THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014758
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 29, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 29, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5B( I
declassified onlY on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 29, 1975
Table of Contents
Vietnam: Da Nang in effect has fallen. (Page 1)
Cambodia: Lon Nol reportedly has accepted an in-
vitation to visit Indonesia. (Page 3)
Arab States - Israel: Both the Arabs and the Is-
raelis continue to improve their military pos-
ture. (Page 5)
Syria:' President Asad may visit Cairo this week-
end in an effort to close ranks with Egypt and
to chart a new course. (Page 7)
USSR - Middle East: The Soviet Union plans to send
a large contingent of Middle East experts to
Geneva in early April in expectation of a re-
sumption of the peace conference. (Page 8)
Note: Laos (Page 9)
Annex: Cambodia: The Security Situation in the
Phnom Penh Area
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?16
104
106
NORTH
VIETNAM
108 110
Demilitarized Zone
Da Nang
.Hoitn
MR 1
LAOS
KONTUM
Kontum?
?14
Pleiku?
PLEIKU
?12
CAMBODIA
PHNOM PENH
e
.. ui Nhon
MR 2
PHU .
rEN.Tuy Hoa
OAR LAC
Ban Me
uot?
Mekong
? ha Trang
Da Lat
SINK
LONG
^ GON
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a
Gulf of
Thailand
104 557575 3-75
MR 4
106
MR 3
Capital Special Zone
South
China
Sea
110
14-
12-
10 ?
118 MILES 1110
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VIETNAM
Da Nang in effect has fallen. Gen-
eral Truong, the regional commander, has
abandoned his headquarters and is believed
aboard a tugboat in the harbor.
The only South Vietnamese military remaining
in Da Nang are Marine units, but they are trying
to get to the beach to be evacuated. It is doubt-
ful that any of these units can be rescued.
Early this morning, the North Vietnamese be-
gan a heavy artillery and rocket barrage against
the airport. Many refugees crowding the runways
were probably killed. The government was able to
get some of its aircraft in the air, but many were
destroyed.
Given the imminent arrival of North Vietnamese
infantry units in the city, there is little chance
that further evacuation of civilians can continue
either by sea or air. All Americans have left the
city, including the US consul general, who is
aboard a tugboat in the harbor.
Communist forces are closing in on Qui Nhon
City from the north; pressure is also increasing
from the west. The situation in the coastal plain
south to Nha Trang remains unclear. The Phu Yen
Province chief stated yesterday that he had been
ordered to hold the capital city of Tuy Hoa. As
many as 60,000 persons from the convoy from Kontum
and Pleiku have arrived in Tuy Hoa. Most of the
town's shops have closed, however, and at least
half of the population has fled south toward Nha
Trang. There is a report that the communists have
moved into the southern districts of the province,
in which case Tuy Hoa may become another isolated
government enclave.
The loss of the mountain province of Lam Dong
yesterday brings the communists closer to Da Lat.
The road from Da Lat to the coast remains open,
however, and much of the populace has already fled
along this route.
Military Region 1 commander Truong has agreed
to relinquish command of the 4,000 troops of the
South Vietnamese 2nd Division who were evacuated to
an island off the northern coast. Senior officials
in Saigon are concerned, however, that if they are
moved precipitately into Military Region 3 without
adequate psychological preparation and without their
dependents, their discipline would disintegrate.
(continued)
1
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Hanoi has apparently decided to commit a third
strategic reserve division--the 320B--to the current
offensive in South Vietnam. Recent direction-find-
ing information discloses the southward move of the
division headquarters and at least one of its regi-
ments, but there is no indication of its specific
destination. Earlier, two strategic reserve divi-
sions--the 316th and 341st--were apparently sent to
southern Military Region 2 and northern Military
Region 3, The 316th Division probably participated
in the take-over of Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province.
Recent direction-finding information has placed
part of the 341st Division in Binh Long Province
north of Saigon.
In addition to the commitment of three strate-
gic reserve divisions, recent intercepts suggest
that Hanoi may be moving additional artillery or
antiaircraft forces--possibly as much as a full
division--to the southern portion of South Vietnam.
The tone of current Vietnamese communist prop-
aganda makes it certain-that Hanoi nowsees the
clear possibility of a final unraveling of Saigon's
position and is moving to encourage the political
collapse of the Thieu -government. Citing a funda-
mental change in the balance of power in the South,
a North Vietnamese party newspaper editorial of
March 1-gave promiAence-to the communist position
that only the removal of Thieu could lead to nego-
tiations and a "speedy settlement of South Viet-
nam's affairs.?
In an effort to encourage high-level defections
from the Thieu government, a Viet Cong statement
broadcast to the South on March 26 promised that
all generals and senior officials prepared to "im-
plement the Paris Accords seriously" would be
treated as members of the neutralist third force..
The broadcast went on to declare that all military
personnel and dependents who choose to remain in
the "revolutionary zones" will be "welbomed" and
that all officers who defect with their units will
be allowed to keep their ranks and will be given
"important jobs" by the "revolutionary side."
Given the confusion and mounting defeatism in
many areas of the country, such appeals could be-
come increasingly effective.
2
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CAMBODIA
Lon Nol reportedly has accepted an
invitation to visit Indonesia. (
he will leave Phnom Penh
on Tues ay an following a short
stay in Jakarta he will go on to Taiwan
If Lon Nol does not depart on schedule, civil-
ian members of his government maytry to force his
hand. Deputy Prime Minister Pan Sothi and a number
of other cabinet ministers planned to
draft a petition asking
Lon Nol to leave. If this petition -fails to prompt
any action, the cabinet plans to resign. I
the cabinet ministers,
will presumably wait to see whether Lon Nol does
indeed depart on Tuesday.
Prince Sihanouk, meanwhile, appears to have
closed the door on future dealings with any part
of the present government in Phnom Penh following
Lon Nol's departure. The Prince has released a list
of 21 "war criminals" who would be put on trial fol-
lowing any communist take-over. The list includes
all ministers in the newly reshuffled cabinet as
well as Lon Nol's controversial younger brother
Lon Non and Saukham Koy, who is constitutionally
empowered to assume presidential functions in Lon
Nol's absence. The 21 newly named "war criminals"
join the list of seven active and, retired govern-
ment leaders whom the communists have said they
will execute.
Sihanouk's latest announcement is in marked
contrast to his claim in December that he might be
able to find a place in his "government" for such
key Phnom Penh leaders as Long Boret and Sink
Matak. Khmer communist leaders--who have stead-
fastly opposed any "compromises"--reportedly were
furious over this gesture. For the past several
weeks, Sihanouk has been hewing close to the com-
munists line in his public statements. This
appears to reflect and substantiate Sihanouk's
claim that he and the communists have reached agree-
ment on his future role and that he will stay on
as nominal chief of state following any communist
take-over.
(continued)
3
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Soviets recognized Sihanouk's "government"
as the legal government of Cambodia yesterday
Moscow has moved
slowly toward Sihanouk, hoping until the re
downturn in Lon Nol's military fortunes for
tiated solution in Cambodia similar to that
only
cent
a nego-
in Laos,
The US airlift into Pochentong Airport was
resumed this morning, but unless government forces
can push the communists out of range of the air-
field, the airlift may have to be suspended again,
Government attempts to retake Tuol Leap have
been unsuccessful, and army elements abandoned a
position about four miles northwest of Phnom Penh
on Thursday, The local commander stated that the
withdrawal could cause the abandonment of other
positions if they cannot be reinforced,
The communists are also making inroads around
the provincial capital of Battambang, where army
elements have withdrawn from four positions because
of continued insurgent pressure,
4
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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL
Both the Arabs and the Israelis con-
tinue to improve their military posture.
The Egyptians have taken several measures this
week to restrict the access of UN observer forces
and foreign correspondents.
(continued)
5
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- The military road between Cairo and Ismailia
was closed to UN forces' traffic on Wednesday
morning. The Egyptians told a UN officer that
the road will be closed "for repairs" for one
week.
--The UN headquarters in Egypt was also advised
that the bridge over the canal at Suez City is
closed to foreign correspondents, as is the
area between the east bank of the canal and
the UN buffer zone. The UN has not been in-
formed how long the closures will be in ef-
fect.
--An exercise scheduled for Thursday using an
Egyptian air force helicopter for medical eva-
? cuation of UN personnel in the buffer zone was
canceled by Egyptian authorities. UN officers
_were to have been on board the helicopter and
could have observed Egyptian forces along the
flight-path from the buffer _zone-to Ahu Suweir
airfield on the west bank.
The French military attache in Damascus, mean-
while, that he saw no
indications of unusual Syrian activity during a
trip through southern Syria earlier-this week.
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SYRIA
President Asad may visit Cairo this
weekend in an effort to close ranks with
Egypt and to chart a new course.
Apart from echoing Egypt's call for a resump-
tion of the Geneva peace conference, Syria has said
little officially about the suspension of the dis-
engagement talks. Privately, Syria is said to be
relieved, although it remains concerned over US re-
action.
A correspondent of Le Monde says he was told
by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam last week that
the Syrians regard Egyptian President Sadat as an
"Arab patriot" for refusing to agree to a nonbellig-
erency pledge with Israel. Khaddam said Syria
would now follow Egypt's lead on the question of
renewing the mandates of the UN peace-keeping for-
ces. The mandate for the force in the Sinai ex-
pires on April 24, and the one for the force on the
Golan Heights runs out at the end of May.
The correspondent said Syrian leaders are
deeply worried, however, that the US will wash its
hands of all peace efforts--an event they hope will
not happen.
7
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST
The Soviet Union reportedly plans
to send a 30-man contingent of Middle
East experts to Geneva in early April
in expectation of a resumption of the
Middle East peace conference.
Moscow, nevertheless, still seems to have some
doubts about when, and if, the Geneva talks will re-
sume. A foreign ministry Middle East expert told a
US official on Wednesday that Arab positions have
not yet been clarified, and that Moscow does not
expect to know where things stand before mid-April.
Palestinian representation at Geneva is a
troublesome question. The Soviet expert expressed
his government's long-standing exasperation over
disunity in PLO ranks, and claimed that the Soviets,
who now publicly recognize Arafat's leadership, are
not even able to confer with Arafat without members
of his entourage present. An effort is apparently
being made to schedule a visit to Moscow by Arafat-
in April. This would provide an opportunity to dis-
cuss the Palestinian representation issue.
Economic talks between the USSR and Egypt have
been suspended. The Egyptian-ambassador was sched-
uled to return to Moscow on Thursday, and the So-
viets expect talks to resume by late April or early
May. The main-issues remaining are terms for Egyp-
tian debt settlement and-integration of Soviet-
Egyptian-joint projects into Moscow's new five-year
plan. The Middle East expert told the US official
that Brezhnev would probably not-go to the Middle -
East-before autumn.-
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NOTE
Senior non-communist political and military
leaders in Laos are apprehensive over the rapidly
deteriorating military situations in South Vietnam
and Cambodia.
There is a widespread feeling that the Lao com-
munists will become more convinced than ever that
time and history are on their side, and that they
will adopt an increasingly aggressive political pos-
ture within the coalition government. Most non-
communists seem to believe, however, that there is
no likelihood that the Pathet Lao would soon con-
sider resuming hostilities. In what could be a
step toward eventual recognition of the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government and Sihanouk's
Cambodian government in exile, Prime Minister Sou-
vanna has formally requested both Saigon and Phnom
Penh to reduce their representation in Vientiane to
charg?evel.
9
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CAMBODIA
The following memorandum on the
security situation in the Phnom Penh
area was prepared last night by CIA,
DIA, and INR.
There does not appear to be an immediate danger
of a general Cambodian government military collapse
in the Phnom Penh area. The Khmer communists prob-
ably will continue their strategy of steady but
widespread ground attacks and shelling while wait-
ing until supply shortages and war-weariness break
the government's ability or will to resist. We be-
lieve that government forces will, for the most
part, be able to contain the communists along the
capital's outer defenses for the next week or so.
Nonetheless, the communists will continue rocket
and artillery attacks against the city in general,
and Pochentong Airport, the US mission, and American
residences in particular.
At midweek; communist forces recaptured Tuol
Leap and again moved within artillery range of
Pochentong Airport. Howitzer fire on March 28
knocked out the primary military taxiway, forcing
a suspension of-the US airlift. The taxiway is
repairable, but the recent pattern of artillery and
rocket attacks indicates that the communists can
now place accurate fire on vital facilities.
There is little hope that government forces
will push communist artillery out of range of the
airport on anything other than an intermittent
basis. Thus, future communist shelling will limit
the use of Pochentong. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that Pochentong cannot be used for
evacuation of personnel; unlike large jet aircraft,
C-130s should be able to use the airstrip. The
possibility of I a direct hit on an aircraft always
exists, but C-130s could load at dispersed and
alternating areas to minimize the risk. There is
a clear danger, however, that at any time commun-
ist shelling could make the airfield totally un-
usable by transport aircraft.
(continued)
Al
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On the other hand, we do not believe that the
communists will be -able to seize the airportin the
next week or so. Communist ground forces- are keep-
ing steady pressure on government defenses west and
north of Phnom Penh, but government units have been
able to prevent any major communist gains by moving
units from front to front. While this process and
the government's steady battlefield losses have
weakened the capital's outer defenses-,-the commun-
ists have not exploited their? advantage. Indeed,
there is some evidence that the communists them-
selves are stretched thin and may be unable to place
much greater pressure on Phnom Penh at this time.
Political strains in Phnom Penh are also clearly
greater now than at any time in the war,. But most
recent maneuvering appears directed toward the de-
parture of Lon Nol in the hope that this will-some-
how lead to an early end to the fighting. Lon Nol
apparently intends to go abroad soon, and his de-
parture should temporarily reduce the potential for
political disintegration. Should he delay much
longer, however, otherigovernmentaeadexs will prob-
ably try to force him out. The result would be a
political crisis which might make it impossible
for the government to continue to resist. The po-
tential for serious unrest remains high. For ex-
ample,!a halt of the airlift of rice lasting more
than a;few days would bring rice stocks down to
the level which precipitated widespread rioting and
looting in 1972. Finally, a negative vote on the
supplemental aid to Cambodia would lead to a quick
unravelling of the government.
The effect of a US evacuation on the cohesion
of the Cambodian government and on the military's
will to fight would depend on a number of factors:
--A sudden large-scale and highly visible eva-
cuation of US personnel, third-country nation-
als, and local US mission employeeh would be
seen as a signal of approaching defeat.
--The evacuation of smaller numbers over a
longer period of time would at least delay
widespread panic.
(continued)
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--An attempt to evacuate US personnel after a
negative vote on supplemental assistance would
quickly break military and government morale,
and this would make an orderly evacuation ex-
ceedingly difficult, if not impossible.
The evacuation of senior government officials would
signal the end of the war, and organized resistance
by the military would quickly end.
The ability and willingness of government forces
to provide security for evacuation operations is sus-
pect. In any case, there is no assurance that any of
the government's best troops will be available for
such duty. Large numbers of evacuees at Pochentong
Airport or at a Phnom Penh location--especially if
members of the government elite were included--could
easily lead to a breakdown in the discipline of Cam-
bodian security forces and to mob hysteria. Evacuees
might also become the targets of communist shelling
and terrorist attacks, and this would only increase
the risk of panic.
A3
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