THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 FEBRUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014729
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 24, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
February 24, 1975
5
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of 8.0. 11652
exemption category 58(1
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
February 24, 1975
? Table of Contents
Canada: Prime Minister Trudeau will be starting
a visit to Western Europe this week. (Page 1)
Ethiopia: Arab aid to Eritrean rebels may increase.
(Page 2)
- Votes: Mexico; Spain. (Page 3)
.At Annex we present the principal, judgments of an
- intelligence report on the Soviet Military
Presence Egypt,
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CANADA
Prime Minister Trudeau departs later
this week for his second round of talks
with West European leaders in a continued
effort to lessen Canadian dependence on
the US,
The trip, which will begin on Thursday, will
include stops in The Hague, Bonn, Rome, London, and
Dublin. Trudeau visited Paris and Brussels last
December, but held off visiting other West European
capitals until he restored normal relations with
the French. Ties between Ottawa and Paris had been
cool ever since former president De Gaulle in 1967
advocated independence for Quebec.
The Prime Minister views the forthcoming dis-
cussions as a general review of problems facing the
Western nations and does not intend to seek specific
agreements. He will, however, continue to push for
institutional ties between Canada and the EC, al-
though the Nine are reluctant to begin negotiations
at this time. He will also make a point of advo-
cating stronger nuclear safeguards and is likely
to urge the Euratom members, which signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, to complete ratification with-
out delay.
The European leaders, for their part, will be
concerned over the effects of the Canadian govern-
ment's defense review on NATO. They undoubtedly
will urge Trudeau to maintain Canada's military
commitments toward Europe.
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ETHIOPIA - ARAB STATES
Arab aid for the rebels in Ethiopia'
Eritrea Province may be increased.
In Beirut, Osman Saleh Sabbe, the leader of
one of the two main factions of the rebel movement,
rejected the reported plan of a group of Eritrean
notables living in Addis Ababa tp try to arrange
negotiations between the ruling military and the
rebels. The council itself may ?not have approved
the scheme.
Light fighting was reported in Eritrea Province
over the weekend. Air force planes continue to
bomb suspected rebel positions on the outskirts of
Asmara.
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Mexico's Ref orma Oil Province
Nu Area with 12 to 15 structures and
5 new oilfields U GULF OF It1 EX ICI)
I
Area of very favorable seismic surveys
Projected trend
*MEXICO
Cunduacan
CaCtus
Citio Gran
557356 2.75 OA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Mexico's chief petroleum reservoir engineer
recently said that the rich Tabasco-Chiapas oil
discoveries may extend 50 miles offshore into the
Gulf of Mexico.
At last count, 61 of 68 wells drilled in the
onshore fields were successful. Onshore proved and
probable reserves are now on the order of 18-20 bil-
lion barrels. There is a growing belief that all
five major fields in the Reforma area--Sabancuy,
Citio Grande, Cactus, Samaria, and Cunduacan--
actually constitute one enormous reservoir. If so,
and if the pool extends offshore, as seems highly
likely, Mexico's new oil reserves could approach
Persian Gulf dimensions.
The Spanish government's arrest of two army
officers in Barcelona last week suggests that there
is serious disagreement within the army over the
role the military should play in maintaining order.
The arrests have come at .a time when there is
confusion within the government on how to handle
spreading labor and student unrest. High Spanish
military officials have told our embassy that the
incident does not mean that the specter of the
Portuguese "captains' revolt" has been raised in
Spain. They admit, however, that the army's delay
in announcing the arrests and its withholding of
details will heighten public speculation that a
subversive plot existed.
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bJflOuNDflRY REPRESENTA,TION.
NOT1N-ECE_SSAR.110, A,OTKORITAtViE;,.,
Cyprus
SIA
Lebanon
Mediterranean Sea BEIRUT
Iraq
(Isree*occupied)
Mersa
.Matruh
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Isra
Alexandria
CAIRO
Egypt
Saudi Arabia
Aswan High Dam
Sudan
S0 100, 110 200 MILES
0 g0 100 1510 !AO KILOMETERS
557355 2-75
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-EGYPT
We present below the principal judg-
ments of an intelligence ..report on The
Soviet Military Presence in Egypt, pre-
pared by our Office of Political Research.
The Soviet military presence in Egypt has al-
ways been closely dependent upon the Soviet politi-
cal base. That presence has fluctuated considerably
over the years with the Egyptian government's rap-
idly changing view of its needs and degree of sat- -
isfaction with Soviet military services to.Egypt.
The prospects for the Soviet presence remain hostage
to this highly volatile political relationship.
Past and Present Soviet Military Advantages
The primary military advantage Moscow now en-
joys in Egypt is the use.of.the Egyptian ports of
Alexandria and Mersa. Matruh to .support Soviet naval
forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviet
Union has in the past enjoyed two other major bene-
fits for operations against the Sixth Fleet:
--Between 1968 and 1972, the Soviets maintained
a naval air unit in Egypt which ?gave the USSR
its first land-based air capability in the Med-
iterranean.
--Between 1970 and 1972, the Soviets were de-
veloping an extensive deep water facility at
Mersa Matruh controlled by the Soviet navy and
for its exclusive use.
All three benefits were granted by Egypt to
the USSR as recompense .for Soviet .services--first
in reequipping and retraining the .Egyptian armed
forces after the 1967 defeat, and ..then in respond-
ing to Nasser's 1970 appeal for installation of a.
Soviet-manned air.defense.system in _Egypt to halt
Israeli raids against Egyptian cities.
Despite these .past services, Soviet-Egyptian
frictions after Nasser's death produced an abrupt
reduction in the Soviet presence.
--On Sadat's orders in July 1972, the 6,600
Soviet air defense combat personnel in Egypt
were entirely withdrawn, the 5,500 Soviets pro-
viding support and advisory services were re-
duced to about 200, and the total of all Soviet
(continued)
Al
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military personnel in Egypt dropped from a peak
of nearly 15,000 in.1971.to less than a thou-
sand. This spectacular change was humiliating
to the Soviet Union and politically harmful to
the Soviet position in the Middle East.
--More important for Soviet military capabili-
ties against the Sixth Fleet, Sadat simulta-
neously ordered the Soviet naval air unit out
of the country and deprived the USSR of its ex-
clusive facility at Mersa Matruh, while allow-
ing Soviet naval vessels to continue to use the
services of Egyptian ports.
The Soviet-Egyptian political tensions which
produced these changes have not disappeared.
--The Egyptians have chafed .at what they have
seen as Soviet overbearing ways and aspirations
for extraterritorial rights. Sadat has above.
all resented repeated Soviet delays or reneging
on commitments to deliver certain weapon systems,
and in 1972 and 1973 he was angered by .the con-
viction that Soviet dealings with the US were
inhibiting Soviet willingness to support Egypt.
--The Soviets in turn have resented. Egyptian
ingratitude for past services and have been
alarmed at the post-Nasser trend toward the
right in Egyptian political.and.economic life.
In 1974, Moscow was particularly chagrined
over Sadat's turn away from the USSR in favor
of dealings with the US and closer reliance.
upon the conservative Arab states, as he sought
both US aid in obtaining Israeli concessions .
and sources of economic and military aid alter-
native to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Military Concerns and Desires
The Soviets today have both specific concerns
and particular ambitions regarding their military
presence in Egypt.
--The most important concern is over the pres-
ervation of the current Soviet naval right to
use Egyptian ports. While the Soviets have a
contractual agreement with Egypt for use of
these facilities, Sadat has nevertheless several
times raised direct or indirect threats to the
port rights as a means of pressuring the USSR
to fulfill arms supply agreements. There is
good evidence that such a threat was raised by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi during his
October 1974 talks with Brezhnev.
(continued)
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? --The Soviets would probably regard loss of the
use of Egyptian ports as a considerable incon-
venience to their Mediterranean operations.
The Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus, also
used by the Soviet navy, would offer a partial
substitute, but would not serve Soviet needs
as adequately, particularly over the near term.
--A second and less urgent concern exists re-
garding the conditions of Soviet naval use of
a reopened Suez Canal, The Soviets probably
do not believe that even in a new major Soviet-
Egyptian political crisis Sadat would dare to
deny them use of the canal. But Moscow is
aware that there are various delays and diffi-
culties which Cairo could create, short of out-
right blocking of Soviet passage. The Soviets
would probably welcome some formal assurances
from Egypt on this score. Beyond this, they
would of course hope for preferential treatment
for their vessels over those of the US and NATO,
but they would not expect this unless present
political conditions change greatly.
In addition, there are undoubtedly military
benefits in Egypt which the Soviets would like to
regain or acquire if their political relationship
with Cairo ever permitted this.
--Near the top of the list would be restora-
tion of the Egypt-based naval air unit. Since
its departure, the important gap represented
by the lack of adequate air support for Soviet
naval units deployed opposite the Sixth Fleet
has not been filled.
--There is some evidence to suggest that the
Soviets also continue to long for restoration
of the facility they were at one time develop-
ing at Mersa Matruh for the exclusive use of
the Soviet navy.
Contingencies Affecting the Future Soviet Presence
Tensions in the Egyptian-Soviet relationship
are such that the chance of Egyptian acceptance of
any proposals for an expanded Soviet presence are
presently quite small. The Soviets are well aware
of this. These odds would improve for the USSR in
the event of Egyptian involvement in a new war with
Israel, particularly if it led to an Egyptian de-
feat. In the latter case, circumstances could
emerge in which the Egyptian need for Soviet help
would become so grave as to induce Sadat to accept,
or even to request, additional Soviet forces and
facilities in Egypt.
(continued)
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On the other hand, there is reason to believe
that Sadat's ability to fend off any future Soviet
pressures for an increased presence would be further
strengthened if a significant additional Israeli
Sinai withdrawal could be arranged, and the Suez
Canal meanwhile reopened. This would satisfy the
most essential Egyptian war aims and increase Egyp-
tian incentives to try to remain out of any future
Middle East fighting, while reducing Egyptian de-
pendence on prospective Soviet help. There is
strong evidence that Sadat's preference is to mini-
mize such dependence on the USSR so far as his po-
litical needs permit.
In the absence of a new war, there is some
chance that another crisis in Soviet-Egyptian rela-
tions, possibly induced by further Soviet reneging
on promised arms shipments, could lead Sadat to
take sudden action to deny Soviet naval units use
of Egyptian ports. Recently Sadat has personally
alluded in public to the possibility of abrogation
of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, an act
which would probably presage action against Soviet
port rights. We estimate the chance of such dras-
tic Sadat action over, the next twelve months to be
on the order Of one in three, which is somewhat
greater than the chance of his giving the USSR an
increased.presence.
On balance, over the next year the chances seem
somewhat better than even that there will be neither
an improvement nor a further reduction in the Soviet
military presence in Egypt. This is largely because
both leaderships still have important reasons to try
to keep their ongoing disagreements from escalating
to the breaking point.
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