THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992584
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 13, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
13 April 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
13 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
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Thai army troops are encountering stiff resistance
from Communist insurgents neat the Lao border.
(Page 2)
The availability of foreign helicopters has buoyed
some spirits in Ceylon
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On Page 4 we discuss the situation in Pakistan.
France
(Page 5)
At Annex, we discuss the implications of the Soviet
Party Congress.
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CAMBODIA
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NORTH THAILAND: New Counterinsurgency Operation
AREA
OF
MAP
"Chiang Rai;
"?"Approitinia/te-
Area .of Operation
.6:vc ?
Irregular F.orcesXierig
..
.Lom Sak
Irldr4 Area of insurgent activity
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5511502 4-71 CIA" ?100
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THAILAND
At least-three army battalions, which have been
driving against Communist mountain strongholds in
.Chiang Rai Province near the Lao border since 1
April, have encountered stiff resistance from the
insurgents. The operation is aimed at eliminating
the Communists' base camps, but it is evidently not
going as smoothly as government leaders in Bangkok
had hoped.. the insur-
gents are much better equipped, trained and organ-
ized than anticipated, and that the army has already
sustained many casualties4.
For almost two years, Thai security forces
have been trying to establish a presence
in the northern border region, and the
current operation is the most ambitious
effort yet made. It is supported by air
and artillery units/
//It also represents a return to the
offensive strategy that Bangkok abandoned
following serious setbacks along the bor-
der in 1968 and 1969. The government,
however, is up against a Communist force
that has increased in numbers and equip-
ment in the past two years and that re-
tains the advantage of its familiarity
with local terrain to mount effective am-
bushes and harassing attacks on the gov-
ernment forces.
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INDIA
DELF I
ISLAND
PALK
BAY o
GULF
OF
. MANNA.R
Trincomalee BA Y
OF
BENGAL,
Putta lam
Batticaloa
Warikapola.
egalla
COLOMBO
013
551303 4-71
la 1, G.'
ambantota
A
INDIAN OCEAN
"CEYLON'
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CEYLON
yesterday that the situation was ready to. turn
infavor.of the government, although a long; hard
struggle still lies ahead. He is encouraged by the
availability of foreign helicopters to supplement.
Ceylon's inventory, of three. Two helicopters from
Pakistan and five from India, complete with:pilots
and ground crew, now are stationed at Colombo's air-
port, and 150 Indian troops-arrived yesterday to
guard the field.
Numerous clashes were reported yesterday, in-
cluding a firefight at Akuressa in southern Ceylon
in which 25 insurgents were killed. In an attempt.
to improve government control in the most seriously
affected areas, senior army officers have taken com-
mand of six of the island's 22 districts.
There continues to be a lack of cohesion within
the government. The lines ofspeeches last weekend
by government leaders were notably inconsistent. A
second civilian security 'organization is being hast-
ily organized under the direction of the moderate
Home Minister, Felix Bandaranaike, a nephew of the
prime minister's late husband. Composed of civiL
servants and unemployed youth, the new entity is in-
tended to supplement the police; improve popular
morale, and keep youth from joining the insurgents.
This is in addition to the security group
being put together by leaders of the Marx-
ist junior partners in Mrs Bandaranaike.'s
coalition, as mentioned in The President's
Daily Brief yesterday. Although the Home
Minister apparently approved this second
organization, which is planned for the
city of Colombo:alone, the existence of
the two security.auxiliaries is another
indication of divergence within the gov-
ernment. 4
3
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PAKISTAN-INDIA
There has been no significant change in the
military situation-. Government forces appear to be
concentrating on reopening land communications be-
tween Dacca and Jessore,in the west.
Peking has increased its verbal support for
the Pakistani government.
?Chou En-lai once again pledged China's firm support
of Pakistan's efforts to maintain its sovereignty
and independence, and accused the US, the Soviet
Union, and India of meddling in Pakistan's internal
affairs.
This is Peking's strongest support yet for
the idea of a united Pakistan, although it
does not commit the Chinese to any course
of action. The Chinese probably believe
that the Yahya government will be able to
contain the revolt, and that statements
of this sort will help fend off involve-
ment by other countries.
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NOTES
France:
South Vietnam: Vice President Ky has told
Robert Shaplen of The New Yorker. that he has made
an "irrevocable" de-EI'siarT to run against Thieu for
the presidency. He claims he has begun to assemble
a campaign staff and has secured pledges of over
$300,000. The statements of Ky, who has been up
and down on the question of his candidacy, may have
een prompted by his belief that Prime Minister
Khiem will be Thieu's running mate. Ky waffled
once before after assuring Shaplen that he had de-
cided to run, and it is quite possible he will do
so again.
Burma:
5
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THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
The 24th Party Congress was clearly Brezhnev's show.
He used it to promote his own image before the party
and the public and to bring several of his supporters
into the Politburo, but not to launch any major ini-
tiatives in either domestic or foreign policy.
Brezhnev dominated the proceedings from the beginning.
His initial six-hour speech, carried live on teZevi-
sion, pre-empted all the themes of Kosygin's subse-
quent report on the five-year plan. Second-level
speakers heaped praise upon him, and Soviet televi-
sion treated its viewers to a 90-second ovation which
followed his routine reappearance halfway through the
congress. Brezhnev's predominance was underscored
by the failure of any of his Politburo colleagues
save Kosygin and the Ukrainian party chief SheZest
to address the congress; his erstwhile challenger.
Shelepin, current head of the trade unions, suffered
a particularly damaging blow when he was forced to
let his deputy give the traditional trade union
speech.
Brezhnev has been increasingly hogging the limelight
over the past year, and the major question has been
whether he could translate this into real political
gains. When the congress closed, it became clear
that he had. No one lost his job, but the Politburo
was expanded by four new members. We count three
of them as his supporters, and the fourth probably
belongs in this category as well. At the same time,
several possible rivals, including Kosygin and Shel-
epin, slipped in the protocol ranking of the veteran
members.
Our reading of the new .Politburo is that, unless and
until Brezhnev makes a series of major mistakes, no
one can organize a majority against him. Indeed,
his new support dilutes the political strength of
his older colleagues, and he is probably in a posi-
tion to ease them out if he chooses to do so. His
political style is to operate gradually and to avoid
sensations, however, and if he moves in this direc-
tion he will probably take his time.
This outcome raises the question of whether Soviet
policy will change in any important respect now that
Brezhnev has loosened, although not thrown off en-
tirely, the constraints of collective leadership.
In this respect, the congress proceedings provided
numerous indications of continuity and precious few
hints of change. The formulations on foreign policy,
Al
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including such diverse matters as China, the Middle
East, and relations with the US, carefully avoided
breaking any new ground. On the domestic front,
Brezhnev gave unusual emphasis to consumer welfare,
but our first analysis of the statistics released
at the congress does not indicate any substantial
reordering of economic priorities. Neither he nor
Kosygin foreshadowed any significant further steps
in economic reform.
Preliminary analysis of the newly elected central
committee also suggests a strong note of ,continuity
in Soviet affairs. The great majority of old mem-
bers were retained, and many of the new ones earned
their right to seats by virtue of jobs they assumed
long before the congress. While Brezhnev's increased
strength probably is reflected in the enlarged com-
mittee (up from 195 to 241 full members) just as it
is in the enlarged Politburo, the division of seats
among various interest groups appears to parallel
that of its predecessor--for example, the military
establishment again commands approximately eight
percent of the seats.
In general, we have viewed Brezhnev as a politician
of conservative instincts--by Soviet standards--who
values order, is concerned to maintain controls, is
not prone to pose issues sharply, and prefers to see
a consensus emerge rather than to dominate the pol-
icymaking process. He has not given the impression
of a man with a number of strong views who has been
frustrated by the need to take into account those of
his colleagues. But it may be that, now that he has
significantly improved his strength, he will put a
more personal stamp upon Soviet policy.
On the record to date, we doubt it. Brezhnev's prom-
ises to the consumer, whatever the eventual payoff,
may indicate a less harsh political line inside the
USSR, and his even-handed criticisms of both neo-
Stalinists and dissidents point in this direction as
well. But at this early stage, the most likely pros-
pect for Soviet policy under Brezhnev at home is
continued conservatism, and abroad continued deter-
mination to fend off China, hold onto Eastern Europe,
keep the US at arm's length, and expand Soviet in-
fluence as opportunities arise. This will not solve
such fundamental long-range problems as the persist-
ent Zagging of Soviet industrial technology behind
world standards or the inherently unstable condition
of Eastern Europe. But if and when Soviet policy
changes, it is more likely to do so under the pres-
sure of events than in response to the leadership
of a man like Brezhnev.
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