THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977859
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 19, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
19 December 1970
48
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
19 December 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in Poland is discussed on Page 1.
Highlights of the concluding Helsinki phase of SALT
are reported on Page 3.
On Page 43 we discuss a Vietnamese Communist article
which advocates a return to a more conventional war-
fare strategy.
They Egyptians are continuing to improve their radar
coverage west of Port Said and along the canal.
(Page 6)
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LOCATIONS OF DISTURBANCES IN POLAND
BALTIC
..1
1
(
EAST 1/4.
1
GERMANY)
1
1)
zczecin
16
SEA
25 5:D 75
STATUTE MILES
:Slup;k
Gdynia.
-Sopot!
. Poznan
.Wroclaw
20
.Katowice
Krakow
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Warsaw
HUNGARY
24
54-
USSR
50-
550722.12-70
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
POLAND
The trouble that broke out in Szczecin two days
ago is not completely over, but there have been
hints in local broadcasts that the curfew in the
city might be lifted this morning. Gangs of youths
were still roaming the city streets as of mid-after-
noon yesterday and a Swedish correspondent had re-
ported in the morning that tanks and armored cars
were used to disperse local crowds.
To the east, the cities of Gdynia and Sopot
apparently were quiet throughout the day yesterday
and the rioting of the previous night in Gdansk
seems to have abated with daylight. Many workers
in the tri-city area are still staying away from
their jobs, however, and normality has not yet been
fully restored.
New unrest was reported yesterday in Slupsk
and looting in Elblag was witnessed by a traveler.
Sit-down strikes occurred in two of Warsaw's largest
plants and in the firm that prints the main Commu-
nist Party daily, Trybuna Ludu. Disturbances or
strikes in Silesia were also suggested by the can-
cellation of flights to the area, by a break in
telecommunications with Katowice, and by an East
German intercept; some Polish troops in the area
were put on alert on 17 December.
Previously, Silesia has not been much af-
fected by the riots in the north. The
region, however, has been the scene of
several protests in recent months against
the regime's wage policies.
In addition, flights were canceled yesterday
to the cities of Poznan and Krakow, and the main
squares of Krakow and Wroclaw were cordoned off,
presumably to keep crowds from forming. College
students throughout the country are also being dis-
missed today, three days early, for the Christmas
holidays.
Although young peoplehave been seen in
the vanguard of Looters and arsonists,.
there has been little evidence of student
1
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involvement in the protests and riots.
The regime, however, is obviously taking
,no chances.
So far, there has been no indication that
factional differences in the party have
been a factor in the disruptions. If
trouble is prolonged, however, there will
be increased likelihood of factionalism
and of a search for scapegoats.
There is still no evidence that Soviet,
forces-in-either Poland; East Germany or
the. USSR have gone on alert. Adjacent
areas of East Germany were also reported
quiet yesterday by loaal'officials
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SALT
The second Helsinki phase of SALT ended yester-
day with little to show in the way of tangible pro-
gress, but with the Soviets doing their best to head
off any impression that the talks are stalemated.
In his final statement, Semenov cited "points of
contact" between the two sides as well as remaining
differences, and voiced the view that Helsinki II
marked a "useful stage" in SALT.
At the last senior advisers' meeting, which
took place on 17 December, the Soviet adviser noted
that he saw "movement" in Ambassador Smith's formula
of the previous day concerning forward-based systems
(FBS). In-an informal discussion after the 16 De-
cember plenary, one Soviet delegate said he did
not consider Smith's formal statement to be a final
rejection of the Soviet ABM-only proposal.
At the 17 December advisers' meeting, the
Soviets suggested that during the upcoming Vienna-
round the two sides focus on individual offensive
systems. In this connection, a US adviser tried
in vain to elicit Russian comment on the status of
SS-9 deployment. The most he could extract was one
Soviet remark that they may have something to say
on this at Vienna.
3
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
An article recently broadcast by the Viet
Cong radio and published in the Hanoi press
on 16 December contains the first call in
more than two years for Large-unit, quasi-
conventional military operations of the
kind that Hanoi pursued in the mid-60s and
that culminated in the Communist offen-
sives of 1968. This theme, once common-
place, has been muted since that time as
the Communists in South Vietnam adopted
Lower profile tactics. The new call comes
from the commander of Communist forces in
the South, a general officer who goes by
the pseudonym Tran Nam Trung.
Trung argues that large-unit pressure--
particularly the Tet offensive of 1968--
was instrumental in starting the US on the
path of disengagement, and that more such
pressure will be needed if the Communists
are to bring the war to a favorable con-
clusion. He seems to be saying that the
time is growing ripe to accelerate big-
unit warfare while maintaining guerrilla
and subversive action, both because allied
ranks are being thinned as a result of the
widened Indochina battlefield and the US
withdrawals and because the Communists
have gained "new allies" in Laos and Cam-
bodia. Trung's article, unlike other re-
cent Vietnamese Communist military com-
mentaries, does not dwell on the need to
preserve and rebuild local assets as the
base for a gradual return to Large-scale
combat. Instead, it argues that increased
military action will improve the climate
for recruitment and for both political and
guerrilla activity.
We are not certain what this sudden call
for a shift in strategy may indicate about
Hanoi's intentions. It could be one more
sign that Hanoi plans an intensified drive
4
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in Cambodia where much of the Communist
main force strength once targeted against
South Vietnam currently is based. Most
evidence suggests that the Communists will
focus their principal effort in Cambodia
for the next several months.
On the other hand, the Trung article is
cast largely in terms of the war in South
Vietnam, and it may mean that Hanoi has
decided it must pump more troops into the
South if the stronger allied position there
is to be reversed. The article could,
therefore, be intended to serve notice on
Communist commanders in the South that a
shift is in the wind. Before big-unit war-
fare could be stepped up, however, the Com-
munists would need from several months to
a year to re-establish their supply lines
to the far south and to move down more
troops and supplies from the North.
A third possibility, and one we are in-
clined to weigh more heavily than the
others, is that Trung's article represents
an opening shot in a renewed debate within
the Vietnamese Communist leadership over
the proper tactics for carrying on the war
at its present stage. In the past, similar
disagreements have often been reflected in
the Communist press, especially in the mid-
608 when the issues were how many North
Vietnamese troops should be committed and
how they should be used. If the Trung
article is indicative of renewed high-
level debate, it may not necessarily indi-
cate the prevailing view in Hanoi, and we
may before long see in the press more con-
servative articles about how the war should
be fought.
5
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New Egyptian Radar Surveillance Stations
LIBYA
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Recently installed
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550719 12-70 CIA
314
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EGYPT-USSR
The Egyptians are continuing to improve their
early warning radar coverage between Port Said and
Alexandria, and have extended this for the first
time to the Libyan border by installing a series of
air surveillance radars between Alexandria and As
Sallum.
This effort apparently is designed to
prevent the Israelis from circumventing
the Egyptian radar screen, as they did
in 1967, by flying over the Mediterranean
and approaching Cairo from the west.
In the Suez area, the Egyptians have erected a
line of at least seven low altitude surveillance
radars parallel to the canal and about eight miles
apart.
The function of these radars evidently is.
to detect Israeli penetrations at low
altitudes--a favored Israeli tactic.
The Egyptians are able to play a major
role in setting up and operating these
radars, but the Soviets are almost cer-
tainly providing advice and technical aid
as well as the equipment itself.
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NOTE
USSR-Cuba: The four Soviet vessels that ar-
rived in Havana earlier this week left port yester-
day. The guided-missile frigate and F-class diesel
submarine departed in the morning and headed west;
the submarine tender and oiler followed later in the
afternoon. The four ships have joined up and at
last report were proceeding on a westerly heading
about 50 nautical miles northwest of Havana.
7
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Top Secret
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