THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 FEBRUARY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015028
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 12, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
February 12, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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_ _ _ _
February 12, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR-Angola-US: Moscow has published in Pravda its
most complete and authoritative statement to
date on Soviet policy in Angola. (Page 1)
Zaire-Angola: The Popular Movement's successes in
Angola and Zaire's mounting political and eco-
nomic problems are forcing President Mobutu to
reassess his policies. (Page 3)
USSR-Cuba-Angola: We present the key points of an
interagency memorandum on Soviet and Cuban aid
to the Angolan Popular Movement during January.
(Page 5)
Morocco - Algeria - Spanish Sahara: Moroccan mili-
tary forces are apparently moving on the Span-
ish Saharan town of Mahbes, stronghold of the
Polisario insurgents. (Page 7)
Cuba:
Notes: Italy; Turkey; Cyprus (Page 9) 25X1
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.M.-? 1/
USSR-ANGOLA-US
Pravda on Wednesday published a long,
authoritative "Observer" article on Angola
designed in part to refute US criticism of
Moscow's role there.
The article is Moscow's most complete and au-
thoritative statement on Angola to date. It is con-
fident about the situation in Angola itself, asser-
tive regarding the rest of Africa, and almost pugna-
cious in rejecting the notion that the USSR has any-
thing to apologize for in its Angola policy.
The text lashed out at Secretary Kissinger's
speech in San Francisco last week. It said it was
"obviously out of tune with the facts" and was an
attempt to "whitewash" long-standing US "overt and
covert interference" in Angola. "Observer" empha-
sized that detente does not signify "freedom of ac-
tion for aggressors."
Moscow has also displayed considerable sensi-
tivity to the Secretary's congressional testimony
on Angola, but this is the first time that a high-
level Soviet rebuttal has appeared.
Earlier Pravda articles had directly criticized
you and Secretary Kissinger for allegedly "distor-
ting" the Soviet and Cuban roles in Angola, but bal-
anced these barbs with positive comments on the ac-
complishments of detente.
The article mentioned neither Cuban aid for
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
nor the activities of the Soviet navy off West
Africa. It did, however, admit openly that the
USSR and its allies have given Angola "weapons."
Pravda's assertion that South African forces
have no intention of withdrawing from Angola raises,
by implication, the possibility that Soviet assist-
ance and that of the Cubans will continue. This
may also be the meaning behind the statement that
the Angolan people should be "ensured conditions to
complete the liberation."
(continued)
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Revolutionary groups elsewhere in sub-Saharan
Africa are offered strong encouragement. Pravda em-
phasizes that the consolidation of the Popular Move-
ment's power in Angola will provide a "powerful stim-
ulus" for the liberation struggle against Namibia,
Rhodesia, and South Africa itself.
At the same time, however, Pravda attempted to
balance its hard-hitting prose with a conciliatory
gesture. While making no bones about Soviet assist-
ance to the People's Republic of Angola as the "le-
gitimate" government, "Observer" pointed out that
Moscow by no means considers the "military way" as
the only possibility of settling the Angolan issue.
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,
ZAIRE-ANGOLA
The Popular Movement's successes in
Angola and Zaire's mounting political and
economic problems are forcing President
Mobutu to reassess his policies.
Mobutu, who has supported the rival National
Front for more than 10 years, reportedly is now anx-
ious to put Angola "behind him" by arranging an ac-
commodation with the Popular Movement.
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Last month Mobutu tried to get Mozambique Pres-
ident Machel to act as an intermediary in setting up
such talks, but Machel refused. He told Mobutu's
representative that he would not attempt to mediate
between Zaire and the Popular Movement until both
parties had made "conciliatory gestures."
Mobutu realized some time ago that the National
Front was collapsing as an effective military con-
tender in Angola. The poor showing made by Zairian
forces sent to support the Front also raised serious
doubts in his mind about his army's ability to deal
with any significant internal disturbances. Mobutu
is aware that exiled Zairian dissidents are seeking
the Popular Movement's support for an attempt to
mount an insurgency from Angola aimed at overthrow-
ing him.
Early this month, Mobutu signaled his intention
to break with past policies by carrying out a broad
government reshuffle. He dropped his foreign min-
ister and chief defense adviser, reallocated eco-
nomic responsibilities within his cabinet, and
tightened the structure of the official party's
political bureau.
Changing foreign ministers gives the president
some flexibility to move away from his hardline pol-
icy toward the Popular Movement. The change of de-
fense advisers also may be a signal to Neto that
Mobutu is prepared to forgo any further military ad-
ventures against the Popular Movement.
(continued)
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In Angola, National Union forces in the south-
central part of the country appear on the verge of
collapse in the face of a major assault by Cuban-
backed Popular Movement troops.
A National Union spokesman confirmed yesterday
that the Popular Movement had captured Silva Porto,
which the Union had established as its headquarters
after the fall of Huambo last weekend.
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USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA
Following are the key points of an
interagency memorandum on Soviet and
Cuban aid to the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola during January 1976
that was approved this week by the intel-
ligence community. This memorandum sup-
plements and brings up to date an earlier
one on Soviet and Cuban aid to the Popu-
lar Movement from March through December
1975. It also updates preliminary fig-
ures for January which were printed in
the Brief last Friday.
The amount of military support provided the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola by
the Soviet Union and Cuba increased markedly in Jan-
uary 1976.
--It is conservatively estimated that such mil-
itary support delivered in January alone to-
taled at least $105 million measured in US
equivalent costs, raising the total military
support provided to the MPLA since March 1975
to an estimated $284 million. The January to-
tal is more than double the December 1975
level and is over half the $179 million total
outlays incurred from March through December
1975.
--The bulk of the increased outlays reflected
Cuba's vastly expanded effort to support its
troops in Angola. During January, as many as
4,500 additional Cubans were sent to Angola,
raising the total number of Cuban troops sent
there to an estimated 12,000.
--Soviet military shipments in January in-
creased somewhat over the late 1975 level.
Since January 1, we have confirmed for the
first time in Angola such equipment as T-54
tanks, amphibious vehicles, and pontoon brid-
ges.
--We have continued to receive reports that
MIG-type jet fighters are in Angola. There
is still a division of views within the US
(continued)
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intelligence community, however, as to whether
MIGs are actually present in-country. Press
photography received since the publication of
this memorandum purports to show one MIG-17
at Luanda.
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MOROCCO - ALGERIA - SPANISH SAHARA
' Moroccan military forces are appar-
ently moving on the Spanish Saharan town
of Mahbes, stronghold of the Algerian-
supported Polisario insurgents.
Moroccan officials first told the US embassy
the town had been occupied on Tuesday night without
opposition, but were unsure by late yesterday that
their troops had in fact entered the town. This
uncertainty suggests the Moroccan column either is
deliberately moving slowly or is encountering re-
sistance from Polisario or Algerian forces.
Rabat's initial assumption that its troops had
met no opposition may indicate that it has reason
to believe the Algerians have pulled back or are in
the process of doing so.
An Algerian withdrawal would, of course, reduce
the chances of a direct clash between Moroccan and
Algerian forces. Algeria will almost certainly con-
tinue, however, to support Polisario guerrilla at-
tacks against Moroccan and Mauritanian forces in
Spanish Sahara.
Algeria is continuing its diplomatic push for
self-determination for the people of Spanish Sahara.
Algiers sent a lengthy memorandum to UN Secretary
General Waldheim last Friday calling once again for
a "free and genuine" referendum.
The Algerian memorandum may be a prelude to
an appeal to the UN Security Council to discuss the
matter. Given the inconclusive outcome of the Gen-
eral Assembly debate on Spanish Sahara last Decem-
ber--two contradictory resolutions were passed--an
appeal to the Council that the Sahara issue is a
threat to international security is Algeria's only
likely move at the UN now.
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CUBA
The US SR-71 reconnaissance flight
over Cuba drew consider-
able attention from the Cuban air defense
system, but there was no indication of
any intention to fire at the aircraft.
A reading of photography acquired by the
SR-71 confirmed that no missiles had been fired
from the site.
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NOTES
Italian Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro
yesterday presented his new single-party cabinet
list to President Leone, who accepted it immediately.
The new government will be sworn in today. At
best, it is a stop-gap, likely to last only several
months--long enough to take emergency economic meas-
ures and permit some parties to sort out political
options at their congresses next month.
The debate on the budget bill beginning later
this week in the Turkish National Assembly will set
the stage for a vote that will determine the future
of Prime Minister Demirel's shaky, four-party coa-
lition government.
The debate and vote will mark the end of a
six-week long campaign by parliamentary opposition
leader and former prime minister Ecevit to unseat
Demirel. Earlier this year Ecevit had been opti-
mistic about prospects for toppling the government,
but in the past two weeks he has begun to express
doubts about the success of his tactics. During
this same period government supporters have become
more optimistic; one supporter told our embassy re-
cently that the budget should pass easily.
The new round of Cypriot intercommunal talks
will begin in Vienna next Tuesday chaired by UN
Secretary General WaZdheim.
Late last year the Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers agreed to hold these discussions to de-
termine the broad outlines of a settlement. An im-
passe on the issues to be included was ended when
the Turkish Cypriots agreed to discuss the terri-
torial question. Although prospects for a major
breakthrough toward a settlement remain poor, both
governments want talks to continue. The Turks
wish to give at least the appearance of progress
to deflect international criticism while the Greeks
realize that, if they are to recoup any of their
losses, they must keep channels open to Ankara.
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