THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976577
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 22, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
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22 January 1969
19
Tot
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32
F7 Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
?32?
Alexandria
?28?
Mediterranean Sea
Cairo
Port Said
lsmaili& Suez
Canal
UNITED
R AB
REPUBLIC
(E C Y P T)
Suez
Haifa./
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv-
\ BANK
Z. *
e. Amman
2Jeru alem
Dead
GAZA STRIP Sea
Latakia
Beirut*
Yafo / WEST z
36
.Hamah
SYRIA
LEBANON
*Damascus
)GOLAN HEIGHTS
Yarmuk R.
1
)
\ I
SINAI
PENINSULA \ I
1
Elat (
jlAqaba
50 100
MILES
32
Hurghada.
Qina
ASWAN
HIGH DAM
Sharm ash-
Shaykh
Red
Sea
JORDAN
SAUDI
36
?32-
-28?
ARABIA
?24--
93478 1-69
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1-1JK 11-I1 I'K1311J.EIN 1 UAL Y
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Israel is taking strong exception to a speech Nasir
gave to the Arab Socialist Union Monday. Even though
Nasir reaffirmed Egypt's acceptance of the UN Security
Council. resolution of 22 November 1967, Foreign Minis-
ter Eban said the speech "rejected each and every prin-
ciple of that resolution." Prime Minister Eshkol com-
plained that the speech has "made prospects of rapproche-
ment remote," since it showed that the Arabs have not
changed their ultimate objective of destroying Israel.
The speech actually was fairly standard Nasir
fare. He emphasized the need for Arab preparedness
and promised once again Egypt's support of Jarring's
peace efforts. Nasir also played on two perennial
Arab themes--support for the fedayeen terrorists and
refusal to negotiate with an occupying enemy. In con-
trast to the Cairo press, the Egyptian leader eschewed
mention of the US response to the Soviet note, clearly
to avoid prejudicing relations with the new administra-
tion.
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1-1.1K 1 1-i1 l'KUIDhN 1 UN L Y
The US Embassy in Tel Aviv reports that Deputy
Prime Minister Allon is unhappy about being by-passed
by Eshkol in the cabinet decision-making process. He
fears a rapprochement between Eshkol and Minister of
Defense Dayan. Allon has resigned from two of his lesser
government posts, although for the moment at least he
will keep his principal job.
At the root of the problem are the competing ambi-
tions of Dayan and Allon to succeed Eshkol. (We ex-
pect Eshkol to stay in power through 1970, at least.)
The prime minister has tried to maintain a precarious
balance in Israel's unwieldy coalition cabinet by play-
ing off Dayan and Allon and respective factions against
each other. We suspect that Eshkol will manage to
smooth over his difficulties with Allon this time,
but the affair is illustrative of the chronic infight-
ing in the Israeli cabinet which complicates the prob-
lem of fathoming Israeli intentions. Dayan takes a
considerably harder line toward the Arabs than Allon.
2
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rux '1 LLL FKL511>LN 1 UNLY
EUROPE
Nothing of significance to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Prague was quiet today, but indications are growing,
that Saturday's-funeral of the first young man who burned
himself to death will turn into a serious anti-Soviet
demonstration, perhaps even as early as Friday when the
coffin is put on public view. In the meantime, a fourth
person has attempted to take his life by fire.
Czechoslovak President Svoboda, who still retains
the trust of the people, went on national television to-
day to urge moderation "while there is still time" and
to "indicate frankly the seriousness of the situation."
He literally begged his live audience of trade unionists
to turn their support back to the party's leaders, implying
that the workers should ignore the student dissidents.
Svoboda failed to repeat the harsh threats of re-
pression uttered by Premier Cernik on 21 January. He
avoided Cernik's condemnation of youthful demonstrators
as anti-Communists, and instead tried to be conciliatory.
He added weight to his words by announcing he was speak-
ing also for party chief Dubcek, who was home in Brati-
slava with a cold.
3
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192 194
196 198
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NORTH
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93465 1-69
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PUK 11-IL IRL,NIDLINI 1 UINLY
V I ETNAM
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TIM 1 tih I'K1,)11J.CIN 1 (JINL Y
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Several major allied positions, including the Da
Nang airbase, were hit by Communist rocket and mortar
fire on 21-22 January. In general however, the pace
of military activity slackened over the previous day.
5
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Venezuela's Claims on Guyana
co
VENEZUELA
Venezuelan
border forces
(- GEORGETOWN
GUYANA
Essequibo
PARAMARIBO
SURINAM
FRENCH
GUIANA
Area claimed by
VENEZUELA
BRAZIL
MILES
ISO
Area claimed by
NETHERLANDS
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PUK 11-IL liKLJIDLN 1 UNL Y
II OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
VENEZUELA-GUYANA
The US may soon be faced with choosing between
friends as Venezuelan officials
to press their claim on the Essequibo region of
Guyana.
6
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1-1)K 1 fih l'KEVULN1 UN LY
President-elect Caldera's silence on the border dis-
pute may have sharpened fears by military and political
groups in the lame-duck Leoni administration that Cal-
dera will not press Venezuela's claim as vigorously as
they have done. Recent moves by these groups may have
been intended to tie Caldera's hands when he assumes the
presidency in March.
KOREA
Today's Annex is a discussion of North Korean pres-
sures on the South.
COMMUNIST CHINA
Peking yesterday issued another blast at President
Nixon's administration. The content was essentially sim-
ilar to earlier statements about the previous US adminis-
tration.
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KOREA
Sungari
Reservoir
?An-shan
Ch'ongjin
Kimch'aek
Tan-tung
mhung
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA BAY
Chang
Demilitarized Zone
.Kansong
I ncil;g1
ULLUNG-DO
YELLOW SEA
?
Pusan
C ?
TSUSHIMA
HONSHU
JAPAN
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CHEJU-DO
KYUSHU
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH KOREAN PRESSURES ON THE SOUTH
SIGNIFICANCE: The mounting North Korean pressures of
armed harassment and terrorism against the South hold
considerable potential for straining relations between
Seoul and Washington as South Korea seeks to ensure a
high level of US political and material commitment to
its security. At worst, North Korean pressures, espe-
cially if large-scale paramilitary raids continue,
could cause South Korean retaliation in kind and thus
risk escalation into conventional warfare involving US
forces stationed in Korea.
South Korea is now faced with the most formidable
North Korean pressures and harassment since the 1953
armistice. The Communists are increasing their forays
across the Demilitarized Zone and infiltrating armed
agents deep into the South. Their short-term aim prob-
ably is to probe for vulnerabilities in South Korea's
defenses which might be exploited in the future to dis-
rupt the nation's political and economic stability and
shake public confidence in the Seoul government. The
North Koreans almost certainly believe that these sub-
versive pressures will also generate serious frictions
between Seoul and Washington over measures to meet the
threat.
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PUK 11-11 l'Kh,)11J1A 1 U1N L Y
We believe that North Korea's long-range goal is to
unify the peninsula under its control. Pyongyang's tac-
tics over the past two years have been aimed at achieving
what it probably regards as the indispensable condition
for advancing toward this goal--building a strong subver-
sive apparatus in the South and initiating an armed guer-
rilla movement against the South Korean Government. In
launching their campaign of harassment and terrorism in
the fall of 1966, the North Koreans probably calculated
that the US was too heavily committed in Vietnam to under-
take major counteraction in Korea.
North Korea's capability for agent operations and sab-
otage in the South has substantially increased during the
past year.
The level of violence on the peninsula has steadily
increased over the past two years. The assassination at-
tempt against South Korean President Pak in January 1968
and the sea infiltration of over one hundred armed guer-
rillas in November are only the more dramatic aspects of a
generally more aggressive North Korean posture.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Pyongyang's policy seems designed to avoid the risk
of open aggression. North Korea's formidable conventional
military capability appears designed primarily for defen-
sive purposes and places a heavy emphasis on underground
location of strategic facilities and a comprehensive air
defense system. This fortress-state mentality accentuates
the North Koreans' confidence that they can engage in a war
of subversion with relative impunity.
Pyongyang's campaign has had little success to date,
but it has heightened South Korean anxieties about the
availability of greater American military, political and
economic support. Despite the generally strong anti-Com-
munist attitude of the South Korean population, concern has
been expressed in official circles over the possible cumu-
lative effect of North Korean raids in arousing public fears.
Suspicion has also been kindled outside the government that
broadened security measures will be used to suppress legiti-
mate criticism of the regime and to rig the 1971 election
to assure a third term for President Pak.
Seoul, with US assistance, is reacting sharply to cope
with the growing infiltration threat, and has been quick to
perceive the need to remedy shortcomings in its security
performance. Nevertheless, the emergence of larger-scale
North Korean guerrilla warfare would sorely tax the coun-
try's resources, causing massive diversion of personnel and
imposing severe financial burdens. Additionally, the prospect
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of extensive sabotage could discourage foreign investors,
depriving the economy of needed capital and slowing the
country's economic growth on which public acceptance of
the Seoul government largely depends.
There is danger that pressures on President Pak--par-
ticularly from his military supporters--to retaliate in
kind against North Korean forays could lead to encounters
that might at some point involve the two US combat divi-
sions stationed in Korea. (
On the other hand, US efforts to discourage retalia-
tion in the face of continuing South Korean losses from North
Korean harassment could produce serious strains in US - South
Korean relations, particularly if Seoul felt that US political
and material support was inadequate.
The larger the threat looms from the North, the greater
the pressures South Korea will put on the US for additional
assistance. Seoul already is pressing for changes in the
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PUK J1-L1 I'KhJIIJEIN 1 VINL
US - South Korean mutual defense treaty to provide for auto-
matic US retaliation in the ?event of an outright Communist
military attack. South Korea is also seeking modern mili-
tary equipment, an upgrading of its navy and air force, and
the continued presence of large-scale US military forces in
Korea. It would react with dismay to any indication of a
possible reduction in either US presence or determination in
Korea.
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Top Secret
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