THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992891
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 30, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900280001-8
The President's Daily Brief
30 September 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
30-September 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
An eleventh-hour decision to cancel the National
Day banquet suggests that the current political un-
certainties in China remain unresolved. (Page 1)
/Soviets
(Page 2)
Soviet leaders again urge Mrs. Gandhi to act cau-
tiously in dealing with the tense situation on the
subcontinent. (Page 3)
\Jap an/
/ (Page 4)
The Cambodian Government may not renew the National
Assembly's mandate when it expires next month.
(Page 5)
\ Argentina/
-(Page 6)
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COMMUNIST CHINA
An eleventh-hour decision to cancel tonight's ban-
quet (traditionally held on the eve of National Day.)
suggests that the current political uncertainties
are unresolved.
The thesis that the prolonged power struggle between
moderate and radical forces on the politburo has
produced fractures within the leadership is being
reinforced by Jack Chen, an "unofficial" publicist
of Peking's line in Hong Kong. According to the US
Consulate General, Chen is advising Western journal-
ists to focus on the possibility of leadership
changes as the cause for the unusual developments
in China rather ?than on speculation about death or
illness at the top.
There are no indications of a deterioration of se-
curity in Chinal
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USSR
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USSR-INDIA
The key message of Soviet leaders to Mrs.
Gandhi during talks in Moscow on 27-29 September
was that she act with restraint in dealing with the
tense situation on the subcontinent. Kosygin's
luncheon speech and the final communique both indi-
cate the Soviets, although taking the Indian side,
clearly have not abandoned their policy of trying
to prevent another Indo-Pakistani war. Mrs. Gandhi,
for her part, reiterated India's opposition to war
as-a,means of resolving the refugee problem and
pleaded for concerted international assistance to
help India cope with the influx. She went on, how-
ever, to remind the Soviet leaders that "peace can-
not be obtained by waiting and hoping."
The communiqug issued at the end of the visit
featured a joint Soviet-Indian "demand" that the
West Pakistanis take "urgent measures to reach a
political solution" to the problem with East Bengal".
The language of the demand is not much
different from the appeal made to Yahya
by President Podgorny last April and hence
must strike the Indians as old hat.
Another important topic likely to have been
taken up during Mrs. Gandhi's visit is China. Just
prior to Mrs. Gandhi's departure from New Delhi,
Moscow sent a special envoy to New Delhi to discuss
future Soviet and Indian strategy at the UN.
Moscow is interested in counting on India's
cooperation against China when Peking enters the
UN.
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JAPAN
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CAMBODIA
Sink Matak has told Ambassador Swank that the
government is thinking of.doing- without the National
Assembly. Matak said the assembly's mandate may not
be renewed after it expires in mid-October because
the eXeCutive-branch is tired of the legislature's
opposition to its policies; concerned about its wide-
spread unpopularity-, and fed up with the corruption
of its members. Matak said the government .could
rule indefinitely by fiat by declaring a state of
national emergency-. The assembly's future will be
raised soon With chief of state Cheng Heng. He has
the sole:authority for prolonging its mandate.
The military establishment appears to be
supporting the move to dismiss the assem-
bly, and .Lon Nol no doubt shares Matak 's
views. f
Unless the government makes fresh promises
of early elections or other steps to renew
its mandate, an assembly dismissal could
alienate political reformists who viewed
Sihanouk 's ouster as paving the way for
more representative government. Wide-
spread popular opposition to dismissal is
not thought likely, however.
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NOTE
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