THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014738
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 6, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
/
March 6, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category.513(11.(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
a,
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FOR .THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 6, 1975
Table of Contents
Cambodia: Airlift operations at Pochentong air-
field have resumed after a brief suspension.
(Page 1)
South Vietnam: The upsurge in fighting in the
central highlands suggests that the North
Vietnamese have started their spring campaign
in that area. (Page 2)
Cyprus: An anti-American campaign in the Greek
Cypriot press could inspire further violence
against US personnel and facilities. (Page 3)
Israel-Fedayeen: The fedayeen raid on Tel Aviv
yesterday should have no adverse effects on
the coming Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, but
could have serious repercussions in Lebanon.
(Page 4)
Syria: President Asad continues his efforts to
pressure Egypt to link a Sinai accord with
progress on the Syrian front and on the Pal-
estinian question. (Page 5)
Notes: Israel; Kuwait; OPEC; USSR-Indochina; South
Korea - France (Pages 6 and 7)
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
Oudong
Tuol Leap
0.zr
Probable
artillery site
4
PHNOM
PEN11`'
N-?
1 '704
0,1
44
Government
15
operation halted
Neak Luang
0
30
Takeo
0 es 10
557431 3-75 CIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Airlift operations at Pochentong air-
field resumed this morning following a tem-
porary suspension yesterday.
A US civilian DC-8 cargo plane involved in the
resupply of Phnom Penh was damaged yesterday, re-
portedly by 105-Huu. howitzer fire. The artillery
fire apparently came from the Tuol Leap area north
of Route 4, where a government operation is planned
for today. The range and accuracy of 105-mm. artil-
lery pose a greater threat to Pochentong than do
rocket attacks.
Along the Mekong River, government forces have
reopened a secondary road that links Banam and Neak
Luong. Communist pressure increased on the west
bank of the river opposite Neak Luong, where govern-
ment troops have recovered two of four positions.
Farther north, the government task force trying to
push down Route 1 toward Neak Luong has been in-
structed to halt operations. Supporting artillery
and armored units have been withdrawn from the
Route 1 front to help in the defense of Phnom Penh.
1
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SAIGON'
SOUTH VIETNAM
Military Region 2
Military RaoIon 1
LAOS
Kontum
Kontum
Central Highlands
_
Pleiku
Pleiku
CAMBODIA
H U
Dania
No.
?1;
Binh
Dinh
;Phu Cat
P H J
N
'Qui Nhon
Quang 4 0 A
DUC S
T1.1YE./.4 CLIC
1
LA sn T H
Military Raglan 3
Si NH
25 50 75 Mties
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
557428 3-75
IMO PK. 0:)1
S U T H
CHINA
S LA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
The upsurge in fighting in the cen-
tral highlands suggests that the North
Vietnamese have started their spring cam-
paign in that area.
Communist units have attacked and overrun sev-
eral outposts in Kontum and Pleiku provinces and
have cut strategic Highway 19, which links the high-
lands to the coast. The communists have also
shelled two of the government's important airbases
at Pleiku and Phu Cat in Binh Dinh Province.
Increased attacks have been reported in the
northern provinces and north of Saigon, but these
could be in response to expanded South Vietnamese
military operations.
Communist planning apparently involves grad-
ually increased pressure against the two highland
capitals of Pleiku and Kontum. The government's
principal task is to reopen the highway between
Pleiku City and Qui Nhon, so as to avoid the dif-
ficulties of airlifting supplies into the highlands
to hold the two capitals.
Even with the highway open, the South Viet-
namese could face a difficult situation in the
highlands. Kontum City appears especially vulner-
able. It is the last remaining stronghold in Kon-
tum Province and depends upon Highway 14 from
Pleiku City for resupply. The communists can easily
cut this road, and the city's small airfield would
have difficulty handling the number of flights
needed to resupply the garrison by air.
The communists currently have four divisions
which could be committed to the fighting in the
highlands and along the coast. South Vietnamese
forces in the region consist of two infantry divi-
sions and ranger units. In terms of manpower and
firepower they are as strong as the North Vietnamese
forces, but with limited resupply capabilities and
a large area to defend, these units will be under
pressure if the communists decide to launch heavy
and sustained attacks.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CYPRUS
An inflammatory anti-American cam-
paign that began last week in the Greek
Cypriot press could bring acts of vio-
lence against VS personnel and facilities.
The campaign, which the US embassy in Nicosia
believes is inspired by President Makarios, began
after four US airmen assigned to a British base
were detained temporarily by Greek Cypriot author-
ities. Press accusations followed that the US was
using Cyprus as a base for espionage and was work-
ing against Greek Cypriot interests at the UN.
Charges of US complicity in the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus last summer have also been revived.
The embassy speculates that Makarios is orches-
trating the campaign in order to deflect the frus-
tration of Greek Cypriots away from himself, now
that it has become apparent that he has failed to
force Turkish concessions. The campaign has been
effective among refugees and students; many of them
are joining radical leftist Vassos Lyssarides'
party, which supports Makarios and has been the most
vocal critic of the US.
Alternatively, the embassy speculates that the
campaign may be intended to condition Greek Cyp-
riots to a change of policy toward the Soviet Union.
This would involve risks, however, because the
Greek government and at least some of the Greek
Cypriot right would undoubtedly oppose such a move.
The remnants of the EOKA-B terrorist organization,
which participated in the coup against makarios
last July, might react violently.
It is doubtful that Makarios would turn to the
Soviet Union, however, until the outcome of the
current Security Council debate on Cyprus is clear.
He would also want to receive firm assurances of
support from Moscow before taking any steps that
might lead to an enhanced role for the Soviets on
Cyprus.
The Soviets would like to exploit Makarios'
predicament to obtain a greater role for themselves
in any future Cyprus settlement, but they have thus
far moved cautiously, in part to avoid antagonizing
the Turks.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL-FEDAYEEN
The seaborne fedayeen raid on Tel
Aviv should have no adverse effect on
the coming Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.
The attack, for which various Palestinian groups
are claiming credit, apparently was launched from
southern Lebanon. It almost certainly will embroil
the already shaken Sulh government in further con-
troversy over Lebanese-fedayeen relations and will
probably worsen relations between Palestine Libera-
tion Organization chairman Yasir Arafat and Pres-
ident Sadat.
Given the spectacular nature of the fedayeen
attack, pressure may build in Tel Aviv for a swift
retaliatory strike against fedayeen bases alona thif
southern Lebanese coast.
The Israelis are unlikely to feel bound by the
truce they concluded with Lebanon last month, in
which they agreed to limit their retaliation against
minor border incidents.
Tel Aviv may stay its hand because of Secretary
Kissinger's coming visit and perhaps because of the
apparently deteriorating political situation in Bei-
rut. The resignation yesterday of a cabinet minis-
ter who demanded the dismissal of Lebanon's army
commander for his handling of the recent incident
in Sidon could provoke a cabinet crisis. According
to press accounts, there were also gunfights and
explosions yesterday during a demonstration held in
Beirut to demand withdrawal of the fedayeen and sup-
port for the army.
Prime Minister Rabin can be expected to use
the latest terrorist incident to press his argument
that it would be "a great mistake" for Israel to
negotiate with the PLO, even if the Palestinian
group indicated a readiness to accept the existence
of Israel. Israeli hardliners will point to the
raid as proof that the PLO will never accept Israel
and that any sign of moderation by the Arabs is a
chimera.
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SYRIA
President Asad's interview in yes-
terday's Washington Post is a continua-
tion of his efforts to pressure Egypt
into linking a Sinai accord with prog-
ress on the Syrian front and on the
Palestinian question.
Asad refused to attack President Sadat directly
for adhering to our negotiating strategy, but his
comments seemed designed to cast Sadat in unfavora-
ble light in the Arab world if Egypt moves to sign
a separate agreement with Israel.
Asad's own position was a reiteration of his
willingness to negotiate another disengagement
agreement on the Golan Heights. He insisted, how-
ever, that it would have to be within the context
of a general interim accord on all three fronts--
Sinai, Golan Heights, and the West Bank. He char-
acterized a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement as
a step that might "block peace." Asad did not re-
ject the possibility that he may boycott the Geneva
talks if they are reconvened after only a Sinai
agreement.
On Golan Heights negotiations, Asad insisted
again that Syria was interested only in discussing
an Israeli pullback all along the present disen-
gagement line. We continue to believe, however,
that he would probably settle for whatever he could
get, even if it amounts to only a symbolic with-
drawal of a few kilometers.
Asad's strong pitch for the US to recognize
the PLO as the "sole representative of Palestinian
people" may have been calculated in part to embar-
rass the Egyptians, who have recently been having
their troubles with fedayeen leaders. He also may
have wanted to strengthen his domestic position by
posturing as the Palestinians' chief Arab supporter.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
The Israelis regard the next round of negotia-
tions for a second Egyptian-Israeli agreement as a
major test of Prime Minister Rabin's leadership.
Rabin's success depends to a great extent on
his ability to get support for his negotiating po-
sition from conservative members of the cabinet.
Defense Minister Peres, in particular, has shown
little public flexibility on negotiations with Egypt.
The Prime Minister therefore will be hard pressed
to find an agreement acceptable to everyone. Our
embassy believes that the government, with the sup-
port of small leftist parties outside the coalition,
will be able to obtain parliamentary approval for
an agreement even if a minor cabinet split occurs.
The Kuwaiti oil minister announced yesterday
in Algiers that his country has taken 100-percent
ownership of the oil and gas industry, effective
immediately.
Kuwait had planned to increase its 60-percent
share to 100-percent ownership sometime before 1979,
but the government has faced pressure from the Na-
tional Assembly for immediate action. The key is-
sues for British Petroleum and Gulf Oil representa-
tives, who have been asked to negotiate arrangements
next week for the take-over, are whether they will
continue to have preferential access to crude sup-
plies, what and how they will pay for the oil they
buy, and what they will receive by way of compensa-
tion.
OPEC members accounted for about one third of
the record $33 billion pledged as either bilateral
or multilateral economic aid to developing countries
in 1974.
Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan, by receiving the
largest share of the oil producers' aid, have emerged
as the leading recipients of total economic assist-
ance. Other developing countries benefited very
little from the aid increase. After allocations
made to Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan, only about $3.5
billion of OPEC aid was left to be divided among the
other 46 countries. We expect this high level of
assistance to continue this year, but Muslim nations
will receive the largest share.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin is in
Indochina, presumably to sound out the North Viet-
namese on their military intentions in South Vietnam
during the present dry season and to discuss the
Cambodian problem. He arrived in Laos on March 5
after a visit to Hanoi.
Until recently the Soviets had been openly
urging negotiations and stating that a military so-
lution in Cambodia was not possible. Now they find
themselves in the position of having diplomatic re-
lations with the Lon Nol government, weak ties with
the Khmer Communists, and little prospect of working
with Sihanouk, who has been dependent on Peking.
Moscow probably wants to develop closer ties with
the Khmer Communists. Firyubin may caution both
the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Communists to
avoid punitive actions in Cambodia that would evoke
a sharp public reaction in Southeast Asia and else-
where.
South Korea
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