THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014777
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 21, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
April 21, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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LATE ITEM
South Vietnair
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April 21, 1975
Table of Contents
Vietnam: The North Vietnamese have rapidly brought
several corps command headquarters south to
direct the assault on Saigon. (Page 1)
Cambodia: The fate of journalists and other for-
eigners in Phnom Penh remains uncertain.
(Page 4)
Middle East: Egyptian President Sadat begins a visit
to Riyadh today that may include a meeting with
Syria's President Asad. (Page 5)
Latin America: Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming
trip is focusing Latin American attention on
the state of inter-American relations. (Page 6)
Notes: Israel; Thailand - North Korea. (Page 6)
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" CAMDIATN
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese have rapidly
brought several corps command headquar-
ters south to direct the assault on
Saigon. Two major commands from North
Vietnam and the Hue - Da Nang area and
the senior headquarters for the Central
Highlands have joined one other corps
command near Saigon to coordinate the
attacks of some 17 divisions along the
three major approaches to the capital--
from the east, the north, and the south-
west.
The defenders of Tan An, southwest of Saigon,
have been pinned down while the communists send
additional forces around them to new positions
closer to the capital. The same has happened to
the east, at Xuan Loc, which was abandoned by
South Vietnamese troops today. North Vietnamese
regiments that have bypassed Xuan Loc have driven
toward Bien Hoa city.
Bien Hoa's main defense units--two brigades of
marines who escaped from Da Nang--are newly re-
grouped and have poor discipline. They are not ex-
pected to stand and.fight.- The.nearby Long Binh
supply depot contains about 60 percent of all gov-.
ernment munitions. The' loss of Bien Hoa city, and
the air base and supply depot. would likely lead to
the rapid collapse of other government forces,
To. the northwest, remaining South Vietnamese
25th Division battalions have been pulled out of
Tay Ninh city to blocking positions closer to Sai-
gon, but the North Vietnamese 9th Division is
swinging around the southern flank of the 25th to
threaten Saigon's western perimeter., Southwest of
the capital, the North Vietnamese have moved addi-
tional.forces up from the delta to. Challenge the
main defenses of Long An Province. Other communist
regiments are approaching the southwestern outskirts
of Saigon.
The communists are also moving five sapper reg-
iments into the Saigon area to disrupt government
control, terrorize the population, and guide North
Vietnamese regulars into the metropolitan area.
(continued)
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Saigon no longer has any reserve forces avail-
able to help defend the city. The Joint General
Staff does not consider it practical to attempt to
bring any units that are deep in the delta closer
to Saigon.
Communist forces have taken Phan Thiet and Ham
Tan and are continuing their drive down the coast
toward Vung Tau. They will probably capture the
lightly defended port within a few days.
The communists appear to be ruling out any con-
sideration of a genuine negotiated settlement of
the conflict. At a press conference in Saigon Sat-
urday, the Viet Cong's spokesman carefully avoided
mention of negotiations with the present government
or even a reconstituted one such as they had been
demanding. Instead, he reiterated the Viet Cong's
position of March 21 which called for the overthrow
of Thieu and the immediate suspension of all US
support as the only two preconditions which could
bring about a "rapid settlement."
An equally tough line reportedly emerged
the "whole thing" would be fin-
ished in a short time and that the communists would
not agree to enter into negotiations, nor would they
loin any tripartite coalition government.
the issue of US aid had become "aca-
demic," since victory would be achieved before the
South Vietnamese could absorb any new "appropria-
tions."
On the government side, however, President
Thieu still shows every sign of intending to stay
in office. Within the next week, he plans to de-
liver a speech which will make this intention clear
and which will challenge the US Congress to make a
clear decision on future support to Saigon. Thieu
reportedly intends to deny that he is an obstacle
to peace, but will reiterate that he will never
agree to a communist take-over in the South. In this
regard, Thieu will maintain that he would step down
only if this would ensure quick and sufficient US
assistance, and only if the US agrees to "react
vigorously against communist aggression."
(continued)
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Despite, Thieu's tough public stand, South Viet-
namese opposition elements apparently are still try-
ing to work behind the scenes to form a new govern-
ment that could lead to negotiations with the commu-
nists. Catholic opposition leader Tran Huu Thanh,
retired general Duong.Van '13.i9." Minh, former Senate
chairman Nguyen Van Huyen, and Buddhist opposition
leader Senator Vu Van Mau plan to issue a joint proc-
lamation on April 23, demanding the immediate res-
ignation of President-Thieu and calling for the
formation of a "national leadership council." The
new council would be headed by the same four leaders,
with a cabinet composed two thirds of "rightists"--
presumably military officers and others closely
identified with the present government--and one
third of "leftists"--presumably elements represented
by the four oppositon leaders.
The hazy plan of action for the proposed new
government appears to consist-of immediate negotia-
tions with the communists and establishmentof the
National Council of Reconciliation and Concord
called for in the Paris Accords. Under the opposi-
tion scenario, the "leftist" faction of the govern-
ment-would-concentrate on political competition with
the communists within the Council, while the "right-
ist" faction would attempt to stabilize the military
situation in what remains of South Vietnam's terri-
tory:
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CAMBODIA
The fate of journalists and other
foreigners in Phnom Penh remains uncer-
tain.
A Khmer communist message intercepted last
Thursday indicated that all foreigners, except Chi-
nese and Vietnamese, were being held together. The
message said that the foreigners represented a "po-
litical problem" that "must be resolved properly."
Another communist message of the same day or?
-
dered the execution of government officials in the
provincial capital of Kompong Cham. Press accounts
of a Khmer communist broadcast referring to the be-
heading of senior government leaders in Phnom Penh
have not been confirmed.
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MIDDLE EAST
Egyptian President Sadat begins a
visit to Riyadh today that may include
a rare meeting between Sadat and Syria's
President Asad.
Sadat, who avoided Asad during King Faysal's
funeral, told Ambassador Eilts on Saturday that Asad
had requested the meeting. He said that earlier
this month PLO chairman Arafat gave him a letter
from Asad in which the Syrian leader "explicitly
admitted" that Egypt can make peace or war without
reference to Syria, but that Syria could make nei-
ther peace nor war in isolation from Egypt. The US
embassy notes that while Arafat was in Egypt, he
said publicly that the Arabs need Egypt to make war,
although he added that Egypt needs the Arabs to make
peace.
Sadat's interpretation of the Asad letter may
be self-serving, but if the two leaders do meet, it
will be because Asad, probably prompted by the
Saudis, has taken the initiative. The Syrians re-
peatedly have complained about Sadat's failure to
coordinate his political and diplomatic strategems
with them and his penchant for unilateral action.
Sadat, on the other hand, has been making no
visible effort to ease his strained relations with
Damascus
He
expects no improvement to come from the encounter-.
According to Ambassador Eilts, Sadat claimed to
have told Arafat not to come to Riyadh because his
presence would not contribute usefully to Syrian-
Egyptian talks; presumably Sadat wants to avoid a
Syrian-PLO effort to box him in on negotiating
strategy as happened at the Rabat summit last Octo-
ber.-
Also today, the Arab League foreign ministers
convene .a meeting in Cairo. The main item on their
agenda is to select a site for the next Arab summit,
tentatively set for late June.
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LATIN AMERICA
Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming
trip to the region and the OAS General
Assembly meetings next month are focus-
ing Latin American attention on the
state of inter-American affairs. At
the same time, events in Indochina
have provided impetus for a new round
of Latin commentary on broad aspects
of US policy.
While attitudes range from close identifica-
tion with the US to antipathy, a common thread
among the Latins is discomfort over the need to
adjust to a new US view of the world. US positions
on a variety of international topics have been in-
terpreted as tougher toward the nonaligned and less
benevolent toward friendly governments. A few
Latin governments, including Venezuela, Argentina,
and Brazil, harbor some hope that reverses in Asia
will turn US attention closer to home. Most seem
to fear that current problems will make Washington
less flexible in other areas.
Concern over reverberations from Indochina is
highest in Latin countries that feel themselves
embattled in an anti-communist struggle. Chile,
for example, feels increasingly isolated in its
effort to eliminate Allende's Marxist influence
there. Taken together with the removal of Santi-
ago from the Secretary's itinerary, events in In-
dochina have made Chile feel that its best option
is to strengthen ties with neighbors in Latin
America.
Uruguayans question the value of their long
loyalty to and cooperation with the US because the
Secretary plans to visit Buenos Aires, capital of
an ostensibly nonaligned government, but not Mon-
tevideo. They view detente as an unwise accommo-
dation to the communists and deplore Washington's
change of heart about Cuba and Indochina.
(continued)
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Panama's unique concern about the US mood has
raised grave fear over the political fallout from
the Indochina situation. Panamanians speculate that
US public opinion, weary of setbacks, will not tol-
erate yielding the Canal Zone to Panama.
Elsewhere in the hemisphere, US attention to
Asia has fortified the view that Latin America con-
tinues to have very low priority in US thinking.
? Few seem to expect that Secretary Kissinger's
travels will restore the sense of rejuvenation that
permeated inter-American events last spring.
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NOTES
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin focused on US-
Israeli relations in a lengthy interview, apparently
intended for both US and domestic audiences, that was
published Friday in Israel's largest daily.
Rabin was plainly attempting to calm widespread
fears in Israel that relations with the US have dan-
gerously deteriorated. Defense Minister Peres, how-
ever, has openly labeled US-Israeli relations as in
a state of "crisis," and Rabin, despite his efforts
to play the matter down, is worried. Rabin said that
Foreign Minister Allon will try to obtain a reading
from Secretary Kissinger during their meeting today
?on the implications for Israel of Washington's pol-
icy assessment.r
Thailand has reportedly agreed to establish
diplomatic relations with North Korea, the new Bang-
kok government's first move to improve relations
with Asian communist regimes.
The Thai are deeply suspicious of the intentions
of Hanoi and Peking in Southeast Asia, but they do
not view Pyongyang as a potential threat to their
security. Pyongyang views relations with Bangkok as
another step forward in its diplomatic competition
with Seoul, and as beneficial to Pyongyang's side
of the Korean question at the UN.
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