THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 OCTOBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466874
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 18, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
October 18, 1976
9
Top S crea5xi
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Exempt from general
decla.fication schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 5B(I),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 18, 1976
Table of Contents
China: An announcement of changes in the Chinese leadership
decided by the Central Committee seems likely soon.
(Page 1)
Lebanon: The six-member "mini-summit" convened yesterday in
Saudi Arabia. Syrian President Asad has called 25X1
a temporary halt in the Syrian offensive
(Page 1)
Angola - South Africa:
Notes: Western Europe; Rhodesia (Page 4)
25X1
25X1
(Page 2) 25X1
At Annex we discuss the origins of the leftist movement in
China and trace its fortunes during the last 25 years.
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CHINA: The Chinese
Communist Party Central
Committee plenum, which
is presumed to have been
held last week in Peking,
appears to have ended
on Friday.
25X1 ?
A statement on changes in the Chi-
nese leadership decided by the
meeting seems likely soon.l
25X1
One notice specifically stated
that major political actions were
imminent.
Peking will probably announce that
Hua Kuo-feng is party chairman and
may name new members and promotions
within the Politburo. The state-
ment may also officially disclose
the arrests and fate of the four
leading leftists.
* * *
25X1
LEBANON: The six-mem-
ber "mini-summit" con-
vened in Saudi Arabia
yesterday following a
round of informal meet-
ings on Saturday. Syr-
ian President Asad, re-
sponding to a request
from the Saudis, has
called a temporary halt
to the Syrian offensive
in Lebanon, ostensibly
to facilitate negotia-
tions at the summit.
25X1
1
--continued
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:IEDITERRANEAN
SEA
BEI RUT
Beirut
Internatioq
Airport
Sidon
Tyr e
L
620560 10-76
DAMASCUS
IA
MILES 20
KILOMETERS 20
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25X1
ANGOLA - SrUTH AFRICA:
25X1
25X1
25X1
* * *
25X1
25X1
25X1
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
--continued
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BRAllAVILLE
KINSHASA
AIRE
ATLANTIC
OCEA N
r-u. c:;,' _
%Cunenerhydroelectric project
1
\ 0 150 SOU ',-WEST AFRICA
(1.1
Kilometers
MIBIA)
\ 0 150
Statute Miles i
1? \ p3
620555 10-76
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25X1
25X
25X
* * *
3
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--continued
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The six members of
Western Europe's joint
float announced yester-
day a realignment of the
parities at which their
currencies are offi-
cially maintained
against one another.
Robert Mugabe, chief
spokesman for the mili-
tary wing of the Zim-
babwe African National
Union--which fields most
of the insurgents active
against the Rhodesian
government--is likely
to be elected president
of ZANU later this week.
NOTES
At the start of trading today, the
German mark will be revalued up-
ward by 2 percent against the Bel-
gian franc and Dutch guilder, 3
percent against the Swedish and
Norwegian crowns, and 6 percent
against the Dutch crown.
Anticipation of the realignment
has caused hectic trading condi-
tions from time to time in recent
months in world currency markets.
Yesterday's move, however, fol-
lowed a week of relative calm and
apparently took most traders by
surprise.
Mugabe, rather than the current
president of ZANU, Ndabaningi
Sithole, was invited by the Brit-
ish to the conference that opens
in Geneva next week to prepare
Rhodesia for legal independence
under black majority rule.
Overshadowing Mugabe in popularity
among ZANU's guerrillas is Josiah
Tongogara, now on trial in Zambia
for assassination of one of his
rivals. The Zambian government
is said to be considering his re-
lease because Tongogara's accep-
tance of terms reached at Geneva
is crucial if a cease-fire or de-
escalation of guerrilla operations
is to be achieved.
The two other black nationalist
leaders who will participate in
the Geneva conference are Joshua
Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African Peo-
ple's Union and Bishop Abel Muzo-
rewa of the African National Coun-
cil.
4
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CHINA
Mao Tse-tung, writing some ten years ago
about the issue of factionalism within
the Chinese Communist Party, implied that
whatever the political balance at any
given time, neither the left nor right
wing of the party could ever be totally
eliminated. This judgment was almost
certainly correct.
Broadly speaking, those officials who--in the course
of the party's growth and conflict with the Kuomin-
tang and the Japanese--tended to emphasize organiza-
tional discipline, problem solving, and the practical
issues of governing and building a modern economy
coalesced into the party's right wing. Those who
insisted that the party could not simply develop
into a governing class, who believed that the rapid
development of a technological elite would undermine
ideological purity, and who felt that ideological
indoctrination and the nurturing of mass enthusiasm
were the keys to the solution of China's numerous
economic and other problems formed the core of the
party's left wing.
Great Leap Forward
Throughout most of the 1950s and the early 1960s,
the right wing was dominant. A marked exception,
however, was the Great Leap Forward of 1959. Spurn-
ing close party supervision for techniques of mass
enthusiasm and introducing a rather hysterical
style of leadership, it seemed distinctly "leftist"
in orientation. As the campaign progressed, con-
trol procedures broke down, the movement ran into
difficulty, and in the wake of crop failures China
suffered several years of famine and economic dis-
location.
As a result of the Great Leap, the bureaucrats in
control of the party machine were reinforced in
their distrust of mass agitation techniques and of
"unreliable" subordinate cadre. Moreover, many
senior party officials came to distrust the judg-
ment of Chairman Mao, who had backed the Great Leap
experiment. Low-level officials resented the blame
placed on them and ideologues chafed at the new
emphasis placed on techniques that "would work."
--continued
Al
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Cultural Revolution
Over the years, a variety of tensions developed--
personal, institutional, and ideological--that Mao
exploited when he reasserted his authority over
party bureaucrats in the mid-1960s.
To humble the party machine, however, he particu-
larly used two groups. One was composed of ideal-
istic but discontented youth in the institutions of
higher learning, who were to form the core of the
Red Guard formations. The other included the then
defense minister, Lin Piao, and a number of his
close associates in the central military establish-
ment who were at that time in open revolt against
the party bureaucrats.
The resultant explosion--the Cultural Revolution--
tore the party to pieces and deeply rent the social
and economic fabric of the country. This chaotic
political movement, which ran from the spring of
1966 to the autumn of 1968, is the central refer-
ence point of all subsequent political developments
in China. Political fissures and personal animosi-
ties engendered by the movement have never healed.
The period from the summer of 1966 to the
summer of 1967 was the high-water point
for the lefts it has been in slow but
irregular decline ever since.
Leftist attacks on provincial military administra-
tors turned many of these individuals against the
ideologues and their allies and also caused a split
between Lin Piao and his Peking associates on the
one hand and the provincial satraps on the other.
Pressure from the military and from Chou En-lai, plus
the "objective" fact of increasing chaos throughout
the country, led to a closeout of the Cultural Revo-
lution in 1968.
Institutionalism of Left Wing
Despite this major setback to the leftist
cause, leftist strength, still consider-
able, was now institutionalized.
As party committees were reconstituted throughout
the country, young "radicals" shared power, although
usually in a subordinate position, with military,
--continued
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bureaucratic, and party figures. The ninth party
congress, meeting in the spring of 1969, elected
to the Politburo three civilian leftists who had
achieved prominence during the Cultural Revolution--
Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan--as
well as Lin's military associates. Two other left-
ists and Lin himself were elected to the Politburo
standing committee.
The leftist position, however, was weaker than it
seemed. Ironically, the left, which put its faith
in the "masses," had in fact alienated much of the
populace through its excesses in the Cultural Revo-
lution and its evident inability to manage the
country during its period of ascendancy. Moreover,
the provincial military remained deeply hostile. A
reaction quickly set in, and orthodox management
returned to power.
Continuing Decline of the Left
Lin Piao, finding "leftism" a weak reed on which to
lean, now attempted to make common cause with his
estranged regional military commanders--an effort
that led to his attempted "coup" in the autumn of
1971. The elimination from the Politburo of Lin's
close military associates in the wake of his death
left the remaining top leftists--Chiang Ching, Chang
Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan--isolated on that body.
Weakened in the provinces, the leftists retained
firm control of the educational and cultural
spheres--areas about which they were particularly
concerned but which were not nearly such important
sources of real power as control of the party and
government machinery--and somewhat less firm con-
trol over the propaganda apparatus.
The leading leftists still retained a somewhat equiv-
ocal relationship to Mao Tse-tung. In 1970 and
again after the fall of Lin Piao, the Chairman had
dissociated himself from the leftist leaders--par-
ticularly his wife, Chiang Ching--but he still
found them a useful counterweight to pressures from
the military and from the conservative bureaucrats,
now led by Chou En-lai. In these circumstances
the leftist trio retained veto power over numerous
high-level decisions and appointments.
--continued
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The onset of Chou En-lai's illness--known in the
upper echelons of the Chinese leadership by 1973--
tended to upset the tentative balance that had been
established following the fall of Lin Piao. Offi-
cials dependent on Chou were uncertain of their fu-
ture. The left, in preparation for the inevitable
succession and in recognition of its own relative
weakness, began a flirtation with the still dis-
gruntled military which, although never very suc-
cessful, continued until October 6 and 7, 1976.
A Standoff
The tenth party congress, convened in the summer of
1973, was probably primarily designed to deal with
the succession problem. The result was largely a
standoff. Although Chou and his allies lost little
ground, the leftists were able to exclude Teng
Hsiao-ping, "rehabilitated" the previous spring,
from the Politburo. Wang Hung-wen, a young Shanghai
protege of Chang Chun-chiao, was elected to the
third position in the party hierarchy. The one re-
maining military man on the Politburo with leftist
sympathies, Li Te-sheng, was elevated to the stand-
ing committee.
The congress actually settled nothing and was im-
mediately followed by the so-called anti-Confucius
campaign--a feuding between left and right. But by
the end of 1974, the left had been turned back.
Teng Hsiao-ping
At a party plenum in late 1974, Teng Hsiao-ping was
elected to the Politburo standing committee and was
made chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army.
Li Te-sheng was dropped from the standing committee.
The ascendancy of Teng Hsiao-ping, however, raised
in acute form the issue of the legitimacy of the
Cultural Revolution. Teng--the only "rehabilitated"
official on the Politburo--was a continuing provoca-
tion to the left. Moreover, he made no attempt to
disguise his contempt for the Cultural Revolution
and all its works. In addition, anticipating Chou's
coming death, he pressed ahead at great speed with
programs reminiscent of the early 1960s.
In the process, Teng alienated significant military
leaders--who stood aside when the left renewed its
attack on him after Chou En-lai's death.
--continued
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Following the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping, leftist lead-
ers opened a general attack on the many party offi-
cials "rehabilitated" since 1969--a threatening ges-
ture that merely served to unite the bureaucrats in
opposition to the leftists. Further, the leftists
attacked Teng's military policy even while seeking
alliances with military commanders.
Fall of the Leftist Quartet
The continued leftist agitation from late 1973 prob-
ably convinced considerable numbers of influential
figures in the party and military establishments
that political stability could not be achieved in
China unless the leftist leaders were removed from
positions of influence. The fall of the leftist
quartet was probably inevitable; only the timing
was a surprise.
It still is not clear whether the leftist leaders
attempted a desperate move in early October or
whether the right--above all the military--under-
took a pre-emptive one. In either case, the light-
ning purge of October 6 and 7 clearly revealed the
relative weakness of the left in real power terms.
Residual Leftist Strength
At the same time, leftist strength almost certainly
has not vanished. Hua Kuo-feng recently claimed
that the Chinese Communist Party has 30 million mem-
bers. If, as a conservative estimate, a quarter of
this number is leftist in outlook, such members
would total seven and a half million--a sizable
pressure group. Even if the arrest of the leftist
quartet should be followed by a purge of some
100,000 to 200,000 followers--a number comparable
to those purged during the Cultural Revolution--a
huge body of leftists would remain to reassert them-
selves as other pressures build in China.
If a new round of struggle develops in the near fu-
ture, it is likely to be between civilian party mem-
bers and a newly confident and assertive military.
Over the longer term, if the return to the methods
and practices of the 1950s and 1960s continues,
pressures will probably build again within the Chi-
nese political system in reaction to the rigid
bureaucratic "command style."
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Top Secret
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