THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 JUNE 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007974
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 4, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
June 4, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of CO. 11652
exemption category 513(1
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
,P
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
June 4, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Sizable numbers of North Vietnamese and Chinese
troops are still in Laos although today is the dead-
line for the withdrawal of all foreign military per-
sonnel and the return of all prisoners of war.
(Page 1)
Bonn is concerned that growing opposition in Italy
to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may make it
difficult for West Germany to complete the formal
process of ratifying the treaty. (Page 2)
\ India/
(Page 3)
Notes on the annual trade agreement between the USSR
and China
Pacific appear on Page 3.
At Annex, we examine the reasons for the continued
presence of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese in
Laos, reactions of the non-communists to their pres-
ence, and the tactics the Communists are likely to
employ in the months ahead.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LAOS
A 60-day countdown for the withdrawal of all
foreign military personnel from Laos and the return
of all prisoners of war, which began on April 5, ends
today, but only the US and Thailand have complied.
An estimated 47,000 North Vietnamese troops and some
23,000 Chinese forces remain, and show no sign of
leaving. No prisoners have been exchanged, and there
is little prospect of their early release.
At Annex, we examine the reasons for the con-
tinued presence of the North Vietnamese and the Chi-
nese, non-communist reactions to their presence, and
the tactics the Communists are likely to employ in
the months ahead.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMAWY - ITALY
An official of the West German foreign office
has told the US embassy of Bonn's concern that grow-
ing opposition in Italy to the nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty may make it difficult for West Germany
to complete the formal process of ratifying the
treaty. Bonn may hope that the US will take fresh
steps to try to persuade the Italian government to
push for early ratification.
According to the West German, a senior Italian
official recently noted that the Indian nuclear test
has reduced the likelihood of Italian parliamentary
approval of the treaty. The Italian position is fur-
ther complicated, he said, by the fact that other
Mediterranean states, including Israel, Egypt, Libya,
Algeria, and Spain, have not signed.
Although the Italians apparently have no present
plans to join the nuclear club, Italian political
leaders evidently feel that a formal commitment to
ban the development of nuclear weapons would now be
politically unwise. The Rumor government now intends
to delay asking parliament to ratify the treaty.
?The West German Bundestag ratified the treaty
in February after receiving assurance from the Brandt
government that all its EC partners except France
were also prepared to ratify. Bonn decided to delay
the deposit of instruments of ratification, however,
until its European allies, especially Italy, demon-
strated that they too were making progress toward
ratification.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
India:
USSR-China: The recently signed annual trade
agreement between the USSR and China calls for a
total trade level of more than $345 million, compared
with $270 million last year--an increase of nearly
30 percent. Trade, however, is still far below the
record $2 billion registered in 1959. According to
a Soviet broadcast, exports from the USSR will con-
sist primarily of aircraft and generating equipment.
Most of China's exports will be raw materials, agri-
cultural products, and consumer goods.
USSR: The recently completed Soviet naval exer-
cises in the Norwegian Sea and northwestern Pacific
featured intensive anti-submarine and anti-carrier
operations, but no submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles were fired from the Norwegian Sea as had been
expected.
Late last month, Soviet
naval forces also exercised in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, and naval aircraft temporarily based in Cuba
and Guinea flew four reconnaissance missions in the
north Atlantic.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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NVA and Chinese Remaining in Laos
Muotag
Under
construction
I Nam
Aliaco 0
1T'
GULF
OF -
TONKIN
ARCA TION
LINE
Savannakhe
?
o.
THAILAND
VIETNAM
Chinese built roads
(23,000 Chinese engineer and
road construction forces)
. NVA combat units
(Location of major NVA regimental
combat units is approximate.)
Predominantly communist-controlled area
MILES
555675 6-74 CIA.
CAMBODIA
-..---Noncort.runist
enclave
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
F
Sizable numbers of North Vietnamese and Chinese
troops are still in Laos today--the deadline for the
withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and the
return of all prisoners of war. These troops show no
sign of leaving; no prisoners have been exchanged,
and there is little prospect of their early release.
Hanoi has recalled only one major unit since
the 60-day countdown for withdrawal began on April
5. Remaining in Laos are an estimated 47,000 North
Vietnamese troops (18,000 in infantry/combat support
units and 29,000 in rear services). Of this total,
37,000 troops--including four combat infantry regi-
ments--are in central and southern Laos, while 10,000--
including two combat infantry regiments--are in north-
ern Laos. Approximately three fourths of the North
Vietnamese personnel are concerned primarily with
supporting Hanoi's war effort in South Vietnam by
keeping supplies and personnel moving along the east-
ern Lao infiltration corridor.
Chinese in Laos
The provisions of the Lao accords on foreign
troop withdrawal did not specify nationality. Pe-
king's military presence was conspicuously ignored
by both Lao sides throughout the protracted negotia-
tions. Nevertheless, there are an estimated 23,000
Chinese engineer and road construction forces cur-
rently in northwest Laos. The Chinese have withdrawn
some 10,000 troops--including virtually all of their
infantry and air defense personnel--since the cease-
fire went into effect in February 1973. No depar-
tures have been noted, however, since the coalition
government was formed on April 5.
The Chinese are primarily concerned with general
maintenance and road repair activity--although some
limited new construction on their 300-mile road net
is apparently under way.
(continued)
Al
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Why the North Vietnamese and Chinese Stay
Given the high priority Hanoi assigns to. main-
taining a flow of troops and supplies to South Viet-
nam, there was little likelihood of significant with-
drawals of North Vietnamese logistic and engineer
forces from the Lao infiltration corridor. The North
Vietnamese have spent much time and effort. developing
the Ho Chi Minh trail route structure into a dual-
lane all-weather road net down most of the central .
and southern Lap panhandle. As long as the fighting
continues in Vietnam and despite the development. of.
a parallel corridor in western South Vietnam, Hanoi
will not be likely to abandon its road net in eastern
Laos.
The North Vietnamese are apparently also deter-
mined to maintain a limited main-force combat pres-
ence in Laos as insurance against potential rightist
military moves against so-called "liberated areas"
or against the new coalition government itself.
Hanoi, in addition, evidently plans to continue to
train, advise, and provide some logistic support to
the Pathet Lao at least until convinced their Lao
Communist clients can hold their own against the Lao
.army and do reasonably well in future general elec-
tions
The Pathet Lao, for their part, have shown no
interest, in having the North Vietnamese leave. They
probably welcome a continued North Vietnamese pres-
ence to help them protect their political and mili-
tary interests under the new coalition.
As for the Chinese, Peking plainly intends to.
maintain an influence in Laos--partly through. diplo-
matic activity in Vientiane--but also through road-
building activities in the northwest. Although vir-
tually all of Peking's combat forces have left Laos,
the 23,000 engineer and support troops who remain are
regular armed members of the People's Liberation Army.
The Chinese may consider their forces a useful coun.-.
terweight to the substantial numbers of North Viet-
namese troops in Laos, or they may see them as a
contribution to the Pathet Lao cause parallel to
that made by Hanoi.
Communist Public Postures on Withdrawal
Lao Communist officials in .the new coalition
government deny the presence of North Vietnamese
forces in Laos.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Communists are trying to shift attention on
the troop withdrawal issue to the US and Thailand.
Thenational political program which Pathet Lao
leader Prince Souphanouvong recently pushed through
the coalition's Joint National Political Council
calls upon Washington and Bangkok to stop their "in-
terference, aggression, and military involvement in
Laos."
There is also a marked increase in Communist
propaganda attacks charging the US and Thailand with
violating the 1962 and 1973 Lao accords. The Commu-
nists particularly cite as violations US reconnais-
sance overflights. Recent broadcasts from Hanoi and
the Viet Cong, as well as from the Pathet Lao, have
demanded that the US military be withdrawn not only
from Laos but especially from bases in Thailand.
Non-Communist Reactions
Prime Minister Souvanna apparently is .not overly
concerned at this Stage with North_ Vietnam'.s continued
military presence in Laos. He has pointed out on
several occasions that there.is little that the non-
Communists can do to eject Hanoi's troops from por-
tions of the Lao interior or to prevent their use of
the eastern trail network--particularly since these
areas lie within the Pathet Lao - controlled zone.
Souvanna probably is even less ,disturbed over
the Chinese presence. Given his. strong desire to
maintain good relations 'with Peking the Prime Minis.-
ter is unlikely to exert pressure on the Chinese road-
builders.
Withdrawal Inspection. Machinery Founders
Under the terms of the Lao .accords, the:military
committee of the two-party Joint Central' Commission
to Implement, the Agreement--assisted by the Interna-
tional Control Commission--is charged with. inspecting
and verifying foreign troop withdrawals. The Lao.
Communists, however, have blocked the development of
any effective inspection procedures
Prisoner Issue:
The Pathet Lao admit to holding .only one Ameri-
can prisoner, a civilian contract pilot who was cap-
tured on May 7, 1973.- Another four Americans are. be-.
lieved to have 'been captured in Laos prior to the
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February 1973 cease-fire agreement, and some. 314 are
listed as missing in action. Between. 500 and .700
Thai volunteers and a small number of Thai civilians
formerly employed by US contractors are believed to
be in -Pathet Lao hands.
The-non-communist side holds an estimated 135
North Vietnamese captives. Neither Lao side has ad-
mitted to holding any Lao prisoners.
The Communists' failure to release any. prisoners
prior to the June 4 deadline supports earlier indi-
cations that they intend to use the issue to force
changes in US and Thai policy toward Laos.
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