THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 MAY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976767
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 10, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/7 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100080001-0
The President's Daily Brief
10 May 1969
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100080001-0
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
We offer some first thoughts on what may be behind
the remarks of Tho and Thuy to Ambassador Lodge on Wednes-
day, a rationale that may also pertain to the new Front
peace proposal. The Communists seem to be saying they
believe US efforts to date have been aimed at buying time
so that the war can be turned over, at least in part, to
the South Vietnamese. They do not believe the US is gen-
uinely interested in bringing the war to an early end.
Thuy said "the best thing would be to end the war,
the sooner, the better," and Tho remarked that neither the
US nor North Vietnam has any interest in protracting the
war. In making the point that the war ought to be ended
soon, Tho went on to admit that North Vietnam has lost men
and resources, just as the US has.
These remarks strike us as further evidence that Hanoi
is quite concerned that the US concept of Vietnamizing the
war may buy the allies considerable time and thus stretch
out the negotiations further than Hanoi had anticipated.
The Communists may have decided to accelerate the pace of
the negotiations in order to put pressure on the US to make
some early concessions.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Czech party leader Husak, in an article in Pravda
which was probably intended exclusively for Soviet readers,
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
charged that nonparty "anti-Socialist forces" had generated
a crisis following the replacement of Novotny in order to
overthrow the party leadership. This attack, which by im-
plication includes the Dubcek regime for failing to curb
the threat, is the strongest by any top leader since the
intervention.
The fact that this article was not republished in
Czechoslovakia underscores the weakness of Husak's position
at home. To overcome this weakness, Husak is working to-
ward an extensive personnel shakeup in party and government.
This will not be easy.
We do not see any political significance to the recent
rash of deaths of Soviet generals announced in the Soviet
press. Two of these generals, who were said to have per-
ished "tragically"--a phrase usually denoting a violent
death by accident--may have died in a single accident.
Because of dissimilarities in the ages, status, and pro-
fessional positions of the others, however, there is little
reason to suppose their deaths were linked.
Since the first of the year, 46 generals have died,
including the nine announced in the past two weeks, but
few of the others were picked up by the Western press.
Furthermore, this figure is not much higher than the 37
who had died by this time last year.
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing significant to report.
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
COMMUNIST CHINA
PERU
The government has asked International Telephone and
Telegraph to reduce its holdings in the Peru Telephone Com-
pany from 67 to 49 percent. The government would pay for
the shares in local currency; ITT would then be required
to invest the money in Peru. The current contract states
that the government must either buy out ITT by 12 August
or permit it to retain its shares until 1971.
Earlier discussions aimed at the "Peruvianization" of
the telephone company hinted at expropriation if an agree-
ment is not worked out.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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50X1
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100080001-0