THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014776
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 19, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 19, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5 B(1)42),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
April 19, 1975
Table of contents
South Vietnam: The communists are tightening their
noose around Saigon. (Page 1)
Cambodia: Phnom Penh radio remains off the air,
and few details are available on the commu-
nist occupation. (Page 3)
China-Cambodia: Peking's major statements on the
"liberation" of Phnom Penh re-emphasize China's
solidarity with the rebels. (Page 4)
China-Korea: Peking appears to be setting down a
moderate tone for North Korean President Kim
Il-song's visit. (Page 5)
Jordan: King Husayn and his prime minister have
been pursuing a more active foreign policy.
(Page 6)
France:
Spain-US:
(Page 8)
(Page 9)
Panama Canal Treaty: We present an estimate of
probable reactions in Panama to three assumed
outcomes of the present canal negotiations.
(Page 10)
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Xuan Loc
1
N VIE TN *VI\
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557732 4-75
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.I.fung Tau
CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
SOUTH
, VIETNAM
AIGON
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The communists are tightening their
noose around Saigon. In a matter of days,
they will have 17 full divisions to com-
mit against remaining government positions
defending the capital and the delta, and
will outnumber the government forces by
about two-to-one.
The South Vietnamese have only seven divisions
left and many of these have recently been hard hit.
Three other divisions are in the process of rebuild-
ing, but they will not be ready for combat in the
next few critical days. Moreover, communist artil-
lery attacks are threatening to close down govern-
ment airbases close to the capital. Without air
support, the South Vietnamese will be outgunned as
'Nomll as outmanned.
At Xuan Loc, on the eastern end of Saigon's
defense line, South Vietnamese forces are still
crumbling in the face of sustained communist at-
tacks. It appears likely that the South Vietnamese
18th Division and an Airborne brigade will be lost.
At least one of the attacking communist divisions--
the North Vietnamese 6th--already has pulled away
from Xuan Loc and is swinging to the south, either
headed for Vung Tau or around the government's
southern flank and on toward Saigon.
A large gap in the defensive perimeter of Bien
Hoa was filled yesterday when a brigade of Marines
was moved into blocking positions to the north of
the city. Despite airstrikes against North Viet-
namese artillery positions, the Bien Hoa airbase
has been hit again with large-caliber artillery and
rockets.
To the south and west of Saigon, the communists
are bringing the fight closer to the capital. Dur-
ing the past two days, a flurry of communist at-
tacks in Long An Province spread to the outskirts
of the capital. A number of smaller positions were
overrun and many others were hit hard with shellings
and ground attacks.
(continued)
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the commu-
nists were in a position to put military pres-
sure on his forces which could not possibly be con-
tained. reserves, including
parts of the Airborne Division, have taken heavy
casualties, are exhausted, and cannot fight much
longer.
The communists are threatening to close down
the government's two large airbases at Bien Hoa and
Tan Son Nhut. The Bien Hoa airfield has already
been hit by 122-mm. artillery, which has a range of
13 miles; the communists also possess the heavier
130-mm. field gun, which is accurate up to 17 miles.
The North Vietnamese may also be movina SA-2 surface-
to-air missiles toward the bases.
The
SA-2 missile, which is normally effective against
aircraft above 1,000 feet, has a range of just under
20 miles.
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CAMBODIA
Radio Phnom Penh has been off the
air since late Thursday. The French
government's representative there is
maintaining the, only contact with the
outside; he apparently is staying in-
side the French embassy compound and
has provided few details on the com-
numist occupation.
The French diplomat did report yesterday that
all French newsmen were safe, thus casting some
doubt on a rumor that the communists had executed
21 journalists.
Intercepted messages confirm that the commu-
nists are evacuating large numbers of civilians from
the city. Most who have left are apparently headed
for provinces north of the capital. The evacuation
will reduce the capital's population to a more man-
ageable level but will complicate any international
relief effort.
There is no indication yet that senior Khmer
communist leaders have entered Phnom Penh to set
up a new regime. Their occupation plans call for
the establishment of a temporary "revolutionary
council" to consolidate control in the city, and
press reports indicate that a "council" has been
formed.
Prince Sihanouk is in Peking where he has re-
ceived numerous congratulatory messages.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations--
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the
Philippines--yesterday announced joint recognition
of Sihanouk's government. Laos and Portugal made
similar announcements. Japan followed suit today,
even though Sihanouk had told a Japanese newsman
that any such move would be rebuffed because of
Tokyo's past support for the Lon Nol government.
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CHINA-CAMBODIA
Peking's major statements yesterday
on the "liberation" of Phnom Penh re-
emphasize China's solidarity with the
rebels and the importance Peking attaches
to Prince Sihanouk's past and future role
.in Cambodia.
An authoritative People's Daily editorial de-
clared that the Cambodian people were successful
because they rallied around a united front that in-
cluded Sihanouk as well as the communists. Express-
ing its interest in Sihanouk's future role, the ed-
itorial asserted that the united front, formally
chaired by Sihanouk, and the royal government "rep-
resents the interests of the Cambodian people."
Moreover, Peking's congratulatory message from
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders
was addressed to "head-of-state" Sihanouk, as well
as to the prime minister and deputy prime minister
of the royal government. These references clearly
indicate that Peking expects the Prince to play a
significant role in Phnom Penh; they may also mean
that the Chinese hope to preempt any possible move
to shunt Sihanouk aside.
The thrust of the Chinese statements is that
Peking should be considered the new regime's most
consistent ally. The editorial specifically con-
trasts Chinese support with the duplicity of the
Soviets. The editorial carefully balanced criti-
cism of the US role in Cambodia with an attack on
the Soviets for supporting Lon Nol until the last
minute. It said Moscow had been exposed as "a po-
litical gambler who has lost his all."
Neither the editorial nor the congratulatory
message makes any direct reference to Hanoi--an in-
dication that the Chinese may expect to find them-
selves in competition with the North Vietnamese
for influence in Phnom Penh.
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.CHINA-KOREA
Peking appears to be setting down
a moderate tone for North Korean Presi-
dent Kim Il-song's visit, which began
on Thursday.
Although the reasons for Kim's visit are not
yet clear, the importance that the Chinese attach
to it is obvious from the massive welcome Kim re-
ceived and the fact that Kim met with Mao--in the
Chairman's first appearance in three months--only
hours after he arrived in Peking. The very fact
that Kim has traveled to China, for his first offi-
cial visit in 14 years, in itself suggests that is-
sues of importance to both countries are under dis-
cussion.
A People's Daily editorial that appeared the
day before Kim's arrival in Peking pledged support
for the "correct policy" of peaceful reunification
of the two Koreas. Treatment of the US role in
Korea was perfunctory; the only reference to US
troops in the south was a pro forma statement that
they "must be withdrawn."
The editorial drew no connection between recent
events in Indochina and the Kim visit. In fact, the
references to "peaceful reunification," as well as
the relatively restrained criticism of Seoul, strongly
suggest that Peking is in no mood to support any
thoughts Kim may have about increasing tensions on
the Korean peninsula.
If Kim is in Peking to engage in military dis-
cussions--military aid negotiator 0 Chin-u was in-
cluded in the talks with Mao--the Chinese will be
careful in their response because of concern that
the North Koreans will turn to the Soviets if they
are cold-shouldered in Peking. Although Moscow has
shown no disposition to encourage any Korean adven-
turism, the Chinese are especially sensitive to
Soviet relations with Pyongyang.
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JORDAN
King Husayn and his prime minister
have recently been pursuing a more ac-
tivist foreign policy highlighted by
closer contacts with Syria and a less
hostile attitude toward communist states.
Within the past six weeks Jordan has:
--Embarked on an unprecedented, close relation-
ship with Syria, including wide-ranging eco-
nomic and trade agreements and active military
and political consultations.
--Advertised its intention of seeking Soviet
air defense equipment from Syria if its re-
quests for US equipment are not met quickly.
--Entertained several Soviet economic and po-
litical delegations and lavishly welcomed
Romanian President Ceausescu.
--Approved bids for diplomatic representation
by Yugoslavia, East Germany, and North Korea.
In another of his periodic rounds of major army
units this month, the King stressed the threat of
war, Jordan's military needs, and its solidarity
with other Arab states in demanding that Israel re-
turn Jerusalem and the West Bank to Arab control.
He has been unusually strident on the subject of
Jerusalem, and made a point of raising it during
the official reception for Ceausescu.
the direction of Jordanian poli- cy, fearing that the
country will be drawn into costly entanglements
abroad when it should be concentrating on internal
development.
concern about
if the King turns to Syria for
air defense weapons, Syrian advisers might be sta-
tioned in Jordan.
Jordan's increasing inv- olvement with Syria could
invite a war with Israel for which the army and air
force are unprepared.
(continued)
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The King and Prime Minister Rifai are due in
Washington at the end of this month for a discussion
of Jordan's military and economic needs, and much of
their recent activity is designed to focus US atten-
tion on their aid requests. But their efforts to
diversify and strengthen Jordan's foreign ties re-
flect a genuine concern that the US can neither pre-
vent another Middle East war by a new diplomatic
initiative nor provide Jordan with the means it con-
siders vital to its defense.
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FRANCE
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SPAIN?US
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PANAMA CANAL TREATY
We present below the precis of a
National Intelligence Estimate, "Panama
Canal Treaty: The Likely Consequences
of Certain Contingent Developments,"
which was approved by the United States
Intelligence Board yesterday.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate prob-
able reactions in Panama to three assumed outcomes
of the present canal negotiations. The paper does
not estimate the chances for successful conclusion
of the ongoing negotiations, nor does it address the
'negotiating positions of the parties.
Scenario 1: A treaty is signed and both sides begin
? the ratification process.
The Panamanian government will be able to ob-
tain ratification of a treaty that Torrijos endorses
and energetically supports.
--Ratification in accordance with the 1972 con-
stitution could come in as little as three
months.
--Torrijos will probably act before the Senate
does, hoping, among other objectives, to influ-
ence that body and to place the onus for rejec-
tion on the US.
A treaty signed and ratified by Panama could
be denounced by a future Panamanian government, but
this is unlikely.
Scenario 2: A treaty is signed, but the US Senate
fails to act upon it for an extended period
or refuses to approve it.
Extended Delay
Panama's reaction will depend on Torrijos' per-
ception of the reasons for the delay and of the
chances for eventual ratification, and on the extent
of his continuing confidence in the US executive
branch.
(continued)
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--Under the best of circumstances, he would
have difficulty living with an extended delay.
--Within a year or less, under growing nation-
alist pressure, Torrijos would openly criticize
the delay, and there would be demonstrations
and some harassment of US personnel.
--As long as he believed the door remained open
for ratification, he would control the level
of the Panamanian response.
Refusal to Ratify
Nationalistic feelings would be ignited and
violence and rioting against US personnel and in-
stallations would occur.
As the initial disorders run their course,
Panama would undertake more calculated actions de-
signed to make operation of the canal difficult.
--There would be harassment and hostile acts,
such as closure of the Canal Zone borders, and
US personnel would be in physical danger.
--Terrorist groups would try to carry out acts
against US interests.
--Torrijos would probably break diplomatic re-
lations with the US and denounce the 1903
treaty.
International support for Panama would be ex-
tensive, particularly in Latin America.
--The prospects for an effective multilateral
dialogue with Latin America would be dealt a
severe blow, and the climate for bilateral
relations would be adversely affected.
--Regional organizations excluding the US
would be given impetus.
The Torrijos government would probably survive,
and any future negotiations with Panama would be
considerably more difficult.
(continued)
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Scenario 3: The negotiators cannot agree on an
acceptable treaty and the talks break down.
If Torrijos perceived that talks might be re-
sumed on his terms, he would maintain a responsible
image.
If talks were not resumed fairly soon, Panama
would resort to tactics like those described in the
case of Senate rejection.
Torrijos would move quickly to such tactics if
he concluded at the outset that there was no hope
for renewed negotiations.
The chances are greater in this scenario that
he would feel duped. This would lead to:
--A more emotional and aggressive response.
--A greater government role in organizing and
directing it, and a greater chance of partici-
pation by members of the National Guard.
--Less prospect for meaningful communication
between the US and Panama.
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Top Secret
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