THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 JULY 1971

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005992739
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 8, 1971
File: 
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PDF icon DOC_0005992739.pdf148.91 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79f0093-6?A009700070001-3 The President's Daily Brief 8 July 1971 46 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T0-0936A609700070001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 July 1971 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS Sink Matak's thoughts on developments in Cambodia are presented on Page 1. The prospects of a serious famine in East Pakistan are increasing. (Page 3) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T0093-6A0097-00070001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CAMBODIA During a wide-ranging conversation with Ambas- sador Swank on 6 July, Sink Matak made the follow- ing comments and observations: --He intends to maintain the Cambodian Army at its current 220,000-man ceiling. He believes that Lon Nol's plans to enlarge the army are ?too ambitious and cannot be realized. --His relations with Lon Nol remain good, and he consults the prime minister regularly on important policy decisions. He added, however, that Lon Nol's efforts to assert his authority on military matters on which he is inadequately briefed causes some "inconvenience." --He credits First Deputy Prime Minister In Tam, with'Undisguised political ambitions,, and feels that he is out.of:tune with the rest of the cabinet Matak is worried that if In Tam-re- signs, he will join the opposition-in the as,- sembly. --He does not believe that the time is ripe for general negotiations with the Communists, and even-less for separate'negotiations affecting Cambodia. He attached no particular importance to former prime minister Son Snn's expected return from Paris this week. Since last August:Son Sann has been in Paris, where he has, made efforts to -es- tablishunofficial contacts with some. of Sihanouks supporters.1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 Egyptian Declassified in Part.- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T0093-6A0097-00070001-3 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Parc- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T0093-6A00970.0070001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY EGYPT 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A0097-00070001-3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY EAST PAKISTAN Estimates of rice production in East Pakistan during the crop year that ended last month have been revised downward to about 11 million tons; compared with 12 million tons in the previous year. Projec- tions for the crop year now beginning are for only 9.5 million tons, leaving a food deficit of about 3.4 million tons. Even if imports of this magnitude could be arranged, it would be virtually im- possible to get them to the food deficit areas of East Pakistan. Port storage facilities are already full because con- tinuing disruptions of the internal trans- port system have hampered movement of food grains to the interior. The ports them- selves are operating far below capacity. Much of the food grain would have to be distributed free rather than through regu- lar commercial channels because of the limited purchasing power in the country- side. Most factories and commercial es- tablishments are still shut down, and the rural works program, which normally employs several million landless laborers, has been interrupted. The chairman of the government's food relief committee has privately admitted "there will be a famine," although the government officially dis- counts this possibility. East Pakistani civil offi- cials are too cowed by the army to differ publicly with the military governor and, as a consequence, little is being done to avert the famine. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700070001-3