THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 MAY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014793
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 9, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
May 9, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. I 1652
exemption category, 5B( I ).(2)A3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
May 9, 1975
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Table of Coritents
Thailand: Thailand is moving rapidly to put its
relations with Asian communist regimes on new
footings. (Page 1)
Laos: The US charge-in Vientiane believes a commu-
nist takeover of the government could occur in
a matter of days and without the use of more
than token force. (Page 2)
Greece-Turkey: The Turkish general staff blames
the US aid cutoff for the lack of progress on
a Cyprus settlement and on an agreement on the
Aegean. (Page 4)
USSR: Soviet leader Brezhnev's speech at VE-Day
celebrations yesterday was, as appropriate to
the occasion, heavy on oratory and light on
substance. (Page 6)
Portugal: The agreement made Tuesday between the
Communists and Socialists is coming unstuck.
(Page 7)
Cuba: Castro has not softened his terms for nego-
tiations with the US. (Page 8)
Notes: Syria-Iraq; Lebanon; Philippines (Page 9)
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THAILAND
Bangkok is moving rapidly to put its
relations with Asian communist regimes on
new footings.
Yesterday, the day after the arrival in Bangkok
of a North Korean diplomatic mission, the Thai gov-
ernment announced its recognition of the Pyongyang
regime. Bangkok's ties with Seoul will not be broken,
but Pyongyang will probably press Bangkok to remove
its last token representation from the UN Command in
Korea. In the past two years, Pyongyang has made
steady diplomatic gains in Southeast Asia by estab-
lishing relations with Malaysia, Australia, and Laos,
and it is now courting the Philippines.
There is evidence
in the offinq.
that recognition of China is
The Thai are also prepared to extend recogni-
tion to Hanoi if the North Vietnamese are willing.
Negotiations aimed at formalizing relations, how-
ytake some time. The Thai cabinet
directed the foreign minister to establish
relations with Hanoi "at such time as he deems ap-
propriate." In the past Hanoi has insisted that
all US forces in Thailand be withdrawn before for-
mal ties could be established. Hanoi has hinted,
however, that assurances from the Thai that US
forces will not be used against Indochina will meet
this condition.
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LAOS
Judging from a conversation yester-
day with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
and against the background of the nearly
total collapse of non-communist will and
morale, the US charge' in Vientiane has
concluded that Souvanna no longer con-
siders the non-communist side to be a
factor in the present coalition. In ?the
charge's view, a communist takeover of
the government could occur in a matter
of days and without the use of more than
token force.
In talking with the charge,. Souvanna expressed
concern only over the country's economic and finan-
cial difficulties and made a pitch for increased
US economic assistance. He displayed optimism over
the political and military situations--espousing
Lao communist views completely--and placing partic-
ular blame for current "problems" on rightist De-
fense Minister Sisouk na Champassak and General
yang Pao. Souvanna appeared ready to dismiss Sisouk
from the cabinet. He has already ordered the firing
of Vang Pao and a number of other general officers.
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In the event of a communist takeover, Souvanna
could well remain in office and the facade of a
coalition government could continue. Any replace-
ments among cabinet officers and military region
commanders, however, would almost certainly be sub-
servient to the Lao communists.
Despite an agreement by the communists on
Wednesday to call for an end to political demonstra-
tions, they ordered one to be staged against the US
embassy last night. A hostile crowd of approxi-
mately 1,500 hurled rocks at the embassy in Vien-
tiane. Speakers sounded anti-US themes, denouncing
CIA and AID. Placards called for the removal of a
number of rightist cabinet ministers. Some demon-
strators attempted to force the gate to the embassy
(continued)
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but were repelled by police. No US mission person-
nel were injured. After a short time the crowd
moved on to the national stadium for a rally.
Although the Lao communist leadership in Vien-
tiane has signed a joint communique with Souvanna,
calling for an end to the recent fighting in north-
ern Laos, communist headquarters at Sam Neua appears
in no hurry to issue cease-fire orders to its troops.
Lao communist forces are continuing to push
south from the Sala Phou Khoun - Muong Kassy area
along Route 13. Contrary to earlier reports, they
apparently elected to bypass rather than attack the
town of yang Vieng which remains in non-communist
hands. yang Vieng has been effectively isolated,
however, by communist attacks farther south against
the towns of Ban Done and Ban Hin Heup.
By consolidating their control over the 75-
mile stretch of Route 13 between Sala Phou Khoun
and Ban Hin Heup, the communist are now in a good
position to interdict the only overland resupply
route to General yang Pao's headquarters at Long
Tieng. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that
the removal of yang Pao, the demobilization of his
Meo tribal forces, and the complete neutralization
of both military regions in northern Laos may be
the Lao communists' primary objectives in the cur-
rent round of fighting.
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GREECE-TURKEY
The Turkish general staff blames the
US aid cutoff for the Zack of progress
toward a Cyprus settlement and an agree-
ment with Greece on the Aegean.
officials have decided that
no significant concessions will be made
on Cyprus until the Aegean problem is
resolved.
The Turkish general staff apparently assumes
that the Greeks are waiting for the cutoff in US
aid to force Ankara to adopt a softer line. The
general staff had earlier taken a "wait and see"
approach to the US aid cutoff, but now that Turkey
has a legitimate government, military leaders are
recommending retaliatory moves against US military
facilities if aid is not resumed.
Earlier Turkish threats to retaliate against
US facilities have been postponed as the Turks
clung to the belief that the arms embargo would be
lifted. Ankara may continue to follow this line
officially, but there is skep-
ticism among top officials that arms deliveries
will be resumed at any early date.
The Turkish approach toward Greece will be
tested on May 18 when foreign ministers of the two
countries are scheduled to meet in Geneva to dis-
cuss their claims in the Aegean and other points
of friction. They are to talk over the texts that
will be submitted to the International Court of
Justice on their conflicting claims to mineral
rights on the Aegean continental shelf.
(continued)
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Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios is prepared to
discuss but is not empowered to negotiate the Cyprus
issue. He told the US embassy that he had no in-
tention of substituting himself for Greek Cypriot
negotiator Clerides. Bitsios expressed concern
that the Turkish Cypriot referendum on the new Turk-
ish Cypriot constitution will be held the same day
he is due to meet the Turkish foreign minister,
a fact which could adversely affect the atmosphere
for the talks.
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USSR
Soviet leader Brezhnev's speech yes-
terday at the VE-Day celebrations was, as
appropriate to the occasion, heavy on ora-
tory and light on substance.
One notable thought to emerge in Brezhnev's
speech is his suggestion that the European security
conference could serve as an example for other parts
of the world. This, however, may only be Moscow's
way of kicking off another effort to stimulate in-
terest in an Asian collective security scheme--a
concept the Soviets have been pushing for some time.
Brezhnev expressed the Soviet Union's hope for
better relations with the US, but avoided subjects
such as the coming summit meeting in Washington.
He called for "concrete agreements" to reduce arms,
but did not mention the recently adjourned SALT
talks.
Picking up on a theme recently enunciated by
Defense Minister Grechko, Brezhnev cited the allied
cooperation during World War II as relevant to the
more complicated task of preventing another "world-
wide disaster." Brezhnev did not, however, repeat
Grechko's explicit reference to "political and mil-
itary cooperation."
the
speech did not include the assertion that detente
is "'gaining strength,"
The speech's rhetoric was colored by the com-
munist victory in Vietnam. Brezhnev said, for ex-
ample, that it was "high time that those whom this
concerns" recognize that the suppression of libera-
tion movements is doomed to fail. He said also,
however, that elimination of the Vietnam "hotbed"
creates conditions for a better international at-
mosphere and better relations between the Soviet
Union and the US.
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PORTUGAL
The cooperation agreement between
Portuguese Communists and Socialists an-
nounced on Tuesday is already coming apart.
The Communists have now charged the Socialists
with trying to use the election results to create
divisions among military leaders and within the
labor movement. The Communist charge is in response
to Socialist Party leader Soares' warning on Wednes-
day that if the two parties are to work together,
the Communists must loosen their control of organ-
ized labor, the press, and local governments.
Soares specifically called for union and munic-
ipal elections and urged the government to investi-
gate bias in the media. The Socialists fear the
Communists will try to use their influence with
radical military officers to change the provisions
in a draft labor law that call for union elections.
The text of the law has not yet been released, which
could indicate that the issue has not been finally
resolved.
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CUBA
Cuba still insists on the termina-
tion of the US economic denial program
as a prerequisite to any negotiations
with Washington. An official press re-
lease published in Havana yesterday
emphasized this point, probably to off-
set foreign journalists' misleading ac-
counts of Fidel Castro's press conference
Wednesday night. Other portions of the
release, however, underscored Cuba's in-
terest in improving Cuban-US relations.
One quote attributed to Castro, for example,
appears to be a direct affirmative response indi-
cating a willingness to recognize and accept "a
mutality of obligation."
Castro's implication that the negotiation of
an agreement against hijacking in early 1973 was
a valuable "gesture" toward rapprochement is not
borne out by the facts. At that time he warned
against just such a misinterpretation of the agree-
ment. Castro's suggestion that his gesture on hi-
jacking might be repaid now by a lifting of the
prohibition on the export of foods and medicines
to Cuba was probably made with the current OAS
meeting in mind. He may expect the US either to
press for a lifting of the OAS sanctions or to act
unilaterally to permit limited exports, thereby
undercutting an OAS policy the US had been instru-
mental in formulating.
Castro will not be rushed into negotiations.
Although he regards a reconciliation with the US
as inevitable, his statements at the press confer-
ence indicate that he sees the process as a drawn-out
affair, involving careful and complex maneuvering
for positions advantage. He is under no pressure
for a quick solution and instead appears to be try-
ing to generate pressure on the US through the press
and public opinion.
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NOTES
Syria has moved surface-to-air missiles to the
vicinity of the Euphrates Dam, presumably in case
Iraq attempts to attack the dam because of the dis-
pute between the two countries over the downstream
distribution of the river water.
Damascus has been building up its forces near
the dam for several weeks. The missile equipment
at the dam may formerly have been positioned near
Damascus; if so, the Syrians have reduced their mis-
sile defenses along the front with Israel by over
10 percent.
Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Sulh is likely
to resign today.
Half of his 18-man cabinet has either resigned
or threatened to resign in criticism of the way he
handled disturbances in Beirut and Sidon over the
past few months. President Franjiyah apparently
has been willing to see Sulh replaced for some time;
Franjiyah has probably been looking for a more
assertive prime minister who could better control
the fedayeen and would be less hesitant in dealing
with the country's continuing security problems.
Philippine President Marcos hopes to make an
official visit to Peking this summer, perhaps as
early as next month, to participate personally in
establishing diplomatic relations.
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Top Secret
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