THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977391
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 8, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
8 April 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
8 April 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The military situation in Laos is assessed on Page 1.
the Vietnamese Communists,
who are still keeping up their military pressure on
the new government. (Page 3)
North Vietnam's efforts to supply its forces in the
south prior to the start of the monsoon season, and
the latest information on the rate of troop infiltra-
tion, are discussed on Page 4.
Protests of South Vietnamese veterans and students
could lead to considerably more serious trouble for
the government. (Page 5)
Soviet willingness to risk becoming more deeply in-
volved in the Middle East conflict through the in-
stallation of its SA-3 missiles in Egypt is causing
uncertainty among Israeli leaders and more thought
among them about reliance on US support. (Page 6)
The Soviet Union and Communist China may exchange
ambassadors once again. (Page 7)
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LAOS: Current Situation
AREA OF
MAIN MAP
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Communist-held locatio
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Despite the ineffectiveness of enemy ac-
tions in recent weeks, the Communists are
now preparing to return to the offensive
and the battle for Long Tieng is headed
into a new phase. The Communists' first
sharp thrust toward the base, which three
weeks ago came perilously close to sweep-
ing yang Pao's beleaguered guerrillas from
the area, was blunted. At least for the
present, the initiative has passed to the
government. With regular Lao Army troops
from south Laos/
IVang Pao has
deployed his guerrillas against Communist
forces northward to the Plaine des Jarres.
This is the kind of work the guerrillas do
best, and with continuing heavy air sup-
port, they have managed to take back sev-
eral strategically located ridges and are
now pressing the enemy at Tha Tam Bleung.
For their part, the North Vietnamese appear
somewhat at a loss about how to respond to the turn-
around in the situation. They have brought up some
reinforcements to retake Sam Thong--the refugee cen-
ter a few miles from Long Tieng--but so far without
success. The enemy is clearly having supply prob-
lems, although efforts are under way to establish a
capability for a prolonged campaign against Long
Tieng.
Long Tieng is not out of the woods. The
recent history of Laos is replete with in-
stances where the Communists were able to
defeat ostensibly superior government
forces with remarkable speed and ease.
There is no reason to suspect that the
Royal Laotian forces reinforcing at Long
Tieng will be any better in a serious
fight. Nonetheless, time is beginning to
slip through the enemy's fingers. The
rainy season is about two months away,
and the Communists' principal objective
is still not gained. The North Vietnamese
will almost certainly continue to bore in
against Long Tieng, but their capacity to
mount deeper offensives into government
'territory is beginning to slip away.
.(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
After several weeks of preparation the enemy
yesterday launched a series of assaults against Phou
Then, an outpost guarding Bouam Long, the most im-
portant government base north of the Plaine des
Jarres. This action is probably being carried out
by major elements of the North Vietnamese 312th Divi-
sion and designed to eliminate Bouam Long as a
springboard for guerrilla operations against Commu-
nist supply lines in northern Laos.
Such a use of the 312th Division, which
presumably could be used in an all-out as-
sault against Long Tieng, is a fresh sign
that the enemy is almost as concerned
about avoiding a repetition of Vang Pao's
offensive against the PZaine des Jarres as
it is about taking Long Tieng itself.
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CAMBODIA: Current Situation
?
'Kampong VC attack
Trach
.Chak?
Large VC
concentratioft_?_
Jib
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98143 4-70 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
The Vietnamese Communists are keeping up mili-
tary pressure. Yesterday government forces reoc-
cupied the town of Chipou in Svay Rieng Province but
already they are reported preparing to abandon it,
fearing more Communist attacks. Viet Cong elements
burned two district headquarters and their small mil-
itary outposts in Svay Rieng on 4 and 5 April. Else-
where, in northern Cambodia, Vietnamese and Lao Com-
munist forces were said by the Cambodians to have at-
tacked and burned an army outpost in Stung Treng
Province on the night of 4 April. Although Stung
Treng has been the scene of fairly heavy insurgent
activity, this is the first time an attack there has
been attributed to the Communists.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM-LAOS
The Communists seem embarked on a final effort
to complete supply shipments to South Vietnam before
the rainy season settles in. Rear service inter-
cepts mention April as the "critical stage of the
crash program," describing it as a "short period of
intense work." One major organization in the Laos
Panhandle claimed in a recent intercept that 83 per-
cent of the current dry season supply program for
South Vietnam had been completed by the end of March.
The possibility of an early advent of the
rains may be giving the Communists added
reason to finish up quickly.
It is too early yet to judge how complete
the rainy season curtailment of supply
shipments will be this year. Preliminary
indications are that it will be nearly as
complete as last year, when the logistics
organization virtually withdrew from the
panhandle.
As yet there are few signs the Communists
intend to turn off the infiltration flow
as completely or as early as they did last
year. The input so far this month already
has surpassed the total for the whole of
April 1969, when only 2,300 men started
south. But if most of the enemy's logis-
tics units in Laos go home next month--which
seems suggested in their recent communica-
tions--the Communists probably will be able
to sustain only a token infiltration flow
over the summer months.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
The government over the last two days has tried
by a combination of firmness and conciliation to get
demonstrating veterans off the streets, but so far
with little effect. Despite orders to act with re-
straint, the police in Saigon on a number of occa-
sions used tear gas on the veterans. The govern-
ment's offer of temporary quarters in Saigon while
permanent housing is being built so far has failed
to mollify the veterans. President Thieu has also
asked for urgent National Assembly action on a bill
providing increased payments to veterans.
Thieu is clearly concerned about the vet-
erans' demonstrations because of a fear
that their cause is viewed with some sym-
pathy in the armed forces. His attempts
to calm the situation are being complicated
by a simultaneous student protest and by
the general discontent over rising living
costs. So far the students and the veter-
ans have not concerted their actions.
Should they do so, the government would
be in for considerably more serious trou-
ble.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL-USSR-EGYPT
The introduction of Soviet SA-3 missiles into
Egypt has caused uncertainty to creep into the cal-
culations of Israeli leaders about Soviet intentions.
Heretofore, the Israelis had estimated that Moscow
would avoid becoming directly involved in the fight-
ing. Ambassador Barbour believes the government is
less certain of this now, and is worried about draw-
ing the Soviets deeper into the conflict. Recently,
there has been more emphasis in Tel Aviv on the need
for US support and for a US warning to the Soviets
against further entanglement.
The changed situation has provoked a wide-rang-
ing debate on future Israeli military actions. There
is general agreement, however, that air superiority
must be maintained over the Suez Canal in order to
keep down casualties and prevent Nasir from undertak-
ing new adventures. In this regard, Israeli leaders
have said they would not raid Cairo, Alexandria, or
the Aswan region, all areas of special interest to
the Soviets, in tacit exchange for continued Israeli
air superiority along the canal.
There have been no raids on SA-3 sites in
any of these places, and no strikes close
to Cairo since late February. At the same
time, the Israelis have bombed heavily
along the canal in the hope of preventing
the installation of an effective Soviet
air defense.
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USSR - COMMUNIST CHINA
?Soviet officials say that they and the Chinese
have agreed to exchange ambassadors once again,
.after a hiatus going back to 1966. Public announce-
ment has been delayed pending Peking's acceptance
of Moscow's -nominee, Vladimir Stepakov. Stepakov,
who until recently headed the party central commit-
tee's propaganda department, has neither diplomatic
experience nor expertise in Chinese affairs. No one
has been nominated yet by the Chinese side.
Soviet officials made a point of present-
ing this news to US Embassy officials in
Moscow as evidence of progress at the Pe-
king talks. Even so, there is no indica-
tion of progress on basic differences such
as the frontier question, and Moscow's war
of words with China continues.
The Chinese clearly view the current talks
as a useful means to forestall potentially
dangerous Soviet pressure. As a result
they also have an interest in creating the
appearance of some progress and probably
will accept the new Soviet ambassador.
For their part, the Soviets may be calcu-
lating that they could substitute the new
ambassador for Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov and continue talks at a lower
Level, avoiding the appearance of failure.
We also suspect that in notifying the US
of the ambassadorial agreement, the So-
viets may be trying to suggest that they
are bringing their problems with China
under control on the eve of the second
round of the strategic arms limitation
talks.
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