THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 JUNE 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993343
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 8, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
8 Tune 1972
17
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
8 June 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
_I Page 1. The military situation in South
Vietnam remains essentially unchanged.
Intercommunal talks on Cyprus reopen today, but
prospects for success seem slim. (Page 3)
At Annex we discuss some of the problems Pakistani
President Bhutto faces on the domestic scene and
in seeking a settlement with India.
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VIETNAM
(continued)
1
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Demilitarized Zone
Capital Special Zone
?10 10-
South
China
Sea
Gulf of
Thailand
104
553201 6-72
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
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*
The North Vietnamese are withdrawing portions
of their air defense system from the general vicinity
of the DMZ. Recent intercepts indicate that ele-
ments of three SAM regiments are moving north. One
regiment appears to be shifting north within North
Vietnam's southernmost Quang Binh Province, a sec-
ond has moved elements to the Vinh area, and parts
of a third have moved still farther north to Thanh
Hoa Province.
The military situation remains essentially un-
changed, although increased combat activity is being
reported from the Cambodian border provinces north-
west of Saigon.
Brief but' sharp clashes are continuing in Hau
Nghia Province, particularly around Trang Bang,
where the Communists have established several block-
ing points on Route 1. In nearby Tay Ninh Province,
enemy-initiated actions are now at the highest level
since the Communist offensive began. To the east,
in Binh Long Province, elements
are keeping pressure on the South Vietnamese units
attempting to relieve the defenders of An Loc. Com-
munist shelling of An Loc has increased recently,
but there are no signs that new ground attacks are
in the offing.
Elsewhere in South Vietnam, combat activity
centered around a new government ground attack into
Quang Tri Province and continuing clearing operations
in the central highlands. South Vietnamese forces
have reported good progress in clearing the remain-
ing pockets of resistance from the northern limits
of Kontum City, but continue to be stymied, however,
in their efforts to open Route 14 between Kontum
and Pleiku.
2
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CYPRUS
Intercommunal talks resume today in Nicosia
after a nine-month lapse. For the first time repre-
sentatives of Greece, Turkey, ?and the UN will par-
ticipate, in addition to spokesmen for the island's
Greek and Turkish communities.
The talks recessed last September after
three years of futile attempts to agree
on how much the Turkish Cypriot minority
should participate in the government and
how much autonomy the Turks should have.
The new format for the talks resulted
from efforts by Ankara and Athens to break
the deadlock, although the hassle over
President Makarios' importation of Czech
arms last winter further delayed the re-
sumption.
There is little to suggest that these
talks will make any more progress than
the earlier ones, for Makarios still seems
intent on withholding real political power
from the Turkish community and an atmos-
phere of trust necessary for mutual con-
cessions is lacking. As long as the talks
last, however, they should help keep in-
tercommunal tensions down.
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PAKISTAN
In his six months as Pakistan's President, Z. A.
Bhutto has maneuvered adroitly to balance conflicting
political pressures. He has not yet, however, come
to grips with the country's basic problems, the most
pressing of which is to obtain a settlement with
India. This mainly involves arranging for India to
withdraw its troops from Pakistani territory and to
release some 94,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. Un-
less Bhutto can achieve this, he will face continued
pressure from the army and the prisoners' families,
and he will be forced to find some place to settle
about a million refugees from the areas occupied by
Indian forces last December. These refugees have
not posed a serious problem thus far, but the longer
their return home is delayed, the more likely they
are to cause trouble.
Bhutto has tried to prepare the Pakistanis for
the price that will have to be paid for an agreement
with India. He has had some success. Recognition
of Bangladesh--once unthinkable--is no longer an is-
sue, although Bhutto intends to use it as a bargain-
ing point with both the Indians and Bengalis. Bhutto
has shifted the government's long-standing policy on
Kashmir. He now claims it is the responsibility of
the Kashmiris themselves, rather than the Pakistanis,
to end the Indian occupation, and Bhutto proposed
easing conditions along the 1945 cease-fire line.
On the other hand, neither Bhutto nor the Pakistani
people yet appear willing to acknowledge formally
New Delhi's claim that Indian-occupied Kashmir is
part of India. Nor is Bhutto in a position to ac-
quiesce in the trial of any significant number of
prisoners of war for alleged "war crimes" in Bangla-
desh. Should Mrs. Gandhi transfer POWs to Dacca for
such trials, the pending summit talks could easily
break down.
If Bhutto were to fail in his efforts in New
Delhi, he would most likely seek to absolve himself
by placing all the blame on Mrs. Gandhi. Without a
settlement, however, he would come under greater
pressure to maintain a "credible deterrent" against
Hindu expansionism, and to divert limited resources
from social and economic programs to defense. Over
the long run, an attempt to maintain a large mili-
tary force without extensive outside assistance could
have serious economic effects.
(continued)
Al
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Even if he does achieve a badly needed settle-
ment with India, Bhutto still faces serious domestic
difficulties. Although he has taken bold initiatives
in some areas, his reforms have alienated elements of
the population without fully satisfying the expecta-
tions of his supporters. The announcement of his os-
tensibly sweeping land reform program was well re-
ceived, but many peasants are bound to be disappointed.
The law contains loopholes intended to appease the
powerful landowning families, and, in any case, there
is not enough land to give each peasant what he
thinks is his due.
Bhutto's labor and industrial policies have been
even less successful. Many laborers assumed that
with "their man" Bhutto in power, there would be ma-
jor changes in the industrial sector favorable to
their interests. These expectations have precipi-
tated many strikes and demonstrations. His early
moves, such as placing some industries under govern-
ment control and jailing a few members of the 30 or
so families that reputedly control most of Pakistan's
wealth, were widely popular. He has since resolved
his differences with the industrialists, however,
and any major nationalization program apparently has
been abandoned. At the same time, Bhutto has been
careful to avoid dealing harshly with labor unrest.
Although he has the power to end most strikes quickly,
in practice he has rarely taken action against the
workers. Eventually, Bhutto faces a difficult choice:
giving in to workers' demands, with considerable
risk of damaging the economy, or getting tough with
the workers at some cost to his political support.
Bhutto has also been unable to resolve his
problems with the opposition. The provincial gov-
ernments of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier
are controlled by a coalition headed by Wall Khan's
National Awami Party. Although potentially seces-
sionist, the NAP currently is more interested in at-
taining provincial autonomy and becoming a political
force nationally by winning over leftists who now
support Bhutto. Bhutto has temporarily avoided a
confrontation by maneuvering the opposition into ap-
proving his interim constitution in order to avoid
appearing to favor continued martial law. Neverthe-
less, he faces the risk of serious unrest along the
frontier unless a relationship between the provinces
and the central government acceptable to the NAP can
be worked out.
(continued)
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Ultimately, Bhutto's success in keeping seces-
sionist tendencies in check is likely to depend on
his ability to master his other problems. As long
as he appears firmly in the saddle and there are
signs of economic progress, the Baluchis and the
Pathans are not likely to press their demands.
Should Bhutto falter, however, the centrifugal pres-
sures that have always existed in Pakistan may again
come into play.
Not the least of Bhutto's problems is his con-
tinuing vulnerability to military pressure. Even
?
though he has removed the ambitious officers who
helped him to power, the military still poses a
threat to his regime. There is still much dissatis-
faction within the military over his reform programs
and his conduct of foreign policy. Military leaders
may feel compelled to step in once again if they be-
come convinced that Bhutto intends to move against
officer-class interests or if he permits a breakdown
of law and order.
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