THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976591
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 30, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
30 January 1969
To
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32
Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
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Alecandria
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93478 1-69
ASWAN
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31 January 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
30 JANUARY 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
* * *
Ambassador Jarring told the British on 29 January
that he is willing to wait in New York as long as necessary
to get a clarification of the attitudes of the great powers.
After that, Jarring may set up shop in Geneva, with the idea
of getting answers from the Middle Eastern states to
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specific questions which ultimately must be part of a
settlement.
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* * *
The Iraqi information minister announced this morning
that a new mass spy trial is being prepared. (FBIS 37,
31 Jan 69)
EUROPE
The first British national opinion poll of 1969,
published yesterday in the Daily Mail, reveals a sharp
swing back to the Labor Government, after a low point in
December. Prime Minister Wilson's personal stock also
went up, albeit not as much as his government's. "Peace
and quiet" for the past month or two seems to have been
responsible.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
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At the same time they are negotiating in Peru, the
Soviets and Hungarians also are dickering with Venezuela
about establishing diplomatic relations. A Venezuelan
Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer yes-
terday that agreement might be reached prior to the inau-
guration of President-elect Caldera in March. No action
is likely, however, until after the new government is
r3worn In.
VIETNAM
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An authoritative commentary on the President's news
conference was published today in the North Vietnamese
party daily, Nhan Dan, according to Hanoi Radio. It
avoided responding to the questions of restoration of the
Demilitarized Zone or a return to the Geneva agreements,
calling such points "deceptive talk." The commentary ap-
parently was timed to reinforce the rejection in Paris
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yesterday of Ambassador Lodge's proposals. (FBIS 28, 31
Jan 69)
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
There is nothing of significance to report.
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TIM PKE3IDEN1 UN L
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
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The evidence at hand is still inconclusive as to
whether there was an Israeli air attack this morning
against Iraqi troops in Jordan.
EUROPE 50X1
2
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PUK 1 tih FKLVD.LIN 1 Ul L
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Soviet authorities today moved to dispel rumors
about Kosygin's prolonged absence. A Foreign Ministry
spokesman said that Kosygin is nursing a cold which he
picked up when he returned to Moscow about a week ago
from a vacation-cure, but that he expects to return to
work late next week. The spokesman said that the Pre-
mier had spent a month in the Caucasus undergoing treat-
ment for a mild liver ailment.
The Soviet Union and its allies have reacted quickly
in response to Peru's overtures for closer contacts. Dip-
lomatic relations will be established between Moscow and
Lima in the next day or two. Since the military took over
in Peru last October, they have established diplomatic ties
with Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Hungary is
now pressing to join the list.
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50
VIETNAM
Numerous indicators point to a Communist intent to
launch a series of attacks, perhaps countrywide, between
4
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PUK HE PKE5'IDEN4 UN LY
now and Tet, which falls on 17 February this year. It
is questionable whether the enemy will do much more than
direct harassing fire against allied outposts and some
urban centers. Terrorist and sapper action in the cities
could accompany the shellings.
Recently captured prisoners report that a fairly sub-
stantial effort has been under way for some weeks to in-
filtrate specially trained terrorists and sappers into
Saigon. They furthere.state that some of these groups
have already succeeded in entering the city; recently
there have been several incidents and attempted incidents
within the capital.
According to the prisoners, terrorist attacks in
Saigon are to be coordinated with main force action in
the provinces around the capital. Signal intelligence
shows that for the last two months the enemy has been
trying to move a number of infantry regiments from four
nearby divisions into the provinces around Saigon. Al-
lied pre-emptive actions have delayed these deployments,
but the sighting of Communist troops in recent days by
villagers in those provinces suggests that some enemy
units are managing to get into positions from which
they could launch attacks. Intercepted messages from
I, II, and IV Corps also tell a story of Communist in-
tentions to step up action prior to Tet.
Preliminary press accounts of today's session in
Paris indicate the Communists took the line forecast
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in earlier statements. Hanoi may eventually be will-
ing to discuss our proposals on troop withdrawals and
restoring the Demilitarized Zone, but the Communists
are unlikely to go very far toward resolving these mat-
ters before they have a fairly clear idea of how politi-
cal issues are to be settled. Xuan Thuy's statement
that "only on a political basis can we settle military
questions" was as straightforward as anything the Com-
munists have said publicly on this subject.
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PAKISTAN
President Ayub has gained a breathing spell by send-
ing the army in to restore order in four of the country's
main cities. Tension remains high, however.
The Ayub government now faces the dilemma which con--
fronts all authoritarian regimes beginning to lose their
grip. As the embassy in Karachi puts it, repression in-
tensifies resistance but concessions suggest an inability
to.govern. We may get a better line on what Ayub plans
after his regular first of the month speech Saturday. The
government press is hinting that it will contain some im-
portant announcements.
BRAZIL
At annex is a review of major problems affecting US-
Brazil relations.
OKI NAWA
Okinawan and Japanese leaders have thus far been un-
successful in persuading leftist labor organizers to call
off a general strike and rally against the presence of
7
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B-52s scheduled for 4'February. These officials fear, that
any violent incidents would jeopardize their priority goal
of achieving an early return of Okinawa to Japanese admin-
istration. A large demonstration is to be held in the
vicinity, of the US airbase at Kadena, and extremists may
attempt to penetrate the base in an effort to provoke a
violent response from the police or US security guards.
The_police, who must also be at other potential trouble
spots will be spread thin.
Violence during the demonstrations in Okinawa could
trigger, a sympathetic reaction from leftist elements in
Japan, particularly on the part of militant students who
recently were responsible for the turmoil on university
campuses in Tokyo.
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VENEZUELA
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BRAZIL_
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BRAZIL
SIGNIFICANCE: Brazil, traditionally among the
strongest and closest US allies in Latin America-, has
become a virtual military dictatorship sapped by vac-
illating leadership and internal rivalries. A,climax
came in December 1968 when the Brazilian military forced
President Costa e
that bypassed the
broad .dictatorial
Silva to decree an Institutional Act
Constitution and gave the executive
powers. The US expressed "dismay" at
this action and assumed a policy of watchful waiting.
The massive US aid program to Brazil--which runs
about $350 million annually and is the
in Latin America and the third largest
taken "under review"
tranche was delayed.
expressed impatience
and a $50 million
Brazilian
with these
largest program
in the world--was
program
officials have
loan
not yet
delays, potentially dam-
aging to Brazilian business confidence, but they are very
sensitive to even implied criticism of their internal
political affairs. Our aid postponements could be so
interpreted and could quickly generate open antagonism
among top Brazilian leaders, provoking retaliation against
US business interests, and putting a severe strain on
US-Brazilian relations.
Internal Political Background
Most Brazilians regard their country as ready for
"Great Power" status-primarily by virtue of its vasti
size, burgeoning population (about. 90 million) and tre-
mendous, natural resources. Few of them, however, would
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deny that only rarely has any Brazilian government used
these advantages to exert significant international or
even domestic leadership.
In March 1964 the Brazilian military, joined by
leading state governors, revolted against the corruption,
fiscal and economic irresponsibility y and the excessive
toleration of the extreme left by the administration of
President Joao Goulart. General Castello Branco was
elected by a purged Congress in April 1964 to serve out
President Goulart's term which was then extended until
March 1967. Brazil was outwardly tranquil during the
Castello Branco administration, but tensions within the
military have existed since the 1964 coup. Hard-line
military officers provided the impetus for many of Castello
Branco's decrees. The military seemed united in their
choice of Costa e Silva when he was elected in 1966 by
Congress to replace Castello Branco, but his weak lead-
ership, his failure to crack down on corruption and sub-
version, and his inability to halt growing political tur-
bulence combined to erode this vital backing.
Incident after incident--criticism of the regime
by church and press, a judicial decision to free arrested
student demonstrators--added to military disillusionment.
In December the final straw came. Congress refused to
lift the immunity of an opposition deputy who had in Sep-
tember made a speech in Congress criticizing the military
establishment. Enraged and essentially unprepared for
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this defiance., in which even representatives of the ma-
jority progovernment Arena Party participated, the mill-
tary.concluded that this rebuff Was intolerable..
They forced the President to issue an Institutional
Act on 13 December that gave him clearly dictatorial powers
and stripped away any facade of constitutional government.
Under authority of the act, Congress has been shut down
indefinitely, as have the state legislatures. Habeas
corpus has been revoked, a large number of Brazilians have
been jailed, and dozens of congressmen, including several
from the president's own party, have lost their political
rights. The purge has included several members of the
supreme court and is likely to be extended to include
state and local officials. The press has been censored.
There is little prospect for a return to former constitu-
tional trappings in the foreseeable future.
Most civilian politicians are intimidated and demor-
alized by the military take-over. Although a majority of
Brazilian and foreign businessmen support the new decrees,
most other Brazilians still appear apathetic--the long-
range implications of these events have yet to sink in.
University students return to classes in March after a
long, vacation. They are a potentially strong focus of op-
position, but most will probably be cowed by the govern-
ment's expected show of force and by the military's new
power to deny habeas corpus. Organized labor, with a
host of legitimate grievances, is crippled by poor lead-
ership and a tradition of dependence on government.
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1-1)K 11-1h FK1)11)hN 1 UINL Y
Although Costa e Silva has so far survived as Presi-
dent, his leadership is ineffective, and in fact it is not
clear who, or even what group, actually controls the levers
of power. He is attempting to shore up his position but
he may not be sufficiently forceful or capable to exert
his will. He could not keep his job in the face of united
opposition from military officers./
This inherently unstable situation may dontinue for
some-time. If the President is removed, a military man
or junta would be the likely successor--perhaps a hard-
line figure such as former Interior Minister General Al-
buquerque.Lima or leaders of the powerful group of non-
cabinet officers referred to as "the generals."
Foreign Policy Trends
Brazilian-US relations, which were extremely close.
under Castello Branco, began?to become more difficult
after he left office. The trend in foreign policy since
March 1967 has been toward expressing deep-seated nation-
alistic aspirations that reflect Brazilians' belief that
their country is destined to become a "Great Power."
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This view is particularly prevalent among military of-
ficers, especially those identified with the hard line."
Under Costa e Silva, Brazilian foreign policy has
more frequently diverged from that of the US. For ex-
ample, Brazil has steadfastly resisted all appeals that
it -?orseth& Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because
government leaders say the treaty would forever condemn
Brazil to the ranks of "second rate" nations by hampering
its nuclear development program, Moreover, Brazil with-
drew its'early support for the US-backed permanent Inter-
American Peace Force, The Brazilian Government no longer
gives public backing to US policies onVietnam.
Demonstrations of anti-Americanism in Brazil-have not,
been fostered by the government but they have rarely been
discouraged. For example, there was a major hue and cry
over Brazilian fears that the US had evil designs on the
Amazon basin. This was carried to such an extreme that
missionaries who had provided birth control devices to
Indian women-were accused of attempting to "sterilize
Brazilian womanhood" so that the US could occupy the Ama-
zon,
Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, who has long as-
pired to the presidency, exploited these nationalistic
feelings not only out of personal conviction but because
he believed they would increase his support among the mili-
tary. He has had little success(
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If he is replaced, however, his successor
will probably be-just as nationalistic.
Consequences
The US will be criticized in Brazil and elsewhere
in Latin America. no matter what policies it adopts. Con-
tinuation of large-scale aid would be called a prop for
an unpopular and inept dictatorship. Despite successes
in curbing skyrocketing-inflation, Brazil's current lead-
ers do not seem to understand the complexity of the coun-
try's social and economic needs, much less to be able to
develop effective programs to meet these needs.
On the other hand, reduction or elimination of US
aid would adversely affect--and perhaps completely frus-
trate--the Brazilian effort. to curb inflation and promote
economic growth. Such economic effects would in short
order aggravate the government's political problems. One
result might. well be to strengthen the hand of those in-
fluential hard liners in the military who are urging an
"independent" stance for Brazil and a more- neutral posi-
tion in world affairs.
Although the moderate
view may prevail' in time, the locus of power now resides
in the hands of the "generals."
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