THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977387
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 6, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
6 April 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
6 April 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Communists increased the pressure throughout Indo-
china over the weekend. They made their deepest
penetration yet in Cambodia (Page 1) and renewed
their advance in Laos (Page 2). They continued to
operate at a relatively high level in South Vietnam
(Page 3).
In Latin America, Guatemala has only begun to feel
the repercussions of the kidnap-murder of Ambassador
von Spreti (Page 4), and Colombia appears to be
headed for trouble (Page 5).
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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CAMBODIA
Intercepts of Cambodian Army messages show that
Svay Rieng Province-is,bearing the brunt of stepped
up Communist military pressure along the border, but
there is no suggestion that a major push is under
way. On 4 April the Communists attacked Chipou,
about 12 miles from the border; this was their deep-,
est penetration to date, and the first time they
have hit a heavily populated area. Several govern-
ment outposts also have been attacked.
Communist.activity in Svay Rieng may be. in
response to recent South Vietnamese cross-
border operations there.
There also are signs that the Communists are.
preparing to increase 'antigovernment activity soon,
in the north0
since, late March over 600 Sihanouk sympathizers have
left their homes in Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and
Mondolkiri provinces to join,viptnampqp
Cambodian insurgent forces.
-Communist troops are already transporting muni--
tions from southern Laos to support insurgents in
the northeast.
The government has long had trouble ex-
tending its control over the isolated and
sparsely populated northern provinces,
and it is possible that the Communists
may move to establish a "liberated area"
there.
Sihanouk continues his appeals from Peking. In.
a message on 4 April he implied for the first time
that he would return to Cambodia in the near future.
This message again asked the Cambodian people to
take to the "bush."
1
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LAOS: Current Situation
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
On 4.April, North Vietnamese troops launched'
their first major attack in almost a-week as they
pushed within a mile of the Sam Thong airstrip. At
last report, reinforced, government troops with air
support.were still holding the base-and' most of the
Sam Thong valley. Intercepts indicate that the
enemy attaches considerable importance to.retaking
Sam Thong, and at least two North Vietnamese bat-
talions have moved into the area,
The' situation continues to be quiet around the
main guerrilla base at Long Tieng. Another battal-
ion of regular army troops has moved into Long Tieng,
raising the government total in the area to approx-
imately 5,700. Guerrilla forces continue to patrol
the 'v!lleys north of the base, but they are still
having 'trouble- dislodging Communist forces from an
important ridge-between Long Tieng and Tha Tam: Bleung.
The Communists are. demonstrating fresh interest
in government positions west of the Plaine. Recon-
naissance ,elements are operating near the government
base' at Xieng Dat,' and one team. apparently is being
sent into the Sala Phou Khoun area, according to in-
tercepts. There is no evidence of any imminent at-.
tack by substantial North Vietnamese forces against?
these two positions, however. Last year, a North
Vietnamese battalion threatened the road junction
at Sala-Phou-Khoun, and there has been some specu-
lation that the enemy intends to cut Route 13 there,
possibly as a prelude to a drive into northern Vien-
tianeProvince,
On the political front, rumors continue to cir-
culate regarding the return of Phoumi Nosavan.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Communist mortar and rocket attacks continued
at a relatively high level during the weekend. Some
100 allied positions were struck by light enemy
shellings. Stiff ground fighting occurred near the
Demilitarized Zone and at a half dozen locations in
other areas of the country.
An enemy threat is building in the central
highlands, where the North Vietnamese appear to be
closing in again on an allied Special Forces camp--
this time at Dak Seang. The South Vietnamese now
are largely on their own in the highlands. Major
elements of the US 4th Infantry Division, which op-
erated in the region for four years, were pulled
out recently.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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GUATEMALA
The kidnap-murder of Ainbassador von Spreti
leaves the Mendez government in a precarious posi-
tion. Coup. plotting has long been fairly common
among. military officers, and it will be increased
by the present widespread frustration over the ter-
rorist incident.
The government may attempt to arrest subversives
and "leftists" generally, in the hope of placating
the military and the public with at least the sem-
blance of action. Probably none of von Spreti's.kid--
napers will be caught in the dragnet, however.
The diplomatic community in Guatemala' City
is understandably worried. Additional kid-
napings are likely, as are attempts at as-
sassination. US personnel are especially
vulnerable?the terrorists probably believe
the US was responsible for the Guatemalans'
unwillingness to free prisoners and pay
ransom.
International reactions are not yet known.
West Germany may break relations altogether,
and other countries may recall their envoys.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COLOMBIA
Although four candidates are campaigning for
the presidency, the election on 19 April is really
a contest between only two: the "official" National
Front nominee, Misael Pastrana Borrero, and the for-
mer dictator, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. At
this time, we cannot predict the share of the vote
each will get--except that their totals should be
nearly equal--and we cannot be sure the winner will
take office and serve out the term.
If Pastrana Borrero becomes president (and stays
president) he will attempt to carry on with the for-
ward-looking programs and policies of President
Lleras. Obviously, a continuation of the National
Front's political philosophy would, in the long run,
benefit Colombia and preserve its good relations with
its neighbors.
The election of seventy-year old Rojas- Pinilla
would present a number of sticky problems, some of
which would affect relations between Colombia and
the US. Following his usurption of the presidency
in June 1953, Rojas was popularly acclaimed as a
saviour, but within a year he was progressing toward
a ruthless dictatorship. His ouster in May 1957 was
greeted with widespread rejoicing among politically
aware Colombians. Nevertheless, the public works
and social welfare projects that Rojas instituted
created a large reservoir of support among the urban
and rural poor. This support has been carefully
nurtured for 13 years by his daughter's radical
rightist fringe party, the National Popular Alliance--
usually called ANAPO, its Spanish-acronym.
The ANAPO campaign probably gives us a fore-
taste of the Rojas administration, if there is to
be one. In his speeches, Rojas has been openly,
almost flamboyantly, demagogic. He has promised to
raise the peso to parity with the dollar, although
it is now about 18 to 1, and he says he intends to
nationalize all imports. Also, ANAPO seems to have
a scheme to set up some kind of corporate state,
but its intentions in this regard have been so
poorly spelled out that the idea cannot be assessed.
(continued)
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The greatest danger to public order we can
foresee is that Rojas would lose by a narrow margin.
He is bound to charge fraud, and his followers, by
resorting to violence, could plunge the nation into
serious, prolonged turbulence.
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