THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 DECEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466936
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 30, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
December 30, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 58(11,121,13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
December 30, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR-US: The USSR within the past few weeks has become less
negative about the future of Soviet-US relations. (Page 1)
Notes: USSR-Libya; USSR; China (Pages 2 and 3)
At Annex we present excerpts from the concluding section of an
interagency intelligence memorandum entitled "Peru and
Chile: Reassessment of the Potential for Conflict."
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USSR-US: The USSR
within the past few
weeks has become less
negative about the
future of Soviet-US
relations.
USA Institute Director Arbatov now
is taking the line that there is
reason for optimism on Soviet-US
ties and that the problems raised
during the US Presidential campaign
were "imaginary" and "unessential."
In English-language broadcasts on
Tuesday, he referred to US public
opinion polls strongly favoring
the policy of detente.
Several weeks ago Soviet media ap-
peared to be emphasizing that a
new administration in the US did
not necessarily mean progress for
Soviet-US relations. In an article
in Pravda on December 11, Arbatov
referred to a new skepticism in the
US about Soviet policy and con-
cluded that the effects of the US
campaign could complicate future
relations.
The Soviet media are treating more
evenhandedly certain members of the
new US administration who had been
heavily criticized, particularly
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Yesterday's
Pravda cited Brzezinski's support
for SALT. Other Soviet reporting
has noted President-elect Carter's
pledge to give "priority attention"
to strategic matters. Carter's sup-
port for a weapons freeze has been
called an example of a "positive
attitude" toward negotiations to
limit nuclear weapons.
Party chief Brezhnev, commenting
on future Soviet-US relations,
urged that a SALT II agreement be
concluded at the "earliest possible
date," according to a Tass report.
He credited Carter with an "under-
standing of the urgency" of the
problem, and appeared to link a
summit meeting with progress on
this issue. The mention by Tass
of a summit is particularly note-
worthy in view of the dearth of
such references in recent months.
--continued
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The F?class submarine
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The Libyan navy has ac-
quired its first subma-
rine, a Soviet-built F-
class torpedo attack
boat.
*
NOTES
The submarine, flying a Libyan
arL 25X1
rived in Tripoli on December 27.
flag)
Libya is only the second country,
after India, to receive the F-
class, the principal diesel-powered
torpedo attack submarine in the So-
viet navy.
We do not know whether the Libyans
are capable of operating their new
submarine without Soviet supervi-
sory personnel on board. They al-
most certainly will be unable to
maintain it without Soviet help.
Although Libyan naval personnel
have received submarine training
for about two years, the Soviets
have experienced problems in train-
ing them.
Libya has on order at least 24
ships, including about five more
F-class submarines, an unspecified
number of Osa guided-missile pa-
trol boats, six to ten French
guided-missile patrol boats, four
Italian missile corvettes, and sev-
eral Spanish-built submarines.
*
*
25X1
25X
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
*
An officer of China's
National People's Con-
gress, Chen I-sung, has
suggested that the US,
Japan, Europe, and China
should cooperate to op-
pose Soviet "hegemonism."
25X1
Initial press reports of the inter-
views Chen granted to Japanese news-
papers indicate that he also sug-
gested that the US could append to
documents normalizing relations
with China a statement that it was
concerned about peace in the west-
ern Pacific. Such a statement, ac-
cording to Chen, would serve to
allay US fears of a Chinese mili-
tary seizure of Taiwan.
Chen's comments are said to be per-
sonal views, but he is not likely
to discuss sensitive political is-
sues without some official guidance.
The significance of Chen's comments,
however, cannot be fully assessed
until full accounts of the inter-
views are available in Washington.
Before his defection from
Taiwan in 1973, he had been po-
litically active in a variety of
movements against the Taipei gov-
ernment and had a reputation for
political naivete.
Chen is in Tokyo on what appears
to be a personal visit. According
to press reports, he plans to
travel to the US.
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PERU-CHILE
We present here excerpts from the con-
cluding section of an interagency intel-
ligence memorandum entitled "Peru and
Chile: Reassessment of the Potential
for Conflict."
Peru's continuing faulty perception that Chile is
able and willing to wage war has made Peruvians feel
defensive, contributed to nationalistic sentiments,
and increased the possibility of a Peruvian miscal-
culation. Some Peruvian officers continue to be-
lieve that the US is secretly arming Chile.
Nevertheless, we do not believe that Peru or Chile,
particularly the latter, would initiate hostilities
in the next year. Chile probably would not attack
Peru under any circumstances.
With serious economic problems, both countries are
focusing heavily on domestic concerns and must cul-
tivate the good will of international trade and
finance groups. An accidental border conflict, as
opposed to deliberate attack or provocation, also
seems less likely than two years ago since each side
is aware of the risk and has taken steps to minimize
it.
We believe continued inability to resolve the Bolivian
corridor issue at present offers the most likely po-
tential cause of a breakdown in relations between Peru
and Chile. Moreover, as Peru continues to acquire
sophisticated military hardware and pursues its
plan to double the army's strength in the next two
years, the possibility for miscalculations will in-
crease.
The Chileans would not in our judgment seek a con-
frontation over the corridor but their recent re-
fusal to discuss the Peruvian counterproposal in-
dicates that neither will they permit Peru to impose
conditions. Some Chilean officers are in fact con-
vinced that the Soviet Union is encouraging Peru to
use the corridor issue to provoke a clash with Chile.
The increased importance of the Bolivian corridor
question raises the possibility of US involvement
as an arbiter. The 1929 treaty establishing the
--continued
Al
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Peru-Chile border stipulated that the US President
would settle any dispute over provisions of the
treaty. The US government was not a party to the
treaty and has never officially accepted the role of
arbiter, but this does not negate the possibility
that one or more parties might appeal to the Presi-
dent.
While it is evident that, out of mutual self-inter-
est, both Peru and Chile should welcome improved re-
lations, the particular issues separating them are
coupled with general notions of nationalistic pride.
Resolution of their differences is further compli-
cated by the positions of Bolivia and Ecuador.
Aside from the difficult corridor question, the
Bolivians are determined not to be victimized in
a Chilean-Peruvian clash and are acquiring new
weaponry to strengthen their defenses. They might
even join in the conflict if they thought they
could thereby secure an outlet to the sea.
The government of Ecuador is displeased with Peru's
refusal to renegotiate the boundary in the Amazon
region, and according to one report, might conceiv-
ably side with Chile in the later stages of any
clash with Peru, thus compelling the Peruvians to
fight on two fronts.
The arms buildup will continue throughout the area,
and miscalculation or misperception on the part of
Chile or Peru could conceivably lead to conflict.
Nevertheless, both sides remain defensive. There
appears to be little possibility that either country
will initiate hostilities over the next year.
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Top Secret
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