THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 SEPTEMBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007818
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 17, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
September 17, 1974
5
To
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category SB( 11(2)13)
declauifted only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 17, 1974
Table of Contents
Turkey: Prime Minister Ecevit may
(Page 1)
USSR: Soviets may be deactivating
missile systems. (Page 2)
Cambodia: Major government operation
(Page 3)
Notes: China; France - Indian Ocean
resign today.
silos for older
stalls.
(Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY
Prime Minister Ecevit will ask his
Republican People's Party today to ratify
his decision to resign and therebj end
the coalition with the right-wing Na-
tional Salvation Party. Ecevit told a
press conference yesterday that if the
party supports this move, he will for-
mally submit his resignation to President
Koruturk and seek new elections.
Referring the matter to the party is a mere
formality, but it gives Ecevit more time to plan
his next move, and even to reconsider if prospects
for forming a new government appear doubtful.
Ecevit's break with the National Salvation Party
seems final this time, but he has drawn back from
the brink on at least one other occasion since the
fragile alliance was formed last January.
A collapse of the coalition would not automati-
cally bring about elections. If Ecevit wants to
take advantage of the increased popularity he has
gained from his actions regarding Cyprus, he will
have to find support for new elections outside his
own party in parliament: A majority vote is needed
to call elections before those scheduled for 1977,
and opposition parties would probably be reltctant
to risk losing seats in the national assembly.
Ecevit's other options include forming a minor-
ity government or another coalition. He would pre-
sumably find it as difficult to obtain support for
a minority government as he would for calling elec-
tions. Suleyman Demirel has already said his Jus-
tice Party--the major opposition group--would vote
against a minority government.
Ecevit may attempt to form a coalition with the
small right-of-center Democratic Party. Such a coa-
lition would give Ecevit the needed majority in par-
liament, but the two parties would have to overcome
significant ideological differences. There are ru-
mors that the Democratic Party has already agreed
to join a coalition or to support a move to call
elections:
If Ecevit formally resigns, the present govern-
ment will continue to serve on a temporary basis un-
til a new one is formed. An interim government
would assure continuity, but it would lack the neces-
sary support in parliament to approve new programs.
It took Ecevit three months to put together a coali-
tion after the indecisive elections in October 1973.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
The Soviets may be starting to de-
activate silos for the SS-8 intercontin-
ental ballistic missile. This is the
first sign that Moscow intends to deac-
tivate silos for older missile systems.
the SS-8 complex at
Omsk shows that the missiles have been
removed from all three of the silos there and the
doors have been left open.. Several silo components
have been removed and are stacked nearby. Nothing
done so far, however, would prevent reinstallation
of the missiles and return to operational status.
Only limited numbers of SS-8s were put in serv-
ice. There are nine silo launchers and ten launch
pads for the missile.
The SS-8 and SS-7 are Moscow's two oldest op-
erational ICBMs; both of them were put in service
in the early sixties. Over the past three years,
17 above-ground SS-7 sites--each containing two
launch pads--have been in a reduced state of readi-
ness; we no longer consider them operational.
These pads were not dismantled in accordance with
the procedures agreed to by the SALT Standing Con-
sultative Commission, however, and they could be
restored to operational status in a short time.
The Soviets still have 90 operational launch
pads for the SS-7; they have not altered the 66
silos where SS-7s are installed.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
The major government operation south-
east of Phnom Penh, which began in late
August, has stalled completely. Although
Cambodian army troops initially pushed
back the insurgents, government forces
have now lost the initiative, and the
Communists have moved their units into
blocking positions.
The poor performance is the result of flooding,
caution on the part of government commanders, and
the withdrawal of some units for rest. There is lit-
tle prospect for any break in the stalemate in the
near future. Moreover, the operation has not gained
the favorable publicity that government leaders
hoped would benefit their cause at the UN.
In other parts of the country, fighting contin-
ues to seesaw. Government. forces have launched
clearing operations around several widely separated
provincial capitals. The most successful of these
efforts have been conducted in Siem Reap Province,
.where the government has increased its territorial
holdings significantly, and in Kompong Chhnang'and
Pursat provinces, where over 20,000 civilians have
been freed since early August.
The Communists are maintaining pressure on gov-
ernment defenses along Route 4 southwest of the pro.- .
vincial capital of Kompong Speu. In the past few
days, they have hit Kompong Cham City with artillery
fire for the first time in nearly a year, The shell-
ings against Kompong Cham are probably an effort to
keep government Units tied down; there is little evi-
dence that the Communists are planning any major
ground attacks against the city.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
France - Indian Ocean: The French navy is
sending another squadron of ships to the Indian
Ocean next month. The aircraft carrier Clemenceau
will be accompanied by a frigate, a destroyer, and
two oil tankers. The move presumably reflects con-
tinuing French concern that the Indian Ocean not
be left solely to US and Soviet domination. In
April of this year, Paris sent a squadron of three
ships to the Indian Ocean for a cruise of about
six months. The carrier-led force apparently will
replace the squadron now on patrol, suggesting that
Paris intends to maintain an increased naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean.
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Top Secret
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