THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993143
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 16, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
'16 Fe ruary 1972
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
16 February 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cypriot President Makarios is standing his ground
against Greek demands amid indications that Athens
may be considering more forceful action. (Page 1)
The military situation in northern Laos is dis-
cussed on Page 2.
Cambodia
(Page 3)
President Numayri's dismissal of his pro-Egyptian
?defense minister has further strained Sudan's re-
lations with Egypt. (Page 4)
(Page 5)
The military has seized power in Ecuador. (Page 6)
At Annex, we discuss Sudan's efforts to promote a
settlement in the Middle East.
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CYPRUS
Athens is still pressing its demands that Pres-
ident Makarios turn over the Czech arms to the UN
peacekeeping forces and broaden his government.
The Greeks apparently believed that political pres-
sure would convince Makarios to capitulate. Ma-
karios, however, is standing his ground and there
are some indications that Athens may now be consider-
ing more forceful action.
Makarios for his part, has been active rally-
ing support. A large pro-Makarios demonstration
took place yesterday in Nicosia, apparently at his
direction.
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LAOS
Yesterday yang Pao's irregular, units advancing
north from Pha Dong reported several clashes with
enemy patrols as they attempted to move toward Route
4. Another irregular force holding a 105-mm. howit-
zer position at Phou Khe has been shelled for the
past three days but has suffered little damage.
The majority of the irregular force is located in
the foothills at the southeastern tip of the Plaine.
yang Pao has also launched yet another diversionary
operation from the Bouam Long area north of the
Plaine south toward Route 7.
The North Vietnamese have shifted additional
forces from Long Tieng to protect their rear areas.
Last week elements of the 148th Regiment moved from
Long Tieng to positions southeast of the Plaine.
More recent intercepts indicate that much of the
174th Regiment, which had been active near Sam Thong,
has been ordered to take up positions on high points
near Route 4 and Phou Khe.
Five other North Vietnamese regiments remain in
the Long Tieng - Sam Thong area, and recent messages
indicate that they are continuing to prepare for new
attacks. Rear service units are pushing supplies to
front-line units, and
trucks are now using the new road from the southern
Plaine to Ban Hintang.
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CAMBODIA
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SUDAN EGYPT
President Numayri's:dismissal Sunday of his.
pro-Egyptian defense minister, Khalid Hassan Abbas,'
has brought .a sharp reaction from Cairo. Claiming
that., an "atmosphere of crisis" prevails in Khartoum,
President Sadat dispatched Foreign Minister Ghalib
.to Sudan on Monday to deliver an "urgent" message
to.Numayri. Ghalib's message included hints of
Egyptian countermoves,_according to press report's.
Numayri.'s removal of Abbas is but the
latest example of friction between Sudan
and Egypt: in recent months. Cairo is an-
noyed with Numayri 's refusal to 'balance
his overtures to the West with friendly
gestures toward Moscow and with his post-
ponement of Sudan's adherence to the Con-
federation of Arab Republics. Cairo views
this behavior as a sign that Sudan is de-
taching itself fromArab affairs and prob-
lems.
The Egyptians are likely to continue their
pressure tactics against Numayri. Cairo,
for example, may have been behind the res-
ignation yesterday of the head of the
Sudan Socialist Union, an ally of the de-
posed Abbas.
Khartoum, meanwhile, remains calm and
Numayri appears to be in full control.
He apparently believes he has strong do-
mestic support for his "Sudan first" pol-
icy.
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NOTES
Bangladesh: Newsmen and a representative of
the UN who visited the Bihari enclave of Mirpur
near Dacca report hunger but no starvation there.
The government is now letting in food supplies, and
there have been no Bengali-Bihari clashes since the
beginning of the month. The Biharis, nevertheless,
remain depressed over their bleak prospects, and
many of them would like to leave the country. In-
dian Foreign Secretary Kaul, however, has told Ambas-
sador Keating that India will not accept the Biharis--
who are Muslims--because of the possible conflicts
with Hindus, and Islamabad has indicated it does not
want them.
Ecuador: President Velasco has been ousted by
the military led by Army Commander General Rodriguez.
The move was taken to prevent populist politician
Assad Bucaram from winning the June presidential
election. The armed forces proclaimed a state of
siege throughout the country and announced a cur-
few, but there have been no reports of bloodshed.
According to a decree issued this morning General
Rodriguez will be supported by a government council
composed of a new army commander and the navy and
air force commanders. The new regime is describing
itself as "nationalist, military and revolutionary"--
most likely in an effort to co-opt some of Bucaram's
support among the younger officers. The military
last ruled Ecuador from 1963 to 1966. Velasco, who
successfully completed only one of his five presi-
dential terms, has gone into exile in Panama. Bu-
caram may also be forced to leave the country.
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SUDAN-LIBYA-EGYPT
One of the more unlikely proposals made
in recent weeks has been Sudanese Pres-
ident Numayri's idea that the US enlist
Libyan President Qadhafi's support for
Egyptian-Israeli proximity talks.
Qadhafi has rarely given even Zip service
to the idea of negotiating the unfinished
Arab-Israeli war, and Numayri 's suggestion
seemed to be his own brainstorm rather
than a product of his discussions with
Qadhafi. However, a re-examination of
Qadhafi's recent statements and published
Libyan views suggests that his and Nu-
mayri's distrust of Soviet influence in
Egypt may be leading both of them to re-
vise their priorities.
Numayri told Ambassador Bush on 5 February that
he believed the US-should use Libya, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait to persuade President Sadat to take Egypt
into the interim agreement talks. Sadat cannot make
the decision on his own, Numayri said, but could be
given the necessary push if these three countries--
the aid givers--indicated their support of proximity
talks. Numayri offered Sudan's own support for any
US initiative that did not embarrass or weaken Egypt
and urged an immediate US contact with Qadhafi.
The Sudanese suggestion to Ambassador Bush came
only ?a few days after Qadhafi's talks with Sadat and
Numayri. The Sudanese minister of information, who
had attended the Numayri-Qadhafi talks, later told
Bush that Qadhafi was so worried about massive So-
viet influence in Egypt that he would probably be
willing to weigh in with Sadat.
While there may be considerable exaggeration in
these Sudanese allegations about Qadhafi's views,
they can be fitted into the trend of his recent
statements. Addressing Egyptian troops at Aswan
last month, Qadhafi repeated his customary line that
the "battle" with Israel was inevitable but went on
to insist that the timing must be left to the "po-
litical leadership." This argument, which supports
Sadat's position, has been repeated in Libya's armed
forces journal, which sometimes serves as Qadhafi's
personal mouthpiece. Other themes he has struck in
recent months include the inability of the Arab ar-
mies to defeat Israel now and the folly of starting
hostilities without adequate planning and training.
Over the same period, he has expressed concern about
the spread of Soviet "imperialism" in the Middle
East in several widely publicized speeches and inter-
views.
(continued)
Al
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If Qadhafi now views the confrontation with
Israel as a protracted struggle which needs
careful preparation, he may also see some
utility in proceeding with talks for an in-
terim agreement. He may have come to be-
lieve that an Israeli withdrawal from the
canal would permit the Egyptians to scale
down considerably the Soviet personnel
manning SAM sites in the canal sector,
something Sadat has said he is anxious to
do. Qadhafi appreciates Egypt's long-term
need for Soviet military aid, but he may
hope that the breathing space provided by
an interim agreement would at least enable
the Egyptians gradually to displace the
sizable contingent of Soviet military ad-
visers.
Apart from this Ambassador Bush's conversation
with Numayri tells a good deal about current Sudanese
thinking on the war. Numayri is clearly anxious for
rapid progress toward a settlement. He-claims that
-the closure of the Suez Canal has imposed an economic
burden on Sudan in the range of $65-75 million an-
nually.
The Sudanese Presidents interest-inachieving
an interim agreement and in involving the. US in that
effort also reflects his own, concern about the So-
viet presence in Egypt. Since the pro-Communist'
coup
coup.attempt last July, Numayri has been extremely
suspicious. of Soviet motives and is
replace Moscow's military aid and technical assist-
ance programs by developing contacts with theJieSt,
China, Yugoslavia, and Romania. He is well aware
that any reduction of the Soviet presence in the
Middle.East,hinges,on a political solution of-the
Middle East conflict: Egypt's successful pressure
on Sudan in the past few weeks to accept a Soviet
ambassador--the latest reminder of the weight that.
the Soviets carry in Cairo--is likely to make_Nu
mayri even more resentful.
Neither Sadat nor Qadhafi has been:heard
from directly since their meetings before
and after Sadat's trip to Moscow Never-
theless,
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count on Qadhafi and Numayri to protect
his rear from radical Arab critics and
Soviet disapproval, he might find it po-
litically easier to take another step
with the United States and Israel in search
of an interim agreement.
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