THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 OCTOBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466868
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 11, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
,
October 11, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E 0 11652
exemption category 58( I
declassified only on approval of
the 'hector of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 11, 1976
Table of Contents
China: Evidence is strong that Hua Kuo-feng has been named chair-
man of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Mil-
itary Affairs Commission. The official announcement of the
promotion could have been delayed because of the reported
purges of the four leading leftists on the Politburo.
(Page 1)
Thailand: The military leaders of the National Administrative
Reform Council are trying to move quickly to establish a
caretaker civilian administration. (Page 3)
Lebanon: Little progress was made during the tripartite Syrian-
Palestinian-Lebanese talks on Saturday. The outlook for
the meeting today likewise appears bleak. (Page 4)
USSR: A bumper grain harvest is still expected. (Page 5)
Notes: UK; West Germany (Pages 7 and 8)
At Annex we discuss ,the impact of the new constitutional amend-
ment on Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government.
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CHINA: The evidence is
strong that Hua Kuo-
feng has been named
chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party and
chairman of the impor-
tant Military Affairs
Commission to succeed
Mao Tse-tung.
The problem could stem
from the reported purge
of the four leading
leftists on the Polit-
buro.
The US Liaison Office has observed
posters specifically stating that
Hua is now party chairman. Polit-
buro member Li Hsien-nien told
Senator Mansfield yesterday that
Hua had "succeeded" Mao. Taken
together with official media ref-
ences to Hua as "head" of the
party central committee, this seems
to be conclusive evidence that a
decision to promote Hua had been
taken, presumably by the Politburo,
during its continuous session from
Mao's death until late last month.
Several events suggest that some
sort of problem has developed:
--An official announcement of
the promotion has been delayed.
--A major editorial published
yesterday called for "resolute
struggle" against words or ac-
tions leading to "revisionism,
splitism, intrigues, and con-
spiracy."
--A hurried leadership meeting
apparently took place on Octo-
ber 9.
The Liaison Office believes that
serious resistance to Hua's eleva-
tion has surfaced. Li Hsien-nien's
comments to Senator Mansfield on
October 10, however, suggest that
whatever problems have arisen have
delayed rather than permanently
blocked public acknowledgement of
Hua's promotion.
Lower level cadre in Peking have
been told that the four leftists
have been arrested for alleged com-
plicity in a coup d'etat--presuma-
bly against Hua. If cadre have
been briefed, the arrests very
likely have taken place.
--continued
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If the four leading
leftists--one of whom
is Mao's widow, Chiang
Ching--have indeed been
purged, a major rea-
lignment of political
forces has occurred.
There are no signs of heightened
security precautions in Peking,
nor have we any indications as yet
of military alerts in the Peking
area or elsewhere in China.
In the event of a purge of this
magnitude, the surviving central
leaders would need to inform mem-
bers of the central committee of
the charges against the "leftists"
and there would be an obvious need
to hammer out new leadership ar-
rangements at the levels immedi-
ately below Hua. This could ac-
count for the delay in making an
official announcement about Hua's
promotion.
Centrist and "rightist" civilians,
together with important military
leaders, would now be dominant, and
a source of friction in the Chi-
nese leadership would have been
removed.
Other major appointments which
have been delayed for some time
might now be made. Wu Te, the
"rightist" party boss of Peking,
would likely become chairman of
the National People's Council--the
equivalent of head of state. Ru-
mors are circulating that Hua will
relinquish his job as premier.
If the leftist stalwart First Dep-
uty Premier Chang Chun-chiao has
fallen, Li Hsien-nien would be a
logical candidate for that impor-
tant post. Li is a "rightist" and
close associate of the late Chou
En-lai.
2
--continued
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If the decision to ele-
vate Hua to the chair-
manship of the party
and of the Military Af-
fairs Commission sticks,
it indicates that he
has secured the strong
backing of the military
establishment.
THAILAND: The military
leaders of the National
Administrative Reform
Council are trying to
move quickly to estab-
lish a caretaker civil-
ian administration.
Assuming Hua weathers the immedi-
ate crisis, his future relation-
ship with the powerful commander
of the Peking Military Region
could prove to be the key as to
whether leadership stability can
be achieved.
Thanin Kraiwichian, a Supreme
Court justice known for conserva-
tive but not extreme right-wing
views, was appointed prime minis-
ter on October 8, and a cabinet is
expected to be formed within two
weeks. NARC Chairman Admiral Sa-
ngat
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Sa-ngat apparently hopes that the
rapid formation of a civilian gov-
ernment will defuse the growing
ambitions of some military elements
for a greater political role. The
expansion of the NARC to include
several more army officers has
soothed the army's initial dis-
gruntlement, but some army offi-
cers on the military council are
arguing for extending the longev-
ity of that council.
Sa-ngat is also concerned about
plotting by the former Thai Nation
Party leaders and their allies in
the military who have been delib-
erately excluded from the council.
None of these figures hold troop
commands and their chances of
pulling off a successful counter-
coup are highly questionable.
3
--continued
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LEBANON: Little, if
any, progress was made
during the tripartite
Syrian-Palestinian-Leb-
anese talks on Saturday.
The outlook for the
meeting today likewise
appears bleak.
Nonetheless, Sa-ngat's concerns
were apparently sufficient to call
a full police alert in the Banokok
area yesterday
Furthermore, yesterday
three high-ranking military offi-
cers were summoned by the NARC to
answer questions about possible
plots against the council.
Bangkok remains quiet and the stu-
dents arrested last week are be-
ginning to be released on bail.
The left is in disarray and going
underground. The most serious
threat to the formation of a new
government would seem to lie in
the ambitions of army officers who
may be reluctant to give up the
power that they recently received.
Arab League mediator Hasan Sabri
al-Khuli's characterization of the
talks as "frank" and "objective"
and the apparent lack of agreement
suggest that
the parties continue to differ on
major negotiating issues.
--continued
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WRY
Oian Contro led
1.014 CONTESTED
Syrian
Blocka e
Predomin ntly
Must m
Popu ated
MEDITERRANEAN
Syrian
Controlled
C NTESTED AREA
redomina tly
US
Palestinian/
Muslim Area
DAMASCUS
MILES 20
0 KILOMETERS 20
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Opposition to the talks
by Lebanese leftist
leaders, radical Pales-
tinian commando groups,
and Phalangist leader
Jumayyil--all excluded
from the negotiations--
would appear to cast
an additional doubt on
prospects for success.
USSR: A bumper grain
harvest is still ex-
pected.
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Late last week leftist leaders re-
portedly rejected in advance any
settlement reached without their
participation. Leftist radio
broadcasts have denounced the talks
as an attempt by the Syrians and
Christians to split the leftist-
Palestinian alliance.
* * *
Our current estimate of Soviet
grain production, based on all-
source information on weather and
crop conditions, is 205 million
metric tons, up 5 million tons
from our early September estimate.
--continued
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The US Department of Agriculture
puts the Soviet crop at 215 mil-
lion tons. Statements made by So-
viet officials concerning the pros-
pect for this year's harvest range
from 195 million tons to a new rec-
ord of 222.5 million tons.
We still believe that the USSR
this year will purchase abroad
about 14 million tons of grain, a
little more than half the amount
bought in 1975. This would cost
roughly $2 to $2.5 billion com-
pared with the nearly $4 billion
spent for last year's purchases.
Of this amount, the US probably
will supply about 10 million tons.
The USSR has bought 6.3 million
tons under the first year of the
US-USSR grain agreement and must
buy about 500,000 tons more wheat
to satisfy the provision that the
first 6 million tons be equally
divided between wheat and corn.
With a grain crop of 205 million
tons and expected imports, Soviet
grain supplies will be sufficient
to maintain the momentum to re-
build livestock herds, improve
the quality of bread and other con-
sumer products, and start restock-
ing depleted grain reserves.
So far, the Soviets have promised
little grain to their traditional
customers. We expect probably 2
to 3 million tons of grain will be
shipped to Eastern Europe. Should
the Soviet harvest exceed our cur-
rent expectations, Eastern Europe
might well press for additional
amounts of grain from the Soviets
but will remain dependent on West-
ern suppliers during the 1976/77
marketing year.
--continued
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UK.
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West Germany/
NOTES
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--continued,
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INDIA
The increasingly authoritarian trend that
has marked Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
decade in office will reach a new bench-
mark this fall when parliament approves,
as it surely will, a constitutional amend-
ment that will institutionalize unprece-
dented power in the executive branch.
The most important provisions of the omnibus amend-
ment:
--Unequivocally establish the prime minister
as the supreme authority in government.
--Institutionalize many repressive measures in
effect since Gandhi imposed a national emergency
in June 1975.
--Sharply curtail the judiciary's power to
challenge legislation and to safeguard civil
liberties.
Beyond this, Gandhi will have carte blanche during
the next two years to amend the constitution fur-
ther under the pretext of removing "difficulties"
that stand in the way of implementing the new amend-
ment.
Gandhi's Leadership Style
Gandhi's intolerance of criticism and her reluctance
to compromise made it almost inevitable that her
administration would grow progressively more author-
itarian. She has repeatedly sought full freedom of
action.
The Prime Minister delegates little authority. She
consults with a small circle of relatives and aides
rather than the cabinet but makes all important de-
cisions herself. There is little opportunity for
policy debate or innovative ideas.
Revising the System
Gandhi charges that the judiciary represents the
elite and that the Supreme Court's "narrow" inter-
pretation of the constitution has blocked social
justice. The pending amendment will bar the Su-
preme Court from challenging the substance of any
--continued
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new amendments and will substantially limit the pur-
view of the state courts. It will enable the execu-
tive to tighten its control over the selection and
assignment of judges at all levels. Nonetheless,
the judiciary probably will retain a fair degree of
independence and continue to rule against the gov-
ernment in some cases involving civil or corporate
matters.
The constitution, as it now stands, vests wide
powers in India's indirectly elected presidents al-
though they have traditionally refrained from using
these powers and assumed titular roles. The new
amendment will clearly subordinate the president to
the prime minister. An addition to the constitution
of 10 "fundamental duties of citizens" exemplifies
the shift in emphasis from individual rights to
one's obligations to the state.
Democratic Facade
Gandhi is highly sensitive to foreign criticism
about her political crackdown and manipulation of
the constitution. This may at least partially ac-
count for her decision to preserve a facade of dem-
ocratic procedures.
Parliament will continue to be elected by universal
suffrage. New procedural rules establish shorter
sessions and limited debate. Parliament's princi-
pal task has clearly become that of approving Gan-
dhi's decisions.
Following parliamentary approval of the amendment,
endorsement by at least half the 22 state govern-
ments is required before it can take effect. This
will be easy as the Congress Party or one of its
allies controls all elected state governments; the
federal authority administers several troublesome
states where elected governments have been tempo-
rarily suspended.
Public Support
Gandhi's actions since June 1975 have stirred lit-
tle negative public reaction, largely because of
economic improvements since then. Gandhi's support-
ers credit the emergency action for the economic
upturn, but two beneficent monsoons are at least
responsible.
The educated middle class generally supports the
emphasis on discipline and resulting improvements
--continued
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in bureaucratic performance. The military also
backs Gandhi, and she usually honors their desire
not to be drawn into internal security matters. The
masses are mostly apathetic or unaware of changes
in the system.
Some intellectuals, particularly those educated in
the West, are despondent over the loss of traditional
democratic rights. Gandhi has used economic pres-
sures and other threats to force the once lively
free press to conform and abide by rules that re-
strict criticism of the government or exposure of
problems that would embarrass the government.
State governments tend to resent the concentration
of power in New Delhi, but local leaders realize
the futility of bucking the prime minister. The
handful of opposition parties are divided and de-
moralized, with some of their leaders still in jail.
India is not in the same category with repressive
dictatorships that exist in some third world coun-
tries. While tens of thousands of Indians have
been arrested for political and economic offenses
since June 1975, many were released after short
jail terms. Only extremist political parties have
been proscribed. Police brutality, while not un-
known, is uncommon. Except for those arrested for
emergency-related offenses, Indian citizens continue
to enjoy most of the internationally recognized hu-
man rights. The security forces are ubiquitous, but
no attempt has been made to transform them into a
personalized force dedicated to preserving Gandhi's
rule.
Prospects
Gandhi is not likely to use her enhanced power to
implement important social and economic changes.
She recently stated that reform in the countryside
must come from education and persuasion rather than
by force. She seems unwilling to face the serious
political problems that would accompany an attempt
to upset the status quo through far-reaching poli-
cies aimed at redressing basic inequities in Indian
society.
As she faces each new crisis, Gandhi's sense of mis-
sion and self-righteousness seems to grow stronger.
Her assumption of full responsibility for government
performance and the certainty of future economic
crises could bode ill for Gandhi's future popular-
ity and eventually for political stability in India.
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