THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014841
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 5, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
July 5, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5E1(1),(2),(3)
declassified on161 on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
ir A
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July 5, 1975
' Table of Contents, ?
USSR: Party chief Brezhnev lobbied vigorously for
Soviet policies during a two-hour meeting last
week with visiting US Senators. (Page 1)
Cambodia: Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak is travel-
ing abroad; this is the regime's initial foray
on the international scene. (Page 3)
Indonesia: The key judgments of a National Intelli-
gence Estimate', Prospects. for Indonesia, are
presented. (Page 4)
Notes: Israel; Lebanon; EC-Israel; North Korea
(Pages 6 and 7)
At Annex
nesia.
Indo- 25X1
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USSR
Party chief Brezhnev lobbied vigor-
ously for Soviet policies during a two-
hour meeting last Wednesday with visiting
US Senators. He clearly was out to im-
press them with Soviet reasonableness
and occasionally distorted the record
to serve that end.
Brezhnev noted that both he and Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko would meet with Secretary Kissinger
next week. He also spoke favorably of you and
said that he was looking forward to seeing you at
a European Security Conference summit and in Wash-
ington.
Brezhnev devoted most of his remarks to secu-
rity topics, reiterating the recent Soviet theme
that after CSCE the sides should proceed toward
detente in the military field. He praised the
Vladivostok understanding on strategic arms limita-
tion as a good beginning, but expressed regret that
there had been no agreement restricting new weapons
development.
He illustrated the possibilities in this area
by recounting a bilateral discussion last year
about canceling the US Trident and B-1 programs
in return for Soviet cancellation of the "Typhoon"
submarine and the development of an "IL-22" air-
craft, The Soviets have made vague references to
a "Typhoon" submarine before, but this is the first
mention of an "IL-220" The Soviets have claimed
before to have a B-1 type bomber under development,
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It is possible that Brezhnev is bluffing about both
the "Typhoon" and the "IL-22."
Brezhnev also mentioned his proposal of June 13
to ban new types of weapons, saying that he was not
referring to any new Soviet development, but rather
to weapons like the B-1 bomber and others that
scientists may invent in the future,
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Brezhnev claimed that the USSR had proposed
a complete nuclear test ban or, alternatively, a
lower threshold than would be agreed to by the US.
He criticized recent large US nuclear tests, and
complained of US encirclement of the Soviet Union
with nuclear bases, which he said, the US refused
to discuss at SALT. He criticized Secretary
Schlesinger for dispatching two new divisions to
West Germany and took the Senate to task for ap-
proving "enormous" military budgets.
Brezhnev said little about bilateral trade
but, like the other Soviet officials who talked
with the Senators, he ?gave few signs of flexibility
on the Jewish emigration issue. He hewed to the
standard line that emigration is down because fewer
Jews want to leave the USSR. He also repeated the
fallacious claim that exit permission is withheld
only in cases where state secrets might be jeopard-
ized. Although Brezhnev was careful not to rule
out completely an increase in the number of emi-
grants, expressions of Congressional interest in
compromise were ignored. Moscow's unwillingness
even to feign a more cooperative position on a
subject of prime ?concern to the delegation stands
in contrast to its efforts to put a conciliatory
gloss on other issues.
The Soviet decision to stand pat on emigration
at this time suggests ?that the leadership is under
pressure from within the party to maintain a hard
line. The Soviet decision last December to reject
the terms of US trade legislation came amid reports
of such pressure, and the Soviets since then have
been consistently recalcitrant on this subject. In
addition, Moscow may believe that it cannot afford
to bow to Congressional persuasion regardless of
Soviet interest in winning friends among the legis-
lators.
The Soviets also may interpret the Senators'
talk of compromise as reflecting erosion of Con-
gressional support for continued curbs on bilateral
trade and credits. Moscow's position seems to be
that the next step is up to the US Congress and
that the US should expect no Soviet commitment
regarding emigration before there is new legisla-
tion.
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CAMBODIA
Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak's cur-
rent trip to Albania, Yugoslavia, a num-
ber of African countries, and the Middle
East is the new Cambodian regime's ini-
tial foray on the international scene.
Public announcements of Chhak's stops contain
little ?information.
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INDONESIA
The following are the key judgments
of a National Intelligence Estimate, Pros-
pects for Indonesia, June 30, 1975.
Indonesia has good prospects for economic
growth over the next five years. Oil revenues, pri-
vate foreign investment, and foreign aid will per-
mit continued development and diversification of
domestic production capacity, although weaknesses
in the indigenous institutional framework could slow
the process.
Some of the benefits of progress--a stabilized
currency, higher levels of production, rising in-
comes, greater availabilities of consumer goods,
improved communications, and new employment oppor-
tunities--are filtering down to the general popula-
tion, although the extent is far from clear. But
socio-economic problems, of which population pres-
sure is the most intractable, remain very serious
indeed.
Moreover, development itself has been height-
ening social tension--undermining tradition-
sanctioned economic relationships and procedures,
destabilizing rural society, stimulating people to
move to the cities in numbers that strain social
services and exceed employment opportunities,
heightening aspirations beyond the possibilities
of fulfilling them, and underlining the greatly
increased disparities between the conspicuous and
corruption-fed consumption of the few and the con-
tinued poverty of the many.
Over the period of this estimate, festering
social problems will provide rallying cries for
the politically disaffected. These now include
virtually all of the politically significant ci-
vilian elements--party politicians, students, in-
tellectuals, and most important of all, the Mus-
lims--all of whom expected to play a more important
role in post-Sukarno Indonesia.
Instead, increasingly their activities have
been restricted by even more pervasive and effec-
tive controls than existed before the military as-
sumed power. Opposition or potential opposition
groups are, however, weak, divided, without widely
attractive leaders, and incapable of effective
challenge to a united military.
(continued)
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At present, there are no serious challenges
to military unity. If this remains the case, the
Suharto government will be able to maintain itself
in control. There are fissures, however, within
the military that could become more important with
time.
Dissatisfaction with Suharto's leadership
could result in his displacement. But if this
represented a general consensus, it would not nec-
essarily be destabilizing and would probably re-
sult in little more than a change in the cast of
characters at the top.
Greater changes could result from the break-
down of consensus among more or less evenly balanced
factions, seeking to exploit civilian grievances
in the struggle for power. A change of government
precipitated by serious social upheaval could bring
to the fore a puritanical, ultranationalist mili-
tary reform movement that might well be hostile to
continued foreign investment and to a free enter-
prise economy.
Economic hardship, especially in Java, social
dislocations in urban and rural areas, and politi-
cal frustrations could combine to produce a massive
and uncontrollable breakdown of public order. Dur-
ing the period of this estimate violence on this
scale is unlikely.
There is a good chance, however, that a com-
bination of events and forces will precipitate
limited but still serious political disorders.
Even under these circumstances if the military
remains united, they will be able to maintain
'control. .
Indonesia will probably continue to lean to-
ward the US and the West. It will focus its for-
eign and security policy on the Southeast Asian
region where, its leaders believe, Indonesia is
destined to play the principal role.
The other ASEAN states, however, do not auto-
matically accept Indonesian leadership. There are
lingering suspicions ?that Jakarta's regional model
is merely a subtler form of Sukarno's grand design
for Indonesian regional hegemony. And, as its
neighbors recognize, Jakarta for some time to come
will be unable to provide practical underpinnings
for its regional proposals or assume significant
responsibilities in the area.
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NOTES
Israel
Lebanese security authorities announced yester-
day morning that mop-up operations against pockets
of radicals had been completed and that Beirut had
returned to "normal."
The government is concerned that the upsurge
in kidnapings since the cease-fire., could.provoke
more fighting. Meanwhile, some leftist politicians,
led by Socialist chief Jumblatt, are becoming more
vocal in opposing Prime Minister Karami's new cab-
inet. The leftists are likely to confine their
opposition for the time being?to'peaceful protests.
The EC Nine are expected to agree on Monday
to help in heading off a possible Arab initiative
to suspend Israel from the UN General Assembly.
The EC members hope that a firm but low-key
approach will prove effective and that a confronta-
tion with the Arabs on this issue can be avoided.
(continued)
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North Korea
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NEPAL BHUTAN
CHINA
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AMBODIA
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SINGAPORE
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AUSTRALIA
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558152 6-75
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INDONESIA
Al
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(continued)
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Top Secret
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