THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF (MORNING) 17 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976620
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 17, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
The President's Daily Brief
17 February 1969
(Morning)
19
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
32
36
Latakia I
Nicosia
CYPRUS
Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities .
?32?
Mediterranean Sea
Al ea ndria
?28?
Haifa./
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv-
Yafo
GAZA STRIP
Port Said
Cairo .
SINAI
. PENINSULA
Beirut*
.Hamah
SYRIA
LEBANON
*Damascus
GOLAN HEIGHTS
Yarmuk R.
/WEST ,
\ BANK .,:r
Amman
L *
?Jerusalem
(C
/ ___) Y)
((
\ )
\ , JORDAN
\ /
\ /
\ )
\
Dead
Sea
? \
Elat )
t? Aqaba
UNITED
R AB
REPUBLIC
(E c Y P T)
Hurghada
aSharm ash-
Shaykh
Qina
Red
Sea
?32---
SAUDI
?28?
AR ABI A
50 100 .?
MILES
ASWAN
32 HIGH DAM 36
?24-
93478 1-69
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Soviet diplomats are making it clear that Moscow wants
substantive discussions of a political settlement early in
the four-power talks. At the UN, Malik has suggested to
Ambassador Yost that the four powers work up "guidelines"
for carrying out the Security Council resolution of 1967.
He said Jarring needed specific guidance more than a gen-
eral statement of support for his mission. The Soviets'
unfolding strategy seems to be to push for a four-power
peace plan,, which either Jarring or the Security Council
would present to the Arabs and Israelis.
At the same time, as Dobrynin has indicated to Secretary
Rogers, the Soviets seem anxious to search for the ingredients
of a settlement in bilateral talks with the US. They have re-
peatedly told the Arabs that only a Soviet-US agreement could
break the deadlock in the Middle East.
The French and the British are also telling Yost that
they think Jarring should be given some substantive guidance
by the four powers. For the French, this is yet another ex-
ample of the similar views Paris and Moscow have on handling
the Arab-Israeli issue. The Soviets have always taken a
more hopeful line with France than with others on the chances
for a settlement. They recently claimed to a French official
that they, were willing to press the Arabs to accept all aspects
of a settlement even before an Israeli withdrawal began.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EUROPE
Debra's threat to leave the Western European Union (WEU)
is the latest sign that the French think Britain and its al-
lies have gotten in some shrewd blows recently. Paris clearly
is worried that unless a quick halt is called to the consul-
tations between Britain and the Five a disturbing precedent
will have been established. There has not yet been time for
much reaction to Debra's blast, but the British doubtless
were somewhat encouraged by recent West German assurances
that Bonn would go along with London's efforts as long as
the rules of the WEU were strictly followed. (Our reading
of the treaty is that the relevant passages are vague enough
to permit any of several interpretations. Presumably this
could give the Germans a way to back out on the British if
they wanted one.)
There is certain to be more pushing and hauling on the
issue in the next few weeks. The subject is sure to get heavy
treatment both during President Nixon's visit to Europe and
during the semiannual Franco-German summit in March.
Last week's consultations in London are not likely to
have too much effect on the four-power meetings on the Mid-
dle East. The British probably would carry a bit more weight
if they were able to say they had a "Western European" brief.
It is still not clear, however, whether they feel bound by
what the Five told them in London.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
At Annex today we discuss the situation in Britain.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
VIETNAM
Thieu, in a conversation with Ambassador Bunker Friday,
showed considerable nervousness about the impending consul-
tations between President Nixon and De Gaulle. The South
Vietnamese are naturally suspicious of French motivations
where Vietnam is concerned. This suspicion has recently
been reinforced by the rumormongering of lower level French
officials apparently hoping to undermine US-Saigon relations.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
CHINA
22-
BURMA
20-
18-
16-
14-
BANGKOK
12-
10-
192
LAOS
'Luang Prabang
VIENTIANE
Udon Thani.
194
Lao Cal,ff
,
\ 7 ?
? .
?????-.,Ven Bai
?
.Sot
r j.p,. ? . ?
- ' ? I
196
a.;111
Hoa Binh.
THAILAND
Batrambang
GULF OF
SIAM
VIETNAM
0 25 50 75 100 125
MILES
Samneua.
, ?
?
' rhanh Hoa.
Thai
Nguyen.
? ?/1
17?RS
HANOI?
?
c?-\ - ?
vi-lainh`ohg ?
198
Lang Son..
.Ning-ming
Nam Dinh.
01;0'
+.
t"\
NORTH
VIETNAM
.Sayannakhet
Tinh
?????-?
_
Tchepone.
GULF
OF
TONKIN
Dong Hol
.Nan-ning
CHINA
V. rih,Linh. Demarcation Line
ang Tri
LAOS
*Saravane
PHNOM PENH
*
102 104
Can Tho
??7 IV CORPS
.Ca Mau
(Da Nang
.1?
HAINAN
SOUTH
VIETNAM
? (
,Qnang Ngai
\
-22
e
-18
-16
-14
A4Qui Nhon
,y
I
I
.., ? , .....?:?..,..,?,,
? 4.1
.tiAt
. BiahnjaMt e
._ .....,
-'? .e? 'r
?4---, ??)%?iN...!ia Trang
L.. ....--t .,..) ,_, 1.
1' 1-.)701)
.?
Loc Ninh t
Tay Ninh ? r
--)
III CORPS __-.1
My Tho
\S?.
Vung Tau
Capital Special Zone
SOUTH
CHINA SEA
106 108
-12
?Ga'm Ranh
-10
93465 1-69
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The hospitality shown
the Communist delegations in Paris cannot, however, have es-
caped the notice of the South Vietnamese. Saigon probably
really fears that De Gaulle will use his talks with the Presi-
dent to put Communist demands in their most attractive form.
Military activity was light over the weekend as the Com-
munists generally observed their Tet cease-fire. The enemy
remains in a position, however, to launch widespread attacks
at any time.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PERU-CHILE
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NIGERIA
Nigeria has bought 30 million rounds (about $2.3 million
worth) of small arms ammunition from the USSR.
the ammunition will be
shipped by sea. Five million rounds may be ready for ship-
ment before I March. The Nigerians are also going to take
a look at some Soviet antiaircraft guns which are for sale.
The federal government's attempts to interdict Biafra's
one operating airstrip are causing relief organizations in-
creased concern. In one raid last week two relief aircraft
were slightly damaged. Even if these raids do not close the
airstrip, they could discourage pilots from making nightly
arms and relief flights.
5
50X1
50X1
50X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FUR 11-1E PRE,S1DENT ONLY
INTERNAL PRESSURES ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
SIGNIFICANCE:
The severe economic problems which have be-
deviled Wilson's
1964 have forced
ments throughout
Labor Government since it took office in
Britain to abandon many of its commit-
the world. With the battle to solve the
balance of payments problem still not won and with massive
international debts to repay, Britain will for many years
have to tailor its foreign and defense policies to avoid
large new expenditures. These policies will also become
increasingly aimed at promoting cooperation with Europe,
goal which will probably begin to push Britain away from
the close relationship that it has had with the Os.
a
Britain's economic troubles bid fair to bring the elec-
toral defeat of the ruling Labor Party. In numerous by-elec-
tions for Parliament and in local elections during the past
two years, the party has been badly beaten. The public opin-
ion polls during that period have recorded the lowest stand-
ing for a prime minister and a governing party in the 30-year
history of the polls. Many Britons, who once admired Wilson's
mastery of the political arts, now consider him a political
opportunist. At the same time, the polls have been very er-
ratic and strongly influenced by specific developments. The
political recovery of the Labor Party cannot, therefore, be
ruled out. An election is not required until March 1971,
leaving barely time enough for the Wilson government to dem-
onstrate convincingly that it can manage the economy.
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Despite Labor's misfortunes, no permanent realignment of
voter sentiment in favor of the Conservatives appears to have
taken place. As an individual, Conservative leader Ted Heath
has seldom topped Wilson's poor showing in the public opinion
polls.
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Economic Problems
The political fortunes of the Labor Party are tied to
the success of the devaluation of sterling ($2.80 to $2.40),
which took place in November 1967. The underlying weakness
of the pound stems from the UK's recurring balance-of-payments
deficits and large international debts. In order to secure
the maximum benefits to international payments and debt re-
duction from the devaluation, constraints have been placed on
wage increases and credit. These constraints are intended to
help protect the gains from the devaluation in price competi-
tiveness and profits and to hold down demand for imports. The
authority for certain of these measures lapses in late 1969.
In the meantime, failure to achieve marked improvements in
the balance of payments would only make public acceptance of a
continuation of the present controls more difficult to obtain.
50X1
London has focused its economic policy almost exclusively
on correcting its international payments situation. Sustained
improvement is vitally necessary to retire some $7 billion in
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
50X6
50X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
debt accumulated in defense of sterling. The government had
hoped that devaluation and related economic measures would cut
the UK's balance .of payments deficit sharply in 1968. Instead,
it rose to about $1.3 billion, compared with about $900 million
in 1967, The major factor in this setback was the continuation
of a sizeable imbalance im Britain's foreign trade. Strong
consumer demand brought an unexpectedly high level of imports
which offset the gains from a rapid growth in exports. More
measures were taken late in the year to stem the flow of imports.
In 1969 the British may achieve a surplus in international
payments ranging from $240 million to $600 million. The December
trade deficit was unexpectedly large, but the January trade def-
icit was the smallest since devaluation. This improvement
should be maintained in early,1969 by the impact of the restric-
tions applied in November on credit for imports. The measures
taken in 1968 to redirect production and investment toward the
export industries will also continue to have an effect.
A number of developments, however, could alter this op-
timistic outlook. For example, a significant slowdown in the
growth of world trade or the devaluation of the French franc
would hinder British exports, but these external pressures are
not likely to be felt within the first quarter of 1969.
Another crucial factor will be the government's ability
to restrain excessive increases in wages, while avoiding the
kinds of strikes that have been so damaging to the British
economy in recent years. In 1968, the government was forced
by strike threats to allow exceptions to its 3 1/2% ceiling
on wage increases. These breaches were justified by reference
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
to high productivity or the long interval since the previous
increases, but they have encouraged other unions to press ex-
orbitant demands.
There were no strikes last year with the economic impact
of the seamen's strike of 1966 or the dockworker's walkout of
1967, but British industry was nevertheless plagued by innum-
erable work stoppages, mostly wildcat strikes. In an effort
to control labor disputes the government has proposed major
reforms in British labor relations, including a 28-day cool-
ing off period for wildcat strikes. These proposals may not
be enacted into legislation until 1970.
The effort to improve the UK's balance of payments re-
mains very much a race against time. Sterling is weak and
extremely vulnerable to any upset in the international mone-
tary system.
A5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006800100001-1