THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 JULY 1976

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006015159
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RIPPUB
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T
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13
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date: 
July 9, 1976
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 The President's Daily Brief July 9, 1976 25X1 Top secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 513(1),(25,(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence a. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 L ; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 F nE, F IVE.LILLJEdIV 1 LAIN, July 9, 1976 Table of Contents Lebanon: Christian and Syrian forces seem to have gained the upper hand in the north. The Israelis evidently are contin- uing to take a relatively relaxed view of the situation. (Page 1) USSR: Our early July estimate of the Soviet grain crop, assuming normal weather, is 195 million metric tons. (Page 3) Ken a-U anda: Saudi Arabia - Syria: Saudi Arabia's first substantial aid pay- ment this year will help ease Syria's serious financial problems. (Page 6) Notes: Cuba; Hungary (Page 7) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 MEDITERRANEAN SEA BEIRUT Sidon DAMASCUS IA I AEL 620038-7-76 CIA ' MILES 20 0 KILOMETERS 20 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 L?i I.?==1 L_ ._ A 1.?.1 .1 .._ - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 A I," At 1 11 A-I .1. .1 V 1.-i UI l .1.-, .L- a A V A. %..." .L V 4....i 2. LEBANON: Christian forces, with Syrian sup- port, apparently have blunted the Palestinian and leftist offensive against Christian vil- lages in northern Leb- anon. The Palestinians' des- peration over the sit- uation at Tall Zatar apparently prompted charges yesterday from Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat that Syria is planning an imminent attack on Beirut. 25X1 The Christians reportedly regained Chekka and another village on 25X1 Wednesday and were able yesterday to take control of the main access route to the town of Zaqharta. In Beirut, heavy clashes continued yesterday in the central part of the city and in the suburbs sur- rounding Tall Zatar refugee camp. Muslim and Palestinian units try- ing to break the siege of Tall Za- tar evidently have begun sending "suicide squads" into neighboring Christian communities. Syrian troops and artillery have supported the attack on Tall Zatar, but there is no direct evidence that substantiates Arafat's claim. President Asad did meet with top Syrian military and political lead- ers on Wednesday, possibly to gain endorsement of a new initiative in Lebanon. 25X1 --continued 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 A V .1 1h. 1 11 A-d A A V A.1 ki I .L.'LJ1 VA VAN A.,/ A The Israelis apparently still believe that events in Lebanon pose no immediate threat to their security and are continuing their tacit endorsement of Syria's role there. In a recent conversation with the US ambassador, Israeli Defense Minister Peres--who is usually sus- picious of Syrian aims--cautiously indicated that Israel could toler- ate a consolidation of Syrian con- trol in Lebanon. According to Peres, this would be less damaging to Israel's security than a left- ist-Palestinian takeover. Peres also discounted speculation that President Asad is seeking to trans- form Lebanon into an anti-Israel confrontation state. The Israelis probably remain con- cerned, however, that Syria's mil- itary presence in Lebanon could ultimately work to Israel's disad- vantage. Prime Minister Rabin, for example, has repeatedly ex- pressed the view that Asad could eventually be forced by Arab and domestic pressures to reverse his course and seek an accommodation with the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists that would isolate the Christians. 25X1 Tel Aviv has long hoped that the Christians will be able to maintain25X1 a strong political position in or- der to prevent the Palestinians from osin a threat to Israel. --continued 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 _ ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 /' .1 .111:d I IX 0.11?/Ed .1 V.1 LJ1 V1--i .1 - USSR: Assuming normal weather, our early July estimate of the Soviet grain crop is 195 mil- lion metric tons--un- changed from the mid- June estimate. Later today the Department of Agriculture will pub- licly release a crop estimate of the same size. The actual crop could be substantially higher or lower depend- ing on the weather in the next month. Soviet grain require- ments are especially difficult to estimate this year because of the legacy of last year's disastrous harvest. We estimate that the winter grain crop, which will soon be harvested, will be 45 million metric tons. Crop conditions in most of the European USSR, the major winter grain area, remain unusually fa- vorable. Continuation of wetter- than-normal weather in the north- ern European USSR, could, however, cause delays and above-average losses. Overall prospects for spring grains continue to be good, and production is now estimated at 150 million tons. Conditions west of the Urals which favored winter grains also have fostered the development of spring grains. In contrast to the rather uniform crop development in this area, crop conditions east of the Urals are uneven in the main spring grain areas. Moscow's requirements will depend on the rate of rebuilding poultry and hog inventories, on the rate of recovery in meat production, and on the replenishment of grain stocks. More claims on Soviet grain supplies may come from East- ern Europe, especially Poland. Large increases in grain exports to Eastern Europe and in grain re- serves, as well as a rapid buildup of livestock herds, would require substantial additional grain im- ports. --continued 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 run I Ill, FIVEAJ.ILILL IV I l.1.1V L. _I There is no reliable in- formation on the likely scale of Soviet grain imports for the balance of the crop year. Bal- ance of payments con- siderations may be crit- ical. The large Soviet import contracts for grain and soybeans in recent months indicate that Moscow is giving high priority to rebuilding its livestock sector. So far, the Soviets have bought an estimated 13.6 million tons of grain for de- livery beginning this month. This figure includes 6.5 million tons from the US, 1.6 million tons of which was purchased during the past week. Under the US-Soviet grain agreement, there remains a minimum Soviet commitment of 2.2 million tons. The Soviets also have bought 2 mil- lion tons of soybeans, of which 1.5 million tons probably will come from the US. Outlays for grain and soybean pur- chases to date have reached nearly $3 billion. Moscow has shown a willingness, however, to continue spending heavily for grain imports despite its hard-currency deficit and growing indebtedness. Nonethe- less, it probably is increasingly concerned over these problems., --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 EAST AFRICA Lake Thea jibouti Gulf of Aden SUDAN Addis Abati;"" SOMALIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Lake Rudolf SOMA c-. Mogadisci Lake A 'berl ? kas n ambala KENYA Nairobi Lae 1 e N 4 BU UNDI Bujum ura INDIAN OCEAN Lake Altreru ke s, Hu TANZANIA Lake Tanganyika La ,ZAMB!A 82000_ 7.,76 CIA bares Salaam 200 Miles 200 Kilometers MOZAMBIQUE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Ii=1111 MOW LJt== - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 / ?LFIV LE: I v./ KENYA-UGANDA 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 --continued 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 L77:77 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 A F A IL A II A-I A A VU kJ A _L.! Li VA %..Z.LV L1 A 25X1 The Saudis had been withholding aid this year to underscore their displeasure over Syria's contin- uing dispute with Egypt. Damascus' willingness to reach even a super- ficial reconciliation with Cairo at the Saudi-sponsored meeting in Riyadh late last month obviously prompted Saudi approval of the new grant. The decision to provide assistance also reflects Riyadh's concern that Syrian President Asad's position has been seriously weakened by his political and military problems with Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. The Saudis' grant may reflect a decision to resume their assistance program for Syria. This would strengthen Damascus' capability to pursue its military campaign in Lebanon and its economic develop- ment programs at home. Riyadh's move could also encourage the smaller Persian Gulf states that often follow Saudi Arabia's lead to resume financial aid to Syria. Saudi assistance to Syria during 1975 exceeded $400 million; total Arab aid was approximately $800 million. --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 ? 1/It / // Li / /N../....ii..31/_/1:d/ V .1 L/1 V Li I A third convoy of Cuban ships probably return- ing troops from Angola is to lerneAfrica on JuZu 13, Hungary's increase in the prices of meat prod- ucts on Monday appar- ently provoked no ad- verse public reaction. NOTES Two of the ships in the convoy have carried troops previously. One is able to transport up to 700 troops and the other between 50(-25)(1 and 700 troops. If the ships ledve on schedule, they should arrive in Cuban waters in early August. The Hungarian success will compound Poland's embarrassment over its mishandling of proposed price hikes. Unlike Warsaw, Budapest has raised prices periodically on a number of food items without incident. The recent Hungarian price increases, however, were less drastic and covered fewer foodstuffs than those proposed in Poland. 7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010019-7