THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 OCTOBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977762
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 27, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
27 October 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 October 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
A draft new constitution for Communist China provides
a codification of changes wrought by the Cultural
Revolution, and is being circulated pending ratifi-
cation by the long-delayed National People's Congress.
(Page 1)
On Page 2 we comment on recent shifts in the Italian
Communist Party leadership.
The first report on the status of the American and
Turkish officers whose plane landed in the USSR last
week appears on Page 3.
At Annex, we review major trends in Cambodia since
Sihanouk's fall and look a bit into the future.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
A new state constitution was approved by a Chi-
nese Communist Party plenum last month and is now
being given local circulation pending ratification
by the long-delayed National People's Congress.
/appears to be a greatly shortened version
of the original 1954 version--30 articles compared
to 106--but departs from the original on several
counts. It amounts to a highly generalized codifica-
tion of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolu-
tion.
Unlike the 1954 version, which mentioned neither
Mao Tse-tung nor the army, the new constitution en-
shrines Mao and heir-designate Lin Piao as China's
personal rulers and notes specifically that they are
supreme commander and deputy, respectively, of all
of the nation's armies. The army's role in politics
is further legitimized by a provision authorizing
its participation, along with veteran civilian cadres
and former revolutionaries, in the newly established
Revolutionary Committees, which are formally described
as local organs of government.
In addition, the new constitution makes no pro-
vision for a head of state--the office last held by
the disgraced Liu Shao-chi, ignores the several leg-
islative powers of the National People's Congress,
and gives short shrift to the judiciary system. The
judiciary is no longer authorized to operate inde-
pendently, subject only to state laws. China is,
for the first time, declared a socialist state and
all references to private property rights are elim-
inated, with the significant exception of "small-
scale" peasant land holdings.
The new constitution is, in effect, a po-
litical manifesto rather than a legal in-
strument, and contains no real surprises.
It affirms the major role of the military
in Chinese politics, while leaving Mao as
the sole head of the party, government,
and military apparatus. as a
whole, however, is a series of loosely
worded propositions and may have been de-
liberately designed to allow varying in-
terpretations. The section dealing with the
sensitive subject of economic policy, e.g.
peasants' private plots, is especially
general in its wording and smacks of con-
troversy and compromise.
1
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ITALY
Shifts in the Italian Communist Party leadership
announced last week suggest that neither ofthe prin-
cipal rivals for the right to succeed ailing Secre-
tary General Luigi Longo has yet gained a clear edge.
A strongly anti-Soviet ally of Enrico Berlinguer,
Longo's deputy, received one key appointment, while
another, went to a backer of Giorgio Amendola, who
has adopted a pro-Soviet stance. At the same time,
Amendola has for the second time in a little over a
year publicly stated his wish to see the party par-
ticipate in the government.
Amendola's statement probably is a ploy
designed to aid him in the leadership
struggle, for there are no early prospects
that Premier Colombo's government will in-
vite the Communists in. An Amendola vic-
tory, however, would result in a stronger
effort by the party to evolve into an ac-
ceptable coalition partner. It would also
lessen the chill between the Italian and
Soviet parties that has prevailed since
the Italians criticized the Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia.
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NOTES
USSR-US-Turkey: The three American officers
and the Turkish colonel whose plane landed in Soviet
Armenia last week are being detained together, ac-
cording to the US consuls who visited them yesterday.
Apparently no effort has been made to drive a wedge
between them as a possible bargaining device in seek-
ing the return from Turkey of two Lithuanian hijackers
but the consuls reported their strong impression that
the Soviets do intend a linkage between the officers
and the hijackers. The Soviet official present at
the interview stated that the officers were being in-
vestigated under an Armenian civil air statute, and
when queried on the time involved said only that the
investigation would be completed as soon as possible.
USSR:
3
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CAMBODIA
In this annex we take another Zook at major trends
in Cambodia and offer a few projections into the
months ahead.
From a strategic point of view, in the first few
months after Sihanouk's fall the Communists achieved
at least their minimum tactical objectives. They
protected the rear areas of those forces that had
been based on the Cambodia - South Vietnam border and
brought under their control a swath of Cambodian
territory that could be used for a southward exten-
sion of the Laotian infiltration corridor. They
established enough of a presence in the populated
areas of Cambodia and began the exceedingly diffi-
cult work of building and generating a Communist
movement.
By mid-summer, however, the Communists' offensive
was clearly running out of steam. Since the action
against Prek Tameak in August, when large numbers
of Cambodian Communists were turned back with heavy
losses, the Communists have avoided large-scale ground
assaults. Harassments by fire and small-scale probes
continue on an almost daily basis, but the large
cities have been free from the intense pressure they
were subjected to several months ago. Even in the
countryside, where much of the Communist effort has
been focused since early summer, there has been a
discernible decline in Communist attacks.
The ebbing of Communist military activity is directly
related to the monsoon season. The enemy finds it
difficult to pre-position supplies and move troops
through an inundated Indochinese countryside. This
is particularly so in Cambodia, where the enemy is
operating in an unfamiliar and largely hostile en-
vironment, and where there is no Long-established
local organization to facilitate the operations of
large combat units. Some fall-off in the pace of
the war during the late summer and early fall was,
therefore, not unexpected.
(continued)
Al
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The combination of Cambodian tenacity and allied
air support has also played a role in determining
the enemy's current tactics. Cambodian reports of
Communist casualties are probably exaggerated--
just as Cambodian estimates of enemy combat strength
are not noted for their conservatism--but there is
little doubt that the Communists have taken some
substantial losses. No Communist commander can
assume that an important Cambodian target will fall
without the risk of substantial casualties. The
Communists, with most of their immediate objectives
in Cambodia already achieved, may have estimated
that the reversion to more economical tactics--
especially in view of possible logistic restraints--
was the most prudent course, at least until the dry
season.
The North Vietnamese can take considerable satis-
faction from the gains they have already made in
? Cambodia, but there are many aspects of the situa-
tion?particularly over the past several months--
which must be of concern to them.
With each day, the Cambodian Army gets a bit stronger,
the government in Phnom Penh more entrenched, and,
if possible, more confident about the future. The
Cambodian attitude was summed up best by the radio
commentator who, speaking of the war, said "we have
this indestructible faith."
Although it may be only a temporary phenomenon,
some _of the military initiative has now passed to
the Cambodians and, for the first time in the war,
the Cambodian Army has taken the action to the
Communists. Large sweep operations south of Phnom
Penh and Battambang in recent weeks and the massive
deployment along Route 6 are operations that--de-
spite their considerable deficiencies?would have
been unthinkable in the dark days of May and June.
The leadership in Phnom Penh appears to be demon-
strating a facility in turning adversity to its own
advantage. The Route 6 operation is a good case in
point. By most criteria, i.e., weighing its achieve-
ments against its costs and risks, it would be chalked
up as a failure. The operation was designed to open
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a land route to Kompong Thom city. The size of the
force committed to the operation has swelled from
eight to about 20 battalions. After almost two months
on the road, and casualties numbering in the hundreds,
the task force has moved but 15 miles from its starting
point. The objective of reaching Kompong Thom city
at any time in the near future has been all but aban-
doned. But the Cambodians are convinced that the
operation has been a great success. And to the ex-
tent that it has Lifted morale and has proved that
it is possible to retake territory once under Com-
munist control, the Route 6 operation has been a
success.
Making success out of seeming failure is only one of
the achievements of the Lon NoZ leadership. More im-
portant has been its ability to turn the sense of
elan that permeated "progressive" and opposition
elements into support for Lon NoZ--a figure who long
had been closely associated with Sihanouk, who had
personally profited from the arms deals with the
Communists, and who had himself once been the target
of the intellectuals and students. In this area, the
war was of great assistance to Lon NoZ. With the
Vietnamese tiger at the gates, opposition elements
have not felt the time propitious to press for changes
in the way Cambodia is ruled. We have some doubts
about Lon NoZ's Long-term prospects--quite apart from
what the Communists may do militarily--but at this
juncture there is no evidence that he is in serious
political trouble with any powerful segments in Phnom
Penh or that his rule will be seriously challenged
in the near future.
None of this means that the Cambodians are out of
the woods. On the contrary, if the Communists be-
came convinced that the trend of events in Cambodia
was running strongly against them, they would prob-
ably move quickly to rectify the situation. We think
that how things go in Cambodia still depends for the
most part on the North Vietnamese. What does seem
reasonably clear, however, is that if the Communists
want to bring down the Lon NoZ government, they will
have to do a great deal more than they have been do-
ing; they will have to commit far more troops and ac-
cept far greater losses than up to now; and they will
almost certainly have to move--in some fashion--
against Phnom Penh itself.
(continued)
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There is no hard evidence--either from documents or
prisoners or intercepted messages--that provides the
basis for a compelling argument about what course the
enemy is most likely to pursue in the next few months.
The recently reported COSVN Directive (noted in
the Daily Brief of 26 October) suggests that the Com-
munists are now working toward an early show-down,
but this is far from conclusive. What can be said is
that the Communist capability to step up the fighting
should improve in the coming months. With improving
weather, the Lao infiltration complex will begin to
disgorge supplies into Cambodia; fresh North Vietnam-
ese units and replacements, some probably slated for
action in the Cambodian theater, are already making
their way south, and cross-country movement within
Cambodia should become a good deal easier.
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