THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 MARCH 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976665
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 12, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
12 March 1969
19
34,444,(1
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rut( 1fif l'KhJILlhN 1 UNLY
13 March 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
12 MARCH 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Intercepts indicate that a minimum of eleven North Viet-
namese MIGs flew to Communist China on 13 March.
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Reports from the US Embassies in Warsaw and Budapest in-
dicate that a Warsaw Pact summit is to be held, apparently in
Budapest, before the end of March. One source says the meet-
ing will convene next Monday.
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing significant to report.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PAKISTAN
Ayub announced today that Pakistan's round table conference
has reached "broad agreement" that direct adult suffrage should
be introduced and that the country should have a parliamentary
system of government. He indicated that several issues, includ-
ing the extent to which East and West Pakistan should be autono-
mous, were still unresolved. (FBIS 24, 13 Mar 69)
JAMAICA
Violence against foreigners (as well as prominent Jamaicans)
has been building up. Two Americans have been shot by unknown
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FOR 1HE PRESIDENT ONLY
assailants in the past few weeks, and a telephone caller re-
cently threatened Ambassador Tobriner. The Jamaican Govern-
ment has stepped up police and military raids in an effort to
halt the violence, and the US Embassy is taking precautions.
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I, MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Military action throughout South Vietnam was relatively
light during the past 24 hours.
Recently intercepted North Vietnamese air defense com-
munications suggest that Hanoi has fully examined the pos-
sibility of US military responses to its offensive in the
South. Conversations intercepted on 7 and 8 March reflected
an urgent concern with preparations for anticipated US re-
taliatory strikes, even as far north as the airfields near
Hanoi. There was some indication that communication proce-
dures were being established so that, if necessary, North
Vietnamese jets could be flown to Chinese airfields. This
occurred following US bombing of Phuc Yen Airfield near Hanoi
in December 1967.
Some of this concern over retaliation no, doubt stems from
the recent northward deployment of US naval units in the
Gulf of Tonkin and their taking station just outside Hanoi's
territorial waters. On 9 and 10 March, North Vietnamese naval
radar stations maintained unusually close surveillance of two
US destroyers, reporting their locations at two to four
minute intervals.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The North Vietnamese are not sitting back to await the
outcome of new or anticipated military actions in the field.
Their interest in getting down to private talks came through
loud and clear in language used by Xuan Thuy, by the Soviets,
and by the Poles in the past few days. All three parties
made a special effort to convince US officials that the talks
ought to begin soon, and they left plenty of room for includ-
ing Saigon.
In Xuan Thuy's first privatemeeting with Ambassador
Lodge, he strongly implied that four-way talks to discuss
de-escalation should be the first step, and he confirmed that
the Communists wanted to focus on troop withdrawal as the
initial major substantive issue.
Soviet diplomat Oberemko told a Paris Embassy officer
that the US should begin talks with the Front. Like a few
others pressing Hanoi's case, he left a strong impression
that the Communists were eventually going to accept a change
in the Saigon government's "attitude" rather than a change
in its composition as a condition for progress in the talks.
Polish diplomat Lewandowski, in his conversation with
Ambassador Lodge, also urged that the US should quickly
move into private talks. Lewandowski's line that the US
cannot expect to achieve a "position of strength" while the
talks are under way is becoming a more and more prominent,
Communist theme. Hanoi is steadily hittipg hard on this
subject and doubtless will carry it on at the formal talks
tomorrow.
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a story in the US press
quotes Am-
bassador Harriman as saying that the Communist offensive
was a response to allied military operations rather than
a deliberate attempt to torpedo the talks. Hanoi radio
used the quote in a broadcast on 12 March about Secretary
Laird's trip, and it is a safe bet that it will be heard
again in Paris tombrrow.
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Eu ROPE
Chancellor Kiesinger and President De Gaulle Will hold
their semiannual summit meeting in Paris tomorrow and
Friday, with no' significant results expected.
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing significant to report.
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing significant to report.
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LAOS
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CHINA
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94618 3-69 CIA
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IL OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
While there is a good deal of military activity,, we
still seeno firm evidence of a major attempt by the Com-
munists- to expand into areas traditionally controlled by
the government. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops are
pressuring some of the remaining government positions in
:Samneua Province, but they have failed: to drive friendly
guerrillas from any importaht base since capturing Houei
Hinsa on 3 March. A Communist attack against Houei.Thong
Ko, a transit point for thousands of Meo refugees fleeIng
southward, was recently repulsed with the help of tactical
air support. The Meo guerrillas have for tactical reasons
evacuated a- number of smaller positions west and north of
Na Khang
The enemy's raid against Luang Prabang Airfield early
today was the third in-as many years.- The Communists also
increased pressure in the vicinity of the Mekong RiVer town
of Pak Beng. In addition, the Communists are moving fresh
troops and supplies into the Thateng area in southern Laos,
possibly signalingia new assault against the base there
These moves will add to Vientiane's apprehensions. In
fact, the most immediate danger is one- of some ill-advised
move by a rattled government leadership.
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PAKISTAN
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CHILE
.Last week's legislative elections have depressed President
Frei. He regards the results, which showed both left and
right increasing their vote totals at the expense of his
Christian Democrats, as :a grave defeat for both his party
and himself. He,does not believe the Christian Democrats
can win the presidential election in 1970 without allies,
and he thinks the party is so isolated after last week'
vote that it has no hope of linking up with any. other party.
Nor does he see any attractive presidential candidates
among his Christian Democratic colleagues. Even though
the Chilean right made the most noteworthy gains last
week, Frei thinks a-candidate backed by the Communists
and Socialists will have a better than even chance of
winning the three-way presidential race which most ob-
servers believe will develop in 1970.
Frei's analysis on the whole does not differ too
drastically from our own conclusions. In a sense the
Christian Democrats had nowhere to go but down from the
unprecedented majorities they rolled up in recent years..
The vote they received last week--30 percent of the
total,-probably is close to a fair measure of their basic
'strength, and we do not expect it to drop much further.
We suspect that Frei will recover from his depres-
sion- before long and will continue to push his legisla-
tive programs. He may be less interested in involving
himself in partisan political affairs, however, believing
that his party is on the road to disaster and hoping to
keep clear.
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Top Secret
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