THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 NOVEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992952
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 3, 1971

Declassified inPart - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100030001-1
The President's Daily Brief
3 November 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 November 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
President Yahya says he will agree to withdraw Pak-
istani forces unilaterally from their forward posi-
tions. (Page 1)
Prime Minister Sato has taken a much more flexible
line on China since the passage of the Albanian
resolution. (Page 2)
A new Soviet decree states that the output of
selected consumer goods will rise by 90 percent in
the next five years. (Page 3)
A high West German official has provided the most
explicit statement to date of Bonn's position on
mutual force reductions. (Page 4)
The Jordanians are considering seeking a united
Arab call for UN sanctions against Israel on the
Jerusalem issue. (Page 5)
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
President Yahya told Ambassador Farland:yeSter-
day.that- he would agree to withdraw his forces uni?
laterally from their forward'positions. No specif-
ics:of a withdrawal_were_discussedi but he added
that "this doesn't mean that I would pull the troops,
back into the barracks.."
Yahya undoubtedly hopes to encourage US
pressure on Prime Minister Gandhi to take
similar action. Although Indian Foreign
Minister Singh said that
New Delhi would consider withdrawing if
the Pakistanis pulled their troops back,
Defense Minister Ram has committed him-
self publicly that there will be no with-
drawal as long as the East Bengal problem
remains unsolved.
The Pakistanis would find it far easier to
withdraw on the western, frontier than in
the East, where border clashes with guer-
rillas or Indian forces occur daily.; If
Yahya envisaged.returning the troops to
their peacetime stations in. the West;
some, of these posts, are' less than 20 miles
from the border and the troops'could.re-
turn in a matter of hours;
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JAPAN-CHINA
With the resolution of the China issue in the
United Nations, Prime Minister Sato has publicly
stated that Japan. wishes to begin official negotia--
tionsleading to recognition of the Peoples Republic.
He intends to dispatch a-high-level Liberal Demo-
cratic Party emissary to Peking to pave the.way for
a.visit-by either himself or Foreign Minister FukUda.
The ruling party's. executive board has reached agree-
ment on -a resolution which:acknowledges that the
Peoples Republic represents. China.
In the past week Sato has soundedmuch more
flexible on China relations: In a Diet debate the
day after the UN_vote.he-made what the press termed
the firstformal apology.by-Japarifor its wartime
actions on the.mainland an&said.that Peking need
have?no fear of a Japanese militaristic revival.
Two days ago Sato admitted that the logical justifi-
cation-for the 1952 Japan ? Republic of China.Peace
Treaty had crumbled with the UN General Assembly's
passage of the Albanian Resolution. While he stated
flatly that his government would not abrogate the
treaty as a precondition for negotiations with the
Chinese Communists, both.he and Fukuda have
pressed-A willingness to consider the treaty .a mat-
ter for discussion with them..
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USSR
A new party and government decree states that
the output of selected consumer goods will rise by
90 percent during the period 1971-1975. It also
stresses the need to improve the quality and vari-
ety of such goods. Enterprises are to be prevented
from cutting production of "items in great demand,"
and the performance of those producing mainly non-
consumer items is to be measured, to a considerable
extent, by their production of consumer goods. The
decree also provides for the creation of .a reserve
fund to subsidize the production of those consumer
items "having a comparatively low profitability."
The traditional Soviet emphasis has been
on heavy industry, and prices and incen-
tives have been tailored toward this goal.
Consumer goods production has suffered ac-
cordingly. The new decree represents
Party Chief Brezhnev's attempt to fulfill
a promise he made at the 24th party con-
gress last spring that a program on con-
sumer goods would be forthcoming. As
have previous--and unsuccessful?Soviet
efforts to, satisfy the consumer without
reordering basic economic priorities, it
relies on direct administrative control
of the enterprise rather than on such
economic levers as a more rational price
system.
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WEST GERMANY
In a conversation with:Ambassasor Rush late last
week, State Secretary. Frank provided the. most ex-
plicit statement of the Weat_German poSition on-mu-
tual force reductions to date.- Bonn's most important
divergence with Washington, he said, is the belief
that the opening phase of.negotiations should seek
agreement on general:principles and on constraining
troop movements rather than on immediate reductions.
In addition,-Bonn.believes that the geographic area
of the reduction must extend beyond the two Germanies,
and that, at some stage reductions of indigenous, as
well asforeign, troops must be included.
We see increasing signs that the Germans
are coming to share French and British
skepticism that mutual force reductions
could accord with European defense inter-
ests. Bonn also appears concerned that
Washington's interest in negotiations on
force reductions might be dictated by
domestic pressures for unilateral with-
drawal of large numbers of US troops from
Europe.
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UN-JERUSALEM
The Jordanians are ,mulling over the possibility
of. seekinga united Arab call for UN sanctions
against Israel,On the Jerusalem issue, according to
several high Jordanian officials. This would be
done. at a meeting of Arab foreign ministers sched-
uled to be held in Cairo on 13 November.
Two considerations appear to dominate Amman's
thinking. One is that failure to initiate the.move.
on sanctions could result in yieldingleadership on,
this subject to Syria. Jordan also is concerned
about Peking's ability to stir Arab animosity toward
King Husayn's government. Taking the strong line
on sanctions would, according to the Jordanians,
result in more Arab-support.and.reduce any immediate
impact of activity by Peking.
Ambassador Brown suggests that Amman this time
may well be willing to risk the prospect of a US
veto on sanctions and force the matter to a vote in
the Security Council.
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CYPRUS
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NOTE
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Top Secret
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