THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 31 OCTOBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014942
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 31, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
October 31, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of EO. 11652
exemption category, 58(1),(2).(3)
declassified on on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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IUM11111vV2'1_
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October 31, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Fighting diminished in all sections of
Beirut yesterday following an early-morning
announcement of yet another cease-fire.
(Page 1)
Portugal: The government was presented with a new
challenge yesterday when Lisbon's main arsenal
was seized by troops charged with its security.
(Page 3)
Angola: The National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola and the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola reportedly are preparing
to form a provisional government that would
unilaterally declare Angola independent.
(Page 4)
Egypt: President Sadat and other Egyptian officials
are ambivalent about their position in the Arab
world as a result of the second Sinai disengage-
ment agreement. The views of the other Arab
states are not clear-cut. (Page 6)
USSR-EgykDt: Soviet-Egyptian relations have reached
their lowest point since the 1952 Egy tian revo-
lution
(Page 9)
Notes: Syria; Japan; Spanish Sahara; Bangladesh;
China; Spain (Pages 103 11, 12, and 13)
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LEBANON
Fighting diminished in all sections
of Beirut yesterday following an early-
morning announcement of yet another cease-
fire. Prime Minister Karami has threat-
ened that he will resign if this agree-
ment is not respected.
Karami won approval of the accord at a meeting
on October 29 of Lebanese leftist and Muslim politi-
cians and representatives of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization, the Lebanese internal security
force, and the Lebanese army. Leaders of the large
Christian political parties did not attend but had
offered assurances that they would respect a new
cease-fire.
Prior to the cease-fire, the Christian militias
were gradually being driven from their forward posi-
tions in central Beirut and the city's Western hotel
district. These setbacks resulted from the contin-
ued strengthening of leftist forces with increased
numbers of commandos from the large fedayeen organi-
zations.
Christian elements are said to have withdrawn
and allowed internal security force units to re-
place them in one major hotel, and were negotiating
a similar withdrawal from two others. Leftist
forces reportedly also withdrew some distance, but
they were in a stronger position than before the
clashes spread into the area last weekend. The
Phalangists now may be willing to engage in more
serious political negotiations. At a minimum, a
round of private talks would allow time for the
Phalangist militia to regroup and obtain additional
arms and ammunition.
The terms of the latest cease-fire are much
like those of several previous accords, but they
include a threat that the government radio will for
the first time publicize the identity of persons or
groups responsible for cease-fire violations. Al-
though this tactic ordinarily would not intimidate
the offending parties, they may in this case be
sensitive to the fact that Karami has identified
himself with this novel scheme.
(continued)
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Karami almost certainly does not want to resign.
He presumably put his job on the line to demonstrate
that he has run out of ideas for solving the pres-
ent crisis, but in the expectation that he would be
urged to stay on. In fact, Syrian Foreign Minister
Khaddam, Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, and PLO
chairman Yasir Arafat immediately appealed to Karami
to remain in office.
Arafat reportedly played a centrol role in ne-
gotiating the new cease-fire, and Fatah units were
immediately instructed to adhere strictly to the
terms of the accord. Violations of the agreement
by Lebanese radicals and fedayeen rejectionists
could be interpreted by Arafat as a slap at him,
and might ultimately lead to more forceful efforts
by the major Palestinian groups to control the re-
jectionists.
2
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PORTUGAL
The government, which has had some
success in recent days combating military
indiscipline, was presented with a new
challenge yesterday when Lisbon's main
arsenal was seized by troops charged with
its security.
The rebels issued a statement saying they had
too few men to guarantee the security of the arse-
nal. Their action probably is related to wider con-
cerns expressed by leftist military elements over
the demobilization of the army. Eighteen percent
of the army will be discharged today, and another
9 percent are scheduled for demobilization on Decem-
ber 2. The left has protested that these reductions
are designed to transform the army into a reaction-
ary corps.
Leftist military groups have been losing momen-
tum recently, and efforts to keep pro-government
military regional authorities under pressure have
been somewhat less than successful. Two rallies
this week sponsored by radical military elements
were poorly attended and generally unimpressive.
In contrast to the waning leftist fortunes, anti-
Communists in the military appear to be organizing
themselves more effectively. Officers sympathetic
to the anti-Communist faction of Foreign Minister
Antunes have formed a "Single Military Front" to
combat radical attempts to bring down the Azevedo
government.
The left also is losing ground on the civilian
front. Dissident employees of a Communist-influ-
enced Lisbon newspaper occupied the paper's edito-
rial offices on Wednesday and demanded the removal
of the left-wing management. Earlier this week the
anti-Communist employees won by a 4-to-1 margin a
vote'to dismiss the pro-Communist management commit-
tee.
The Azevedo government is unlikely to move
against the anti-Communist workers, since their ac-
tion is consistent with its recent efforts to loosen
the Communist grip on the press. The Prime Minister
might even use the incident as an excuse to revamp
the management of other left-leaning newspapers.
He is particularly anxious to bring the left-wing
press under control, since it is largely responsi-
ble for stirring up political tensions in Lisbon
and spreading reports of alleged plots to return
the country to right-wing rule.
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ANGOLA
The National Union for the Total In-
dependence of Angola and the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola report-
edly are preparing to form a provisional
government that would unilaterally declare
Angola independent. The move would be
aimed at countering an expected similar
declaration by the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
National Union leader Jonas Savimbi told US
officials in London this week that he expects the
Popular Movement to claim sole sovereignty on Novem-
ber 11. Savimbi indicated that his group and the
National Front intend to declare their own govern-
ment and to continue fighting the Popular Movement
while seeking international recognition. Savimbi
professed to believe that such a government could
win a reasonable amount of international support.
Its formation would also provide an excuse for coun-
tries to remain neutral if they did not want to rec-
ognize a Popular Movement government.
(continued)
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All three liberation groups have unequivocally
rejected a pre-independence coalition. Between now
and independence the National Front and the National
Union intend to mount major offensives designed to
discredit the Popular Movement's claims to control
all important areas of Angola.
Cooperation between the National Front and the
National Union would be, at best, tenuous. Rela-
tions in the field between troops of the two move-
ments are frequently strained, and if these differ-
ences were allowed to worsen it could seriously
impede operations against the Popular Movement. The
National Union's secretary for foreign affairs has
reservations about the National Union's future re-
lations with the National Front, and these reserva-
tions undoubtedly are shared by Savimbi. Further-
more, the National Union continues to believe an
ultimate political settlement must include all three
liberation groups, since no single group or combina-
tion of two of them can expect to govern success-
fully a country as sharply divided tribally as is
Angola.
5
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EGYPT
President Sadat and other Egyptian
officials are ambivalent about their po-
sition in the Arab world as a result of
the second Sinai disengagement agreement.
At times, they exhibit confidence that
Egypt retains the support of most Arab
states despite Syria's vitriolic criti-
cism; on other occasions they show deep
concern that the agreement has undermined
Egypt's position of leadership and that
as long as Syria and the Palestinians re-
main unsatisfied by negotiations, the
Arab mainstream will not Zook toward
Egypt for moral and political guidance.
In fact, views of the other Arab states
are not clear-cut.
The Egyptians have not been hurt materially;
no Arab state has cut off critically needed aid as
a result of the disengagement. Only Syria, Iraq,
and the Palestinians have officially denounced the
agreement in public. None of the Arab states, with
the exception of Syria, wants to risk burning its
bridges with Egypt at this point.
On the other hand, few of the Arab states have
supported Egypt with public statements. Sudan alone
has repeatedly given open backing to Sadat and to
the agreement. Saudi Arabia and Morocco initially
praised the agreement, but since early September
the silence from Riyadh and Rabat has been deafen-
ing. No Arab government has officially stood up to
defend Egypt against the charges of treason that
daily emanate from Syria, and none has seen fit to
censor the anti-Egyptian criticism that is now the
standard fare of virtually every Arab country's
press.
The reaction among the Arabs is almost a re-
flex. None of them, no matter what their basic
sympathies, wants to be seen condoning Egypt's com-
promises with Israel at a time when Syria and the
Palestinians label accommodation treasonous. The
impression left is of a subtle but steady erosion
of Egypt's moral leadership. So far, this erosion
has had no tangible effect, but it is gradually
undermining Egypt's ability to exert a moderating
influence on the Arabs.
(continued)
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Saudi Arabia's position is typical. The Saudis
understand Sadatis reasons for seeking the second
Sinai agreement, and they continue to support him
both materially and, in a quiet way, politically.
They have given no indication that they intend to
cut off their material support, which is critical
for Egypt. Indeed, Saudi officials have recently
urged the US to get on with arms deliveries to Egypt,
for which Saudi Arabia would foot the bill. The
Saudis are, nonetheless, caught in a political di-
lemma as a result of the Sinai agreement that could
at some point weaken their will to continue material
or moral backing for Egypt.
The Saudis are now skeptical, despite their
sympathy for Sadat, that Egypt any longer intends
to be part of the Arab struggle. Riyadh would be
reluctant to continue supporting Egypt if this
meant risking its own relatively new identification
with the Arab cause. If the Saudis come to believe
that Egypt has abandoned the cause through the
Sinai agreement, and particularly if they become a
target of Arab propaganda attacks along with Egypt,
they will place their bets where their status as
Arabs in good standing will be safe--with Syria and
the Palestinians.
Jordan similarly is caught in the middle. The
Jordanians worry about the possible implications
of Egypt's isolation from the Arab world, and they,
perhaps better than any other Arabs, appreciate
Egypt's moderation and its desire to end the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the
only Arabs who have attempted to mediate between
Egypt and Syria. But by its rapprochement with
Syria earlier this year, Jordan had already cast
its lot with Damascus, and its efforts to mediate
have been half-hearted at best. The Jordanians
have allowed their press to denounce Egypt and the
Sinai agreement, and Prime Minister Rifai has per-
mitted himself to be associated with Syrian state-
ments criticizing the accord. Although Jordan has
thus far avoided direct official criticism, King
Husayn recently went on record in an American maga-
zine interview/
/with a statement expressing reservations
about the wisdom of Sadat's acceptance of the dis-
engagement.
(continued)
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Of the other key Arab states, Algeria and the
oil producers on the Persian Gulf also have adopted
ambivalent positions. Because all are on the pe-
riphery of the Arab-Israeli dispute, none of these
states has a direct interest in how negotiations
are conducted, whether by the step-by-step method
or through a multilateral approach. The principal
interest of all these states, but particularly of
Algeria and Kuwait, lies in ensuring that the Pal-
estinians receive full satisfaction. None of them
is prepared to denounce Egypt or the disengagement
or to sever aid relationships with Egypt while
Syria and the Palestinians retain hope of obtaining
something from negotiations themselves. But, like
the Saudis, these states are increasingly doubtful
that Egypt remains dedicated to the Arab--particu-
larly the Palestinian--cause, and are therefore in-
creasingly doubtful that negotiations will be suc-
cessful on other fronts. They will not speak out
in defense of Egypt while the Syrians and the Pal-
estinians remain unsatisfied.
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_ _ _ _ _
USSR-EGYPT
Soviet-Egyptian relations have
reached their lowest point since the
1952 Egyptian revolution2
Moscow has demonstrated continuing nervousness
over the future of the treaty. Pravda, in a scath-
ing denunciation of Egyptian policies andSinai II
on the eve of President Sadat's arrival in the US
this week, went to great lengths in alleging that
it was Sadat himself who had called for the 1971
accord.
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NOTES
Syrian forces on the Golan Heights apparently
remain on a high state of alert.
Japan wants to sign a formal grain pact with
the US to supersede the letter of intent signed
last August which provided for the sale of at least
14 million tons of grain a year for three years.
Tokyo did not press for a more formal pact
last August, but agriculture officials now feel a
formal grain agreement will make it easier to win
Japanese farmers' support for concessions at the
multilateral trade negotiations. Japanese official-
dom has uniformly applauded the US-Soviet grain
agreement as contributing to the stabilization of
the international grain market. They also are
pleased with the escape clause, which assures that
in poor crop years the US will honor its export
commitments to Japan while cutting back exports to
the USSR. The signing of the US-Soviet grain agree-
ment has intensified interest in a binding US-
Japan contract.
(continued)
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Two days of talks on Spanish Sahara among
Spanish, Moroccan, and Mauritanian officialswere
suspended yesterday without any sign of progress
toward a settlement.
Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki reaffirmed
Morocco's opposition to the inclusion of Algeria in
the talks. The Algerian delegation, led by one of
President Boumediene's closest advisers, has been
holding parallel talks with Spanish officials and
was still in Madrid when the Moroccan delegation
left for home. The Algerians presumably are reit-
erating their position that the principle of self-
determination for Spanish Sahara must not be ignored.
Foreign Minister Bouteflika apparently is making
similar demarches to UN Secretary General Waldheim
in New York. Saharans would almost certainly opt
for independence in any fair referendum.
Bangladesh President Mushtaque has joined
other government figures in expressing deep con-
cern to US officials in Dacca about Indian inten-
tions toward his country.
In a conversation on October 29 with Deputy
Assistant Secretary Dubs and Ambassador Boster,
Mushtaque accused India of recently increasing the
number of troops on the Bangladesh border, stirring
up trouble at Dacca University and elsewhere, and
aiding a band of antigovernment guerrillas led by
a supporter of former president Mujib. The Presi-
dent said he is presently able to manage these
situations but is worried about what India may
do in the future./
(continued)
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China has decided to transfer some provincial
party chiefs to new provinces.
Thus far, we have information on only one
three-way shuffle, but according to some Chinese
officials, more transfers are in the offing as an
effort to prevent the provincial leaders from de-
veloping independent power bases. A widespread
rotation of provincial party leaders, most of whom
are civilians, also could be intended as a sop to
the military. Several military men at the regional
and district level have been relocated to remove
them from their power bases. The transfer probably
was not popular with some military men, but they
may be placated somewhat by seeing similar rotations
among their civilian counterparts.
(continued)
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Spain's need for an active head of state, plus
the near certainty Franco will not recover, appar-
ently convinced Prince Juan Carlos yesterday to
become temporary chief of state.
The problem has grown more acute because of dif-
ferences within the government over policy toward
Spanish Sahara. Juan Carlos probably consented
with a tacit understanding that his rule will be
temporary in name only, thereby preserving his
image and the future of the monarchy. He is ex-
pected to preside over a cabinet meeting today.
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,
Top Secret
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