THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015059
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 19, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 19. 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved T.App7c;Tv-re-d'foiRseTe-as'e-2-616/(W/1-9 UA:14DP79T00936A013200010024-4
March 1 9 , 1976
Table of Contents
South Africa 7 Angola:
(Page 1)
Cuba-Africa: Fidel Castro, in his speech in Conakry
on Monday, directed his harshest comments at
the remaining South African presence in Angola.
(Page 2)
Notes: Egypt; Peru; Rhodesia; USSR-Egypt (Pages
3 and 4)
At Annex we examine Syrian Intervention in Lebanon.
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SOUTH AFRICA ? ANGOLA
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CUBA-AFRICA
Fidel Castro, in his speech in Con-
akry on Monday, touched only briefly on
the situations in Rhodesia and Namibia
and directed his harshest comments at the
remaining South African presence in Angola.
While this criticism was couched in belliger-
ent language, he appeared to be giving assurances
that the South African interests in the Cunene dam
would be protected if their troops were withdrawn.
Castro's aggressive posture in Conakry was
probably due in part to his desire to maintain his
reputation as one of the world's leading revolu-
tionaries. His de-emphasis of Rhodesia and Namibia
suggests he is wary of overplaying Cuba's military
role in Africa and sparking local concern over the
presence of Cuban troops.
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NOTES
The Egyptian cabinet resigned yesterday and
President Sadat has asked Prime Minister Salim to
form a new government, which may be named today.
The reorganization is aimed chiefly at the
economic ministries and will essentially be a pal-
liative aimed at giving the appearance of progress
toward resolving economic grievances. Some of
those to be replaced are under attack for ineffi-
ciency; others, ironically, for trying to press
programs too vigorously. Salim is an able admin-
istrator and has been largely responsible for the
recent modest acceleration in the government's
economic program.
President Sadat is being criticized by labor
leaders for stating in his speech last Sunday that
Egyptians will have to face five more years of
austerity. A labor union official has told the US
embassy that workers had expected some commitment
from Sadat on price stabilization and wage increases
Peru
(continued)
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Rhodesia
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Soviet
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Beirut and Vicinity
Ajaltun
As
Suhayla
Ad Bubayyalr\--'
Mediterranean Sea
Antilya
Beirut
? Ar Rabiyah
urnat
Shahwan
Brummana
Babdat
furiyah
Nan,
11-.3
dential
Beirut
International'
Airport
As
Shuwayf
Khaldah
I
Syr' n Forces
Alayh
Bhamdun
MEDITERRANEAN
Baysur
.Tripoli
. Zagharta
?Za la h
()amour
Kafr
Matta
559A13,I, 3-76 CIA
ayr al Qamar
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SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON
The limited intervention of regular
Syrian military forces in central Lebanon
this week is a measure of President Asad's
determination to arrest the deterioration
in the security situation and to force a
political solution on the Lebanese.
The introduction of some 1,000 Syrian regulars,
thinly disguised as additional elements of the Pal-
estine Liberation Army and reportedly supported by
some tanks, appears to have been a calculated gamble
with three immediate objectives:
--to help fill the military vacuum created by
the rapid collapse of the Lebanese army;
--to prevent the Muslim forces under Lieutenant
Khatib from attacking the Christian forces de-
fending President Franjiyah;
--to speed Franjiyah's resignation and control
the selection of his successor.
Since Syria's leverage in Lebanon hinges on
its potential to bring overwhelming military pres-
sure to bear, President Asad apparently concluded
that the presence of at least some Syrian regulars
was necessary to reassert Syrian control. He prob-
ably felt this was the only way to prevent a slide
back into civil war and to get implementation of
the reform package that was achieved through Syrian
mediation last month back on track.
We believe that Asad is prepared to augment,
in a controlled manner, the number of Syrian regu-
lars in central and northern Lebanon if that is re-
quired to break the political impasse in Beirut.
The Syrian Rationale
The principal Syrian aim in Lebanon is to re-
store stability and achieve a political accommoda-
tion acceptable to both Lebanese Christians and
Muslims. The Syrians believe that Franjiyah's res-
ignation is necessary, and they want to control
(continued)
Al
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the choice of his successor; but they are not at-
tempting to deprive the Christians of the presidency
nor are they prepared now to impose a Muslim-domi
nated government on Lebanon.
In our view, Syria does not intend to try to
annex Lebanon. On the other hand, the Syrians prob-
ably do not believe they can abandon their mediation
efforts and allow the resumption of a full-scale
civil war. They have said repeatedly that they will
not allow the partition of Lebanon, which almost
certainly would be the result of a civil war.
The Syrian decision to inject regular forces
was stimulated by the rapid disintegration of the
Lebanese army. The army's collapse, the revolt of
Muslim army elements led by Lieutenant Khatib, and
the attempted coup by Brigadier Ahdab underscored
the fact that there was no Lebanese force capable of
providing nationwide security and enforcing the pro-
visions of the political reform package worked out
in February.
Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi told Ambassador
Murphy last week that the Palestine Liberation Army
was inadequate to provide security throughout the
country. Moreover, the main Palestinian groups in
Lebanon--Fatah and Saiqa--are not capable of main-
taining security outside areas under their immediate
control. They are often at loggerheads, and are
themselves a central issue in the Lebanese dispute.
The introduction of Syrian forces was designed
in part to reinforce President Asad's mediation ef-
fort. Asad apparently calculated that he could make
no further progress through political suasion with-
out applying some military pressure. He probably
calculated that the Israelis would accept that his
only goal was to stabilize the situation and achieve
a political breakthrough.
Asad would have preferred, we believe, not to
risk a hostile Israeli reaction by using Syrian reg-
ulars. He has staked considerable prestige in the
achievement of a successful Syrian mediation. He
hopes to preserve the enhanced stature he has gained
throughout the Arab world because of his mediation
efforts to date and wants to avoid criticism, es-
pecially from President Sadat. Asad also wants to
(continued)
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avoid giving an opening to those in Syria who have
been urging him to side more forcefully with Leba-
nese Muslims and leftists.
Nevertheless, Asad concluded that some form of
intervention by regular forces was necessary to pro-
tect his heavy political investment in Lebanon.
Syria's Next Step
The immediate consequence of Syria's action has
been to stabilize the security situation--at least
temporarily. Syria probably will have to keep some
regular forces in Lebanon, at least until President
Franjiyah resigns. It is also unlikely that Syrian
forces will be withdrawn entirely until there is
discernible progress in reconstituting the Lebanese
army. The Syrians apparently took their action with
the aim of forcing a quick breakthrough. They would
not hesitate to apply additional pressure, probably
in the form of more troops, if it appeared the the
Lebanese were attempting to drag their feet again.
In the event of a renewed civil war, we believe
the Syrians would feel compelled to intervene on a
still larger scale to impose a truce.
In the absence of a renewed civil war, we do
not believe the Syrians are likely to send division-
size units into Lebanon or to deploy sizable Syrian
units in the sensitive southern Lebanese-Israeli
border area. The Syrians would, however, take such
action in the event Israel attempted to occupy
southern Lebanon.
We do not believe the Syrians want to become
bogged down in a sustained police action in Lebanon.
They probably would leave a substantial PLA con-
tingent in place, however, until a reconstituted
Lebanese army proved it was capable of maintaining
adequate security. Eventually, we think Syria
would withdraw the bulk of the PLA.
Israel's Reaction
Although the Israelis are showing signs of in-
creasing nervousness over developments in Lebanon,
they continue to react with restraint and appear
hopeful of being able to avoid being drawn into the
(continued)
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fray.
Israel also continues to conduct reconnaissance
flights over Lebanon and
off the Lebanese coast. The Lebanese-Israeli border
is relatively quiet, with only a few minor shooting
incidents. The Israelis continue to occupy several
positions during daylight hours just inside Lebanon
astride major fedayeen infiltration routes into
Israel.
Any decision to intervene is likely to depend
largely on Israel's perception of the situation
there as it might affect Israel's security. De-
fense Minister Peres told reporters in January that
if the Syrians invaded Lebanon, Israel's reaction
would depend on the security situation "along the
northern border with Lebanon," suggesting that Is-
rael would not intervene if the Syrians sent some
troops in as long as they stayed out of southern
Lebanon and that area remained calm.
We believe the Israelis would send their forces
across the border if the Syrians intervened in Leb-
anon with large armored units, if the Palestine
Liberation Army concentrated large numbers of troops
in southern Lebanon close to the Israeli border, or
if fedayeen or leftist Muslim units began shelling
Israeli settlements or stepped up cross-border op-
erations.
Any Israeli military intervention is likely to
be confined to southern Lebanon. The size of Is-
raeli forces involved, as well as the duration and
depth of the intervention, would depend largely on
the nature of the threat perceived by the Israelis.
Thus, if the Syrians intervened on a massive scale,
the Israelis would be likely to respond in kind,
sending their forces as far as the Litani River
and remaining as long as the Syrians.
If the objective were to counter a terrorist
threat, the Israelis would limit the size of the
intervention force, the depth of its penetration,
and the length of its stay.
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