THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 NOVEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993616
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 9, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
9 November 1972
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
9 NOvember 197
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
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Hanoi appears
to be sending a fresh armor regiment and two field
artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam.
(Page 1)
Pakistan is taking a number of diplomatic moves favor-
able to Asian Communist regimes. These steps may re-
flect President Bhutto's dissatisfaction with certain
aspects of his relations with the US. (Page 3)
The Argentine Government appears to be preparing for
the return of former dictator Juan Peron. (Page 4)
Uganda's deadline for the departure of non-citizen
Asians passed yesterday without major incidents, and
most of those required to leave havebeen evacuated.
(Page 5)
At Annex, we examine the confusing domestic political
scene that has prevailed in China since the purge of
Lin Piao one year ago.
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VIETNAM
Hanoi appears to be sending a fresh armor regi-
ment and two field artillery regiments into northern
South Vietnam. Recent North Vietnamese messages,
as well as aerial photography and US pilot sightings,
have disclosed large numbers of tanks, tracked ve-
hicles, and convoys of artillery moving through the
panhandle toward the Demilitarized Zone. One inter-
cept disclosed that 92 tanks had moved through the
Vinh area, and other units farther south have re-
ported the passage of three groups of tanks that
could be an armor regiment. A message of 5 November
from the major enemy logistics authority in northern
Quang Tri Province noted that "two ground artillery
regiments..." equipped with tracked vehicles and 120
trucks were to move along Route 9 in Quang Tri Prov-
ince.
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CHINA
It has been a year since the purge of Lin Piao.
The ruling politburo has still not been reconstituted
by replacement of those military members who went
down with Lin. Leadership turnouts and authorita-
tive policy pronouncements have been rare.
Despite the outward appearance of order
in China, tensions clearly persist among
the surviving leaders. This is evidently
recognized by many low- and middle-level
party members in China.
Moreover, the protracted campaign through-
out the country to repudiate Lin Piao
and the absence from view of an increas-
ing number of provincial military leaders
suggest that military powerholders in the
provinces are under pressure. This in-
volves real_ risks for domestic political
order.
At Annex we examine the confusing domes-
tic political scene in greater detail.'
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PAKISTAN
- The Bhutto government is taking a number of
diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Communist re-
gimes. Yesterday, Islamabad began its formal with-
drawal from SEATO. On Tuesday, it recognized Hanoi,
and it intends to recognize Pyongyang today. More-
over, Islamabad's next step may be early recogni-
tion of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National
Union."
There appear to be several factors behind
these moves. Bhutto wants to increase
Pakistan's contacts with other Asian
nations, he wishes to ingratiate himself
further with Peking, and he needs to coun-
ter criticism by leftists at home that
his policy is too pro-American.
A growing dissatisfaction with US policy could
also be involved.
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ARGENTINA
On Tuesday Hector Campora, Peron's personal
representative in Argentina, announced that the 77-
year-old former dictator would return to his home-
land on 17 November. Within a few hours President
Lanusse told the nation that the armed forces would
guarantee Peron's personal safety and deal with any
threats to domestic peace by either Peronists or
their opponents.
Peron has said before that he would re-
turn, and this announcement may be only
another attempt to throw the opposition
off balance and to pressure Lanusse into
agreeing to his demands on Peronist par-
ticipation in political activity. It
seems more likely, however, that this
time Peron recognizes that he must return
or face a serious loss of prestige.
If Peron does return he may well stay for
only a few days, long enough to endorse
an electoral accord with the military.
The short lead time on Campora's announce-
ment and the tenor of Lanusse's speech
suggest that the Peronists and the gov-
ernment are close to an agreement on the
conduct of the national elections next
March and on the orientation of the gov-
ernment that will take office in May.
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NOTE
Uganda: President Amin's deadline for the de-
parture of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday with-
out major incidents, and most of those required to
leave have been evacuated. Some 1,500 stateless
Asians remain, however, along with a few thousand
Asians with Ugandan citizenship and those exempted
because of their much-needed technical skills. The
UN has set up departure centers in Kampala for the
remaining stateless Asians and will try to move them
to facilities in Europe and elsewhere by the end of
the week.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO
(Elected April 1969)
STANDING COMMITTEE
Mao Tse-tung (78)
Chairman, Central Committee
WIVES
Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head,
Cultural Revolution Group
Lin Piao (64) Yeh Ch'un (44)
no -
efens
Chou En-lai (73)
Premier
Ch'en Po-ta (66)
entral Com-
ter
K'ang Sheng (72)
Adviser, Cu volution
, nternal Security Chief
PROVINCIAL LEADERS
Chi Teng-k'uei (40)*
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
ttee
Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military
Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Li Hsueh-feng (64)*
an,
ion
rovincial
mmittee
Chang Chun-ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Second
Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution
Group
Li Te-sheng (61)*
Commander, Anhwei Military
District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
Hsu Shih-yu (64)
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander,
Nanking Military Region; Chairman,
Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary
Committee
Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Member,
Cultural Revolution Group
*Alternate Members Inactive
ilitary Affairs
MILITARY LEADERS
Huang Yung-sheng (62)
St itary Af-
ommi
Ch'iu Hui-tso (56)
, ?
ics C
fairs Committee
Li Tso-p'eng (60)
uty Chief of S ; Po-
litical sar, Navy;
ary Affairs o ittee
taff; Army
ary Af-
Wu Fa-hsien (58)
uty Chief o ; Corn-
man rce; Military
airs Committee
Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Af-
fairs Committee
GOVERNMENT LEADERS
Hsieh Fu-chih (69)
lic Security er; Chairman,
al Revolutionary Corn-
ittee; Vice Premie
Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister
Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown)*
Public Security Vice Minister; Direc-
tor, General Office, Party Central
Committee
HONORARY ELDERS
Chu Te (85) ,
Chairman
ess
eople's
Liu Po-ch'eng (79)
Vice Chairm eople's
ess; Military Affairs Committee
Tung Pi-wu (85)
Vice Chair epublic
na
Purged or dead
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DOMESTIC POLITICS, CHINESE STYLE
The events of last autumn drastically altered
the political edifice in Peking, but the surviving
leaders have, at least up to now, managed the crisis
well. Basic social order has been maintained. The
military has remained stable while being urged by
the regime to be subordinate to civilian party con-
trol. The trend toward moderation in domestic poli-
cies--a trend evident since 1969, and one that has
wide popular support--has been even more pronounced
since Lin's departure from the scene. In the con-
duct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a succes-
sion of triumphs in 1972, the fruition of its deci-
sion several years ago to adopt a more pragmatic and
outgoing foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the domestic political difficul-
ties faced by Peking are major ones, and the leader-
ship has thus far reacted with extreme caution. Pe-
king's problems are most evident within the polit-
buro itself; only 16 of the original 25'members
named in 1969 are still being mentioned in the offi-
cial press by name, and of these only a dozen appear
to be participating in the affairs of state in a
meaningful way. The delay in reconstituting the
politburo is doubtless associated with the question
of the military's future representation on that body.
While the regime wrestles with this problem, the
armed forces are without a designated leader. Mar-
shal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de facto de-
fense minister but has not been formally appointed
to the position.
The Issues
Because Lin was officially designated Mao's
successor, Peking also faces a major task of working
out anew formula for succession. For several years,
Peking has delayed convening the National People's
Congress, the state forum for legitimizing institu-
tional and personnel changes. Presumably this delay
has stemmed from disputes within the leadership, and
among these issues has been the wisdom and utility
of many of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revo-
lution. The idea of a post-Mao "collective leader-
ship" has persistently surfaced in the past year; it
is likely that it is the mix of this collective,
rather than the principle itself, that is now at is-
sue.
The regime's handling of the Lin affair has
made it appear that the central issue in Peking is
one of civilian versus military control. In fact,
the issue is much more complex. Evidence--some of
it antedating Lin's demise--indicates the institu-
tional problem is a real one. Nevertheless, the
Al
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leadership is deeply divided on a much wider range
of policy and personnel questions. Moreover, devel-
opments during the Cultural Revolution clearly cre-
ated and intensified antipathies between leaders
who were identified with its excesses and those of
a more moderate persuasion. It is hard to believe
these antipathies have now vanished, or that they
no longer cut across institutions and interest
groups, including the armed forces.
Some Anomalies
The actual facts surrounding the demise of Lin
Piao?in September 1971 may never be known. Most of
those at politburo level who were purged with Lin
had long been associated with him and were clearly
identified with the excesses of the Cultural Revo-
lution. In fact, however, the affair claimed high-
level military victims at both ends of the politi-
cal spectrum. Moreover, a campaign against ultra-
leftists--which began in late 1969, evidently under
the direction of Chou En-lai--has been muted if not
terminated altogether, even though it has not
reached all of its potential victims. Chiang Ching,
deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group which
directed Mao's purge of the old party apparatus,
Seemingly should have been the next target, but as
Mao's wife she apparently is immune. Two other
prominent leftists, Shanghai party leaders Chang
Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, also continue to ap-
pear frequently in Peking.
In contrast to these inconsistencies in person-
nel matters, China appears at present to be travel-
ing on a single policy track. Rationality and prag-
matism seem to be the order of the day, not only in
foreign policy but also in domestic areas dear to
Mao's heart, such as education. There are no con-
vincing signs that this approach is being opposed
or debated at the moment.
One element that almost certainly is raising
political temperatures is the protracted effort to
repudiate Lin Piao. The notion that Lin, the de-
fense minister and Mao's designated successor, could
turn against his mentor has sharply eroded confidence
in the country's leadership, not only among party
officials but among the populace at large. Since
early this year, cadres have been studying a succes-
sion of documents purporting to spell out the details
of Lin's coup plot. The key item in this series, the
so-called "571 document," contains Lin's purported
operations plan. The plan lists not only those
forces that Lin allegedly could count on for support--
primarily the air force--but also a number of other
military units he supposedly was attempting to en-
list in the plot. The implication is that there
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CHINA: Missing Provincial Military Leaders
SINKIANG
Lung Shu-chin
TIBET
553765, 11-72
TSINGHAI
INNER
Kang Chien-min MONGOLIA
KANSU
PEKING
HOFEH
LIAONING
TI ENTSIN ?
SHANTU G
SHENSI
. S.
Liang Hsing-chu
SZECHWAN
YUNNAN
KIAN
Sun-
i-cha
HUPEH ANHWE
SHANGHAI
Cheng
ih-chi g
KIANGSy
WEICHOW FUKIEN
n 1-nung
CHEKIA
Nan P*
KWANGSI
KWANGTUNG
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still are elements within the armed forces whose
loyalty is questionable. The most ominous sign in
this connection is the latest available document in
the anti-Lin series, issued in early July, which sug-
gests that the central authorities will not in the
future need written evidence of complicity in the
Lin "conspiracy" in order to move against given in-
dividuals.
Problems in the Provinces
Some members of the leadership may in fact be
exploiting the Lin affair in order to move against
military powerholders in the provinces. This im-
pression has been reinforced in recent weeks by the
failure of an increasing number of these leaders to
make public appearances
A move against provincial military leaders, .
even-on a selective basis, risks jeopardizing domes-
tic political order. The Cultural Revolution de-
stroyed the leadership of the old party and govern-
ment bureaucracies, leaving the military as the only
effective instrument of control.. Some efforts have
been made to re-establish the civilian party struc-
ture and reassert its traditional leading role in
the Chinese polity. It is clear, however, that mil-
itary leaders still hold the balance of power in the
party apparatus. outside of Peking. Thus a move
against these military leaders, particularly if it
is widespread, could cause a breakdown in control,
with no alternative mechanism available to fill the
void.
The continuing denunciation of Lin and the ac-
companying "rectification" movement within the party
and the army seem to have Mao's consent.
Mao may see the campaign
as an opportunity to settle personal scores with a
number of provincial military leaders, primarily
those whose opposition to the Red Guard movement led
him to close out the Cultural Revolution before he
felt he had accomplished all of his objectives.
On the other hand, Mao must recognize that his
close personal identification with Lin renders him
vulnerable in certain important ways. The 571 docu-
ment contains some unusually harsh words about Mao's
leadership. In effect, it accuses Mao of the ex-
cesses of the Cultural Revolution, characterizing
him as aY'cruel tyrant." This attack.on the Chair-
man is. attributed to Lin, and it has been circulated
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with Mao's explicit approval, but the effect has
been to give wide publicity to a list of grievances
against Mao with which most of the populace can
readily identify.
Mao and Chou
During 1972, Mao and Chou have seemed to work
very closely on most matters. Chou has constantly
been at Mao's side during the Chairman's meetings
with visiting state leaders, and in the course of
the detailed negotiations with foreign powers, Chou
has made it clear that he always defers to Mao on
broad policy matters. Similarly, Mao has on several
occasions publicly acknowledged his confidence in
Chou.
Provincial leaders_are not now faced, either
collectively or individually, with the massive pub--
lic attacks and orchestrated violence that were so
provocative in the 1967-68 period. In the absence
of such a direct challenge--and Peking has gone to
some lengths to indicate that such a challenge is
not forthcoming--it is unlikely that they could or
would unite to defy the authority of the Chairman -
directly. This seems,particularly to be the case
in the absence of a strong and authoritative leader
for such a move'.
It is difficult to cast Chou in such a role.
His concern for the loyalty of the armed forces to
the political system is surely as great as his con-
cern for the cohesion of the military establishment,
and on both. grounds he is-likely to attempt\to
"limit the damage" rather than place himself at the
head of a, group determined to end the selective
purge of the military by open defiance of Mao. To-
day Chou seems to have the endorsement of the Chair-
man for much of his domestic program as well as for
his foreign policy, and this is an asset he will not
castaway lightly. .Thus, a Mao,-Chou split seems.
highly improbable now...
Mao's motives in the present situation are
equally complicated. Certainly vindictiveness and
a desire to settle old scores play a major part in
the current moves against the provincial military.
But the explicit attempts. to reassure the military
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that it is not about to suffer a thoroughgoing "rec-
tification," coupled with continued emphasis on rel-
atively conservative and pragmatic policies at home
as well as abroad, seem to indicate that the Chair-
man's offensive is at this point a limited one.
Like Chou, he seems intent for the moment to limit
the damage. His objective could well be to estab-
lish abetter balance between competing leftist and
conservative forces--and hence further increase his
own freedom of maneuver--by whittling away at the
predominantly conservative military leaders in the
?provinces through a process of linking them, however
tenuously, to the Lin "plot."
To create this better balance, Mao may eventu-
ally do more than merely whittle away. Most recent
appointments have involved relatively conservative
persons who were under attack during the Cultural
Revolution, but two others do not fall into this
category. These latter appointments suggest at
least the possibility of a leftward swing in the
political pendulum. Whatever the case, it is clear
that further changes are in prospect and that ten-
sions will persist for some time within the leader-
ship.
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