THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 JULY 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007768
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 18, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
July 18, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1).(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of ?
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
July 18, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
? Discussions of the Cyprus problem are expected to
continue in London today. All major parties--
Greece, Turkey, the UK, and the Soviet Union--
appear to be stressing the search for a peaceful
solution. (Page 1)
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Cyprus. (Page 2) 25X1
Although bickering between Cairo and Damascus has
prompted President Sadat tocancel a visit to Syria,
President Asad reportedly has now agreed to visit
Egypt in August. (Page 3)
Egypt--for the present, at least--is refusing to
release to the Palestine Liberation Organization
the terrorists who murdered one Belgian and two US
diplomats in Khartoum last year. (Page 4)
Lao Prime Minister Souvanna's condition has stabi-
lized, and the immediate problem is to find an
interim replacement whose decisions would be ac-
cepted by both Communists and non-Communists.
(Page 5)
The Italian Communist Party's attempt to amend the
government's austerity program has set the stage
for a legislative struggle that could jeopardize
the center-left coalition. (Page 6)
The composition of the new Portuguese cabinet in-
dicates that the Armed Forces Movement, which or-
ganized the April coup, has increased its influence
in the government. (Page 7)
Notes on USSR-Poland, Vietnam, Iran, and France
appear on Page 8.
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CYPRUS
UK Sovereign base area
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CYPRUS
Discussions of the Cyprus problem are expected
to continue in London today. /
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit and Defense Min-
ister Isik also met with Prime Minister Wilson and
other officials for talks in the context of the
1960 treaty, under which Britain and Turkey--along
with-Greece--are guarantors of Cyprus' independence.
Before leaving for the UK, Ecevit told the US
ambassador that he would explore with the British
"all peaceful solutions before considering others."
He said that Ankara hopes the status quo ante can
be restored without Turkish military intervention.
If the new Cypriot regime does retain control of
the island, Ecevit said, Turkey may be willing to
hold off intervention if a corridor to the sea can
be guaranteed to Turkish residents of the island.
Ankara is calm, and there has been no attempt
to arouse public sentiment on the Cyprus issue, al-
though all political factions would support a firm
Turkish reaction.
High-level Greek officials have assured the
US embassy that Athens will not use this week's
semi-annual rotation of half of their 950-man con-
tingent of regular Greek forces on Cyprus to in-
crease the size of the unit.
Moscow issued an official statement on Cyprus
last night that was moderate in tone and avoided
any implication that the Soviet Union sees its se-
curity affected by developments on the island. The
statement reiterated support for Cypriot indepen-
dence and the "legitimate" government of President
Makarios and demanded the immediate removal of all
Greek military personnel from the island. The So-
viets did not promise, however, to actively assist
any Cypriot movement to return Makarios to power.
It is not surprising that the
Soviets would give general assurances to Ankara,
but it seems unlikely that they have made any firm
commitment of military backing.
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USSR
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EGYPT-SYRIA
Recent bickering between Cairo and Damascus
has been serious enough to cause President Sadat
to cancel a planned visit to Syria. President Asad
has now reportedly agreed, however, to visit Egypt
in August.
Each side appears uncertain of the intentions
of the other with regard to negotiations with Is-
rael. Damascus is concerned that Cairo will leave
the other Arabs behind in attempting to achieve
its own objectives. The Syrians are still bitter
over Egypt's unilateral acceptance of a cease-fire
in October and its decision to proceed with disen-
gagement on the Suez front before agreement was
reached on the Golan front.
Cairo has sought to reassure the other Arabs
both publicly and privately that Egypt will not
take further unilateral action, and Sadat is ir-
ritated by Syria's harping on the matter.(
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/ The Egyptian leader may
try to confine future contacts to Asad, whom he
regards as more reasonable and amenable to Egyptian
views.
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EGYPT-FEDAYEEN
Egypt--for the present, at least--is refusing
to release to the Palestine Liberation Organization
the terrorists who murdered one Belgian and two US
diplomats in Khartoum last year.
The terrorists were released by Sudan in late
June, ostensibly to serve out their sentences Under
the control of the PLO. If Cairo turned them over,
they almost certainly would be taken to either Leb-
anon or Syria and given complete freedom..
Egypt's determination to hold the terrorists
is largely a result of President Sadat's reluctance
to offend the US. Cairo has also refused to release
a group of commandos who last December carried out
an attack on a:US airliner and hijacked a second
aircraft in Rome.
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LAOS
Prime Minister Souvanna's condition has stabi-
lized
The immediate problem is still to find an in-
terim replacement whose decisions would be accepted
by both Communists and non-Communists. Neither the
Lao Protocol of September 1973 nor the Lao consti-
tution addresses the problem of providing a tempo-
rary substitute should the prime minister be inca-
pacitated.
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ITALY
The Italian Communist Party's attempt to amend
the government's austerity program has set the stage
for a legislative struggle that could jeopardize the
center-left coalition. The dominant Christian Demo-
crats are caught up in an internal feud, and their
Socialist coalition partners are torn between re-
sponding to labor's unhappiness with the austerity
program and keeping the coalition intact.
The Communist amendments would soften the im-
pact of the austerity measures on workers and force
those with higher income to shoulder more of the
burden. The proposals are certain to appeal to
organized labor and tempt the Socialists and the
Christian Democratic left to side with the Commu-
nists.
The Communists' decision to force the issue
is a tactical shift. The party apparently wants
to exploit the weakened position of the Christian
Democrats and to prevent a decline of Communist in-
fluence with organized labor.
Disarray within the Christian Democratic Party
will complicate efforts to meet the Communist chal-
lenge. The Christian Democrats' key deliberative
body--the National Council--will meet today, with
left-wing factions in revolt against the party
leadership.
The government may find it necessary to accept
some of the Communist proposals. If the Communists
are able to force changes that substantially reduce
the revenue the austerity measures were designed to
produce, a new government crisis may ensue.
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PORTUGAL
The organizers of the April coup have gained
increased prominence in the Portuguese cabinet an-
nounced yesterday. Although the majority of the
new cabinet members are civilians drawn from the
parties previously represented, Military officers
from the Armed Forces Movement comprise the largest
group and hold the key ministries. Some shift to
the left may have occurred, but the Communists
were not especially favored.
The change of cabinets and the installation
of Goncalves as Prime Minister have made it clear
that President Spinola himself cannot act against
the wishes of the Armed Forces Movement. Most
members of the movement are "idealists" without
attachment to any particular political philosophy.
As the chosen candidate of the movement,
Goncalves will have more clout than his civilian
predecessor in dealing with unyielding economic
and labor problems. He also appears committed to
the holding of legislative elections next March
and to early negotiations with rebels in Portugal's
African territories.
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NOTES
USSR-Poland: Soviet party chief Brezhnev ar-
rives in Warsaw tomorrow for a four-day visit that
will include ceremonies commemorating the 30th an-
niversary of Communist rule in Poland. Brezhnev
will deliver at least two speeches; one before the
Polish parliament on July 21 will probably be a
major speech on US-Soviet relations and detente.
The Soviet leader may also suggest a pan-European
conference of Communist parties.
Vietnam: The North Vietnamese continue to
move large quantities of supplies in South Vietnam's
Military Region 1, according to intercepted mes-
sages. This logistic effort, normal for this time
of year, is probably partly intended to support re-
cent Communist tactical activity in the area. In
addition to resupply activity, aerial reconnais-
sance shows that a series of new, short roads and
a number of new military-related facilities have
been built within artillery range of ARVN positions
south of Hue. These newly cleared or improved
roads lead off a main route running eastward from
the A Shau Valley and appear to be access roads to
new military encampments. The encampments include
occupied antiaircraft installations and what are
probably field artillery sites.
Iran: Iran's purchase of a one-fourth inter-
est in the steel-manufacturing component of Krupp
gives the Shah access to the whole gamut of Krupp
activities, including possible inputs to Iran's
defense industry. The deal involves the transfer
of Krupp's technological know-how to Iran and the
nomination of an Iranian member to the supervisory
board of the holding company for the Krupp enter-
prises. Krupp is planning a variety of projects
in Iran. In addition to steel, the company's pro-
posals include factories for cement, sugar, and
automobile parts and port installations.
France:
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