THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JANUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007919
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 16, 1975

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,?
The President's Daily Brief
January 16, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of E.O. 1 165 2
exemption category 56(11.12),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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January 16, 1974
Table of Contents
USSR: Moscow, thus far, seems to be playing down
the broader implications for detente following
its rejection of the US-Soviet trade agreement.
(Page 1)
Egypt: President Sadat links the continued pres-
ence of UN forces in the Sinai to further Is-
raeli withdrawals on all Arab fronts. (Page 4)
Cambodia: Heavy fighting along the Mekong River
has caused the postponement of a large resup-
ply convoy. (Page 5)
OPEC Investment: Dollar assets held by OPEC states
quadrupled during the first nine months of
1974. (Page 6)
United Kingdom:
ye 8)
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The basic posi-
tions of participants in next week's trade
discussions in Geneva remain unchanged, but
differences will emerge. (Page 9)
Note: Israel (Page 11)
At Annex we discuss Prospects for Hostilities in
the Middle East.
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USSR
Moscow, thus far, seems to be
playing down the broader implications
for detente following its rejection
of the US-Soviet trade agreement.
? Premier Kosygin made repeated references to
the necessity of continuing detente in the course
of ,a banquet speech on January 14 honoring Austra-
lian Prime Minister Whitlam. Kosygin, the first
Soviet leader to speak on foreign policy issues
since the USSR's note to the US last Friday,
specifically reiterated Moscow's goal of making
detente "irreversible." His evident effort to
indicate, without mentioning the US, that detente
is still on the track will be reinforced for the
Soviet public by an otherwise routine Soviet press
announcement Wednesday regarding the.resumption of
SALT.
Moscow Radio informed its domestic audience
of Secretary Kissinger's statement in a Tass summary
broadcast 12 hours after the US announcement. The
Tass summary, carried in Izvestia on January 15,
said the Secretary noted the Soviet government's
message that it does not intend to accept a trade
status which is discriminatory and subject to po-
litical conditions and accordingly would not bring
into force the 1972 trade agreement. The report
concluded with the Secretary's assurance that the
administration would continue to pursue all avenues,
including legislation, to promote mutually benefi-
cial trade relations.
A possible sign that the leadership has hope
of an eventual reversal of its fortunes on the
trade issue occurred on Tuesday when a Soviet com-
mentator laid the blame for the trade impasse on
an anti-detente faction in the outgoing Congress.
He said that many of this faction remain in the
new Congress, but he also noted that the new Con-
gress would have a different complexion. Moscow
may hope that its tough line will convince Congress
to reconsider its action.
Internal Impact
The decision not to accept the conditions of
the US trade and Export-Import Bank bills, and the
events that led up to it, were a sharp setback to
(continued)
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a major element of General Secretary Brezhnev's detente
policy and may ultimately affect his basic political
position. He has also suffered a recent setback in
his consumer program and an embarrassing postpone-
ment of his visit to Egypt.
Brezhnev has remained out of public sight since
December 24, except for attendance at the funeral of
his mother on January 8. He entered the hospital on
December 26, and returned there after the services
on January 8.
There is no evidence of a crisis atmosphere
within the leadership or signs of a concerted chal-
lenge to Brezhnev's position. He faces fh nrnh1ri,
however,
from leading to an erosion of
his authority. To prevent this, he must resume an
active work schedule and give a new impetus to
domestic and foreign policies. The pressures to
take an active role will increase as politicking
for next year's party congress picks up.
Economic Impact
The Soviet rejection of the agreement should
not substantially affect the volume of US-Soviet
trade in 1975. Two-way trade was approximately
$1 billion in 1974--down from a high of $1.4
billion in 1973, when the USSR imported large
quantities of grain. Trade in 1975 is expected to
be above the 1974 level. Exports of US capital
goods to the USSR in 1975 will be determined
largely by Soviet orders placed in 1972-1973, when
Export-Import Bank credits were available. Three
fourths of the roughly $1 billion in US orders
backed by Export-Import Bank financing have yet to
be exported. US exports also will be boosted by
deliveries of some $350 million in grain previously
ordered by the USSR.
The lack of Export-Import Bank financing could,
however, reduce substantially the volume of future
contracts placed in the US. Western Europe and
Japan, which continue to grant lower interest
credits, could be the principal beneficiaries.
(continued)
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The Soviets may be able to obtain commercial
loans from US banks to cover US exports of equip-
ment as long as the USSR is willing to pay market
interest rates and guarantee the loans? Further-
more, the USSR currently enjoys the strongest
financial position it has had at any time in its
history, and could keep buying from the US even on
a cash basis. The prospects of major cooperative
projects such as the development of Yakutsk natural
gas will be dimmed considerably, however, without
Export-Import Bank funds.
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EGYPT
President Sadat has 'linked the
continued presence of the UN Emergency
Force in the Sinai Peninsula to further
Israeli withdrawals on all Arab fronts.
He stopped short, however, of imposing
conditions for the extension of the UN
Sinai mandate, which expires on April 24.
According to an authoritative Cairo news service
account of the President's meeting with a group of
French legislators, Sadat said, in a reference to
renewal of the mandate, that Israel "must withdraw
a further distance on the three fronts"--Sinai, the
Golan Heights, and the West Bank. He did not ex-
plicitly demand, however, further pullbacks on all
fronts before the status of UN forces in the Sinai
comes up for review. He noted only that Egypt would
decide the mandate issue "in the light of the situa-
tion and of Israel's behavior."
Sadat probably intended by his remarks to press
for quick progress on a second-stage Sinai with-
drawal by hinting he would not renew the UN mandate
unless a withdrawal agreement has been concluded by
late April. He may, in fact, intend to cancel the
mandate if there is by then no satisfactory progress
toward an agreement.
Despite Sadat's linking of the situation on the
other Arab fronts with the status of UN forces in
the Sinai, it is unlikely he would condition con-
tinuance of the UN Sinai mandate on agreements in the
other areas. Should Egypt achieve an agreement with
Israel in the Sinai by April, cancellation of the UN
mandate would jeopardize that agreement by removing
the force that polices the disengagement lines and
keeps Israeli forces behind those lines.
Sadat also told the Frenchmen that when the
Suez Canal is reopened, Egypt will permit passage
by ships of "all nations except Israel as long as
the state of war continues." This restriction
would not necessarily preclude the passage of
Israeli cargoes and crews in ships flying the flags
of other nations. The Israelis have said that these
indirect passage rights were part of the disengage-
ment agreement last year, and they will insist on
a recommitment from Egypt in return for another
withdrawal in the Sinai.
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
Oudong
\:\
1, PHNOM
PENH
15
Prey Veng
"Pika),
Pochentong Airpo
Prek T
Government clearing
operation stalled
tO
River
tr^ ,
cs) narrows
3 7
0531
1.1
\' Government positions
under pressure
Neak Cuong Navy Base
Heavy co ntrations
of Communis
n Takeo
Miles 10
SOUTH VIETNAM
557134 1-75 CIA
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CAMBODIA
Heavy fighting along the Mekong
River north of the navy base at Neak
Luong and continued Communist control
of the river banks south of Neak Luong
have forced the postponement of a large
resupply convoy originally scheduled to
move upriver from South Vietnam at mid-
week. Phnom Penh has a five-week sup-
ply of rice and enough fuel and am-
munition to support military operations
through the end of the month. These
stocks are being supplemented by in-
creased air deliveries.
Communist ground attacks in the Neak Luong area
are still centered on the town of Banam and on gov-
ernment positions on the west bank of the river
opposite the navy base. Government troops are
fighting well; navy convoys from Phnom Penh are
still getting through to Neak Luong but are run-
ning into heavy Communist shellings. Government
forces trying to push down Route 1 toward Neak Luong
are still meeting stiff resistance some 15 miles
southeast of Phnom Penh.
In the immediate Phnom Penh area Communist
initiatives remain limited to shellings and ground
probes--primarily against the Cambodian army's 7th
Division northwest of the city. Government counter-
attacks on the east bank of the Mekong opposite the
capital are beginning to make some progress.
Insurgent commanders have exhorted units in
outlying areas to increase pressure against a num-
ber of government-held provincial capitals, but so
far only small-scale attacks have materialized.
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OPEC INVESTMENT
OPEC states quadrupled their holdings
of dollar assets, including Eurodollars,
during the first nine months of 1974. At
the end of September, they held at least
$34 billion. Unless OPEC members reduce
the dollar component of their total in-
vestment, their dollar holdings will ap-
proach $100 billion by the end of 1975.
The foreign official assets of the OPEC states
grew from $21 billion at the end of 1973 to $52
billion at the end of the third quarter of 1974.
Dollar-denominated holdings increased from about
$8 billion, 40 percent of the total, to at least
$34 billion, or nearly two thirds of the total.
The growing concentration in dollar holdings
reflects both the ability of international dollar
markets to satisfy OPEC investment goals and the
lack of attractive alternatives. The depth and
versatility of the Eurodollar and US capital markets
have enabled producers to retain effective control
over their investment, to earn a reasonable return,
and to minimize the risk of political seizure. In-
vestment in other currencies has been constrained
by greater concern over devaluation (as in the case
of sterling), by capital controls, and by the lim-
ited size of domestic markets.
A
About 45 percent of OPEC dollar holdings are
located in the London Eurodollar market and 35 per-
cent in the United States. The remainder has been
#17- id--
placed in other European countries, Canada, and 05.
Japan and with international organizations. '
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Because of the premium placed on security and
liquidity, short-term bank deposits and government
securities account for 90 percent of OPEC dollar
assets. Holdings of real estate and equities rose
from 5 percent of the total in December 1973 to
10 percent in September 1974.
(continued)
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Four countries--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran,
and Venezuela--accounted for 80 percent of OPEC dol-
lar holdings on September 30, 1974. Saudi Arabia
alone accounted for about 35 percent. Venezuela,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Nigeria were the largest
holders in the United States, with more than 75 per-
cent of that total.
The dominance of the dollar in international
trade and finance assures a continued heavy inflow
of OPEC investments. Assuming stable oil prices
and output, foreign official holdings of OPEC states
should increase by about $60 billion in 1975. If
the shares of investment in dollars remain unchanged,
OPEC dollar holdings will grow to almost $100 bil-
lion. Even in the event of a sharp decline in US
and Eurodollar short-term interest rates, we would
not expect a substantial drop in the share of OPEC
wealth going into dollar assets. A fall in short-
term interest rates could, however, force a larger
share of OPEC dollar holdings into assets with
longer maturities.
The continued concentration of OPEC investment
in dollar-denominated assets intensifies the re-
cycling problem. Because banks are unwilling to
undertake a substantial long-term exchange rate
risk, consuming countries are forced to borrow
dollars to finance oil-induced balance-of-payments
deficits. Dollar liabilities, unlike those denom-
inated in domestic currencies, carry the additional
burden of an exchange rate risk. The potential loss
from currency realignments and other international
payments uncertainties could reduce consumer-country
willingness to finance higher oil import costs for
a sufficient period to allow gradual adjustment to
an acceptable pattern of current account deficits.
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UNITED KINGDOM
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MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Multilateral trade discussions re-
sume in Geneva next week, in the wake of
the enactment of the US Trade Act of 1974.
In spite of the precipitous rise in oil
prices and emergence of widespread stag-
flation since the Tokyo discussions of
1973, some of the basic positions of the
participants remain unchanged. Certain
countries will doubtless voice concern
about liberalizing trade in the midst of
recession. Differences over the use of
export controls will also emerge.
One of the major issues of concern within the
EC, particularly in France and Italy, is that new
trade concessions will increase domestic unemploy-
ment. In this connection, the European and Japa-
nese press characterize the US Trade Act as a
"double-edged sword" with protectionist provisions
that could be invoked if the economic decline con-
tinued.
Assured access to goods in short supply also
has become a major issue. Japan and the EC favor
substantial limitations on the use of export con-
trols. Canada and Australia, however, regard con-
trol over raw material supplies as their main bar-
gaining chip and will probably use their leverage
in this area to obtain concessions in others. LDCs,
meanwhile, prize their new-found market power and
will try to maximize their benefits without con-
ceding any freedom to restrict supplies.
Objectives of the Developed Countries
Overall, the EC has more limited objectives
in the trade negotiations than does the US. The
Community views the talks as a means of preserving
economic peace with the US and avoiding a trade war.
The EC has two basic aims: preservation of Commu-
nity institutions and maintenance of trade peace.
The EC will push for harmonization of tariffs on
industrial goods (reducing high tariffs by a greater
percentage than low tariffs) and for international
agreements covering all aspects of trade in major
agricultural commodities. While it recognizes that
it may have to make concessions allowing freer ac-
cess to community markets for some commodities, the
EC intends to preserve the basic principles of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Community po-
sition will represent a compromise between the
limited objectives of the French and the more lib-
eral aims of the British and Germans.
(continued)
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Paris views the EC as an integrated independent
grouping that should be largely free of external in-
fluence. It regards the Common External Tariff and
the CAP as linchpins of European unity and will re-
sist any changes that would weaken these. As the
French see it, the harmonization principle could
involve raising as well as lowering tariffs.
Bonn believes that tariffs should be cut ap-
preciably and that harmonization is not an end in
itself. West Germany is more willing than France
to negotiate on agriculture, since it is disenchanted
with various aspects of the CAP. While the Germans
support the idea of world commodity agreements, they
oppose the inclusion of food aid and internationally
supervised storage facilities in such arrangements.
London shares Bonn's positions on tariffs and
agriculture. Though favorably disposed toward the
talks, the British feel that current economic un-
certainties could stifle progress at Geneva.
Less is known about the Japanese and Canadian
negotiating positions, since they, unlike the US and
the EC, do not have to develop a negotiating man-
date. Japan favors uniform percentage reductions
in tariffs on all industrial products and supports
the concept of agricultural commodity agreements.
The Canadians want to negotiate tariff reductions
sector by sector rather than to apply an overall
formula. While Ottawa is closer to the US than to
the EC position on agriculture, preferring freer
market access for agricultural products, it prob-
ably will not vigorously oppose the Community pro-
posals.
LDC Positions
The less developed countries are expected to
insist on preferential application of any new trade
arrangements. They are concerned about market ac-
cess for their products and the effects of tariff
reductions on advantages conferred by trade pref-
erences. They are likely to push hard for improve-
ments in the generalized system of preferences.
Exclusion of OPEC members from the trade pref-
erence provisions of the US Trade Act has evoked
sharp criticism from many LDCs, particularly in
Latin America. Venezuela and Ecuador protest that
they have not restricted oil supplies to the US and
that their exclusion from the generalized preferences
offered non-OPEC LDCs undermines hemispheric coopera-
tion.
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NOTE
Large Israeli air force exercises that began
over the northern Sinai on Tuesday continued yes-
terday.
The Israelis probably are continuing to
practice ground support tactics
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Prospects for Hostilities in the Middle East
We see little incentive for resumption of hos-
tilities by the front-line countries in the Middle
East during the next two or three months as nego-
tiations move ahead toward an Egyptian-Israeli
agreement in the Sinai. Beyond that period, the
likelihood of war rises sharply.
--Fedayeen and Israeli raids along the Lebanese
border probably will increase and could esca-
late into wider hostilities.
--Syria may adopt a more militant stance if it
sees no prospect for negotiations on the Golan
front.
--Israel would seriously consider a first
strike if it believed Syria to be on the point
of resuming hostilities.
The period just before and after the expiration
of the UN mandate on the Golan Heights in late May
will be particularly critical.
Syria
? Syrian President Asad seems resigned to another
Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and if one should be
?reached within the next two or three months, Syria
will be looking for similar progress on its own
front. Moreover, Asad's renewal of the UN mandate
last November implied an expectation that broader
steps toward a settlement--such as the reconvening
of the Geneva conference--would be taken within six
months. We doubt that Syria would again renew the
mandate solely on the basis of promises of future
progress toward Syrian and pan-Arab objectives.
Damascus would not necessarily opt immediately
for renewed warfare. The mere decision to let the
mandate expire would be viewed by Syria as placing
strong pressure on the US and Israel. Damascus
would also agitate for a new oil embargo as a fur-
ther means of forcing serious negotiations on the
Syrian question. All this would be accompanied by
a build-up in the Golan Heights disengagement zones
to increase tensions just short of war.
The Syrians might also exploit the current
situation along the Lebanese-Israeli border for
their own purposes.
(continued)
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We believe Syria
is supporting the fedayeen in southern Lebanon for
defensive purposes--in reaction to Israeli raids into
Lebanon and out of fear that Tel Aviv may be getting
ready to occupy Lebanese territory.
The Syrians may view the situation differently
several months from now, particularly if they should
see no hope for negotiating progress on the Golan.
They might then actively support increased fedayeen
forays into Israel. The risk of escalation would
be great, but we think the Syrians would be willing
to take that risk to break the deadlock.
Israel
There is always the danger that Israel will
strike first against Syria in the months ahead. It
is hard to predict just when such a decision might
be made, for it could be largely a matter of Israel's
perception of the threat against it, rather than an
accurate reflection of the actual threat. The dan-
ger obviously will increase as the date for the re-
newal of the UN mandate on Golan approaches.
As long as negotiations for a Sinai disengage-
ment are in train, we do ot think Israel would risk
blowing up these talks--an drawing Egypt into an-
other war--by launching an attack against Syria.
If an Egyptian-Israeli agreement is arranged, how-
ever, and Syria steps up the pressure for similar
progress on the Golan front, the Israelis may
calculate that a more satisfied Egypt would not come
to Syria's aid, at least not right away.
Israel's concern over US reaction would clearly
be a constraint on a first-strike option. The Is-
raelis might calculate, however, that a quick vic-
tory over the Syrians could leave the US with little
choice but to acquiesce. Many Israelis also seem to
see hope that they can count on US public opinion to
counter whatever pressures the US government might
exert on them. They might bank on this sentiment in
the event of a rapid first strike against Syria.
Egypt
Should no Sinai disengagement develop within
the next several months, the Egyptians would prob-
ably start planning with the Syrians for a two-front
attack, probably reserving a decision to go to war
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again until the political possibilities were ex-
hausted. If Syria were attacked, Cairo would not
hesitate to open a second front.
A second-stage Sinai withdrawal would make the
Egyptians reluctant to join new hostilities and
jeopardize their new agreement. But even in this
instance, fighting on the Golan Heights, particu-
larly if initiated by Israel, would find Egypt un-
able to remain on the sidelines for long.
Sadat has lost much of the popularity he won
during the 1973 war and, with it, much of his abil-
ity to act independently of the other Arabs. He
would be under intense pressure to demonstrate that
the gains he had won for Egypt did not mean he had
abandoned the Arab cause.
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