustration with the slow pace
of the intercommunal talks and the rigidity of the
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot negotiating position.
He recently demonstrated his intention to seize the
negotiating initiative by submitting a position
paper to the Turkish side dealing with all issues
under discussion. Makarios believes that if no
agreement is possible, it should be determined soon
so he can turn to a different forum.
The Greek government and Greek Cypriot nego-
tiator Clerides are likely to press Makarios to
give the intercommunal talks more time to succeed.
In the event of a deadlock in the talks, however,
Makarios may yet seek a broader forum and greater
Soviet involvement.
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NATO
With the convening of the fifth round
of the force reduction talks in Vienna to-
morrow, the NATO allies have accepted, in
principle, a US suggestion on how the West
should reply to the "freeze" proposal sub-
mitted by the Soviet delegation last No-
vember,
The Soviets proposed that each direct partici-
pant in the force reduction talks freeze the size
of its forces in Central Europe for the duration of
the negotiations.
The US has suggested that the West inform the
Soviets that their proposal is unacceptable; that
a freeze agreement should be negotiated only as
part of an agreement to reduce forces; that a
freeze could come into effect when a reduction
agreement is signed; and that discussions of reduc-
tions should have priority.
The US suggestion is designed to prevent the
Vienna talks from being diverted from their main
task of negotiating reductions in forces. It is
a compromise that takes into account the desire
of the West Europeans not to appear to reject the
Soviet proposal flatly. Some of them had wanted
to make a specific counterproposal because they
feared a possible adverse public reaction if they
rejected the Soviet offer out of hand.
All the NATO allies welcomed the US suggestion,
although the West German representative in NATO's
senior political committee has suggested amend-
ments. The committee will continue its delibera-
tions this week, and the North Atlantic Council
will probably consider the matter at a special
meeting on January 31,
The Western Allies hope to reach final agree-
ment by that time, and make their definitive reply
as early as possible in the new round of negotia-
tions.
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LAOS
Nearly two years after the cease-
fire, major steps are finally being taken
to resettle the country's large number of
refugees. The Pathet Lao may be in Zine
for a population windfall if these refu-
gees opt to return to their homes in the
Communist zone. Their presence there
would be extremely valuable to the Commu-
nists when national elections are even-
tually held.
Estimates of the total number of refugees in
Laos vary widely. USAID, which has for years been
deeply involved in providing material assistance
and food support for refugees in the non-Communist
zone, estimates that there are some 700,000. Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma, on the other hand, claims
that fully 1,000,000 of the nation's population of
3,000,000 fall into the category of displaced per-
sons or refugees. Other coalition government of-
ficials believe the figure to be in the range of
400,000 to 500,000. Regardless of the specific
number, refugees constitute a significant percent-
age of the Lao population.
The Pathet Lao--who control two thirds of the
country, but less than one third of the population--
are fully aware of the refugees' potential signif-
icance. The Communists have been waging an inten-
sive propaganda campaign among the refugees in an
attempt to persuade or coerce them into returning
to their native lands. The effectiveness of the
propaganda effort has been enhanced by the refugees'
own sense of neglect and the non-Communists' fail-
ure to convince them to remain in place.
Given the enormous logistic problems involved,
however, and the extreme weakness of the coalition
government's administrative machinery, it is likely
that only a relatively small number of refugees
will actually be resettled in the next few months.
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Israel
NOTES
The latter could
become vulnerable to Egyptian observation and artil-
lery fire after any further withdrawal of Israeli
forces in the Sinai.
A Soviet nuclear-powered submarine--an
torpedo attack unit--
in the port of Berbera, Somalia
confirming the use of facilities
units.
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there by nuclear
Two Soviet nuclear-powered submarines were in
the area last March, but it was not clear whether
they entered the port. Aside from ports in Cuba--
and now Berbera--Soviet nuclear-powered submarines
normally do not make port calls.
China has canceled contracts for 601,000 tons
of US wheat scheduled for deliverythis year and is
negotiating for the cancellation of an additional
500,000 tons.
These contracts--worth about $160 million--
represent all of the current commitments of US
grain to China. China's reasons for cancellation
probably include over-contracting in 1974, a better
grain harvest last year than expected, a tight for-
eign exchange situation, and lower prices now than
when the contracts were negotiated. China still
plans to purchase 5.6 million tons of grain for
delivery this year.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, in his report of
January 13 to the National People's Congress,
charted a course of carefully planned but compara-
tively slow growth for China's economy over the
next five years.
The Chinese economy appears to have grown in
1974 by about 4 percent--down from the 7 percent
gain of 1973. Among the factors holding back the
rate of industrial growth last year were the per-
sistent imbalances among the extractive, process-
ing, and finishing industries, highlighted by short-
ages of coal and scrap steel; the overburdening of
railroads and congestion at major ports; and 'spo-
radic work stoppages, lowered worker morale, and
reduced productivity. A respectable increase in
agricultural output was not enough to offset these
problems.
Canada intends to propose changes in the bi-
lateral North American Air Defense treaty, which
expires in May.
Ottawa wants more effective control over the
use of its own military forces during emergencies
and greater US respect for Canadian airspace.
Canada may offer to make the new accord effective
for five years, rather than two as in the present
agreement. A spokesman for Canada's External Af-
fairs Ministry has said that his government planned
to reach agreement with the US well before the ex-
piration date.
Ecuador has levied heavy fines against the US
fishing companies that operate the four tuna boats
seized on Saturday for unlicensed fishing inside
the country's 200-mile territorial sea limit.
The fines total more than $250,000, and the
confiscated catch, which may be offered for sale
back to the companies, is valued at $235,000 or
more. Thus far, Ecuador has not invoked its new
law prohibiting all foreign fishing boats, even
those with licenses, from a 40-mile zone along the
shoreline. Nevertheless, the authorities' insist-
ence that the four boats were seized near the 40-
mile limit leaves open the possibility of harsher
penalties after ships' logs and other data--in-
cluding the US reaction--are studied.
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