THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976606
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 7, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
7 February 1969
19
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8 February 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
7 FEBRUARY 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Soviet Ambassador Malik told Ambassador Yost yester-
day that he thought the four powers should try to de-
velop concrete suggestions on how the Middle Eastern prob-
lem could be resolved. He doubted that giving Jarring
a new boost would add much to what had been done before.
Malik, obviously not yet in receipt of Moscow's official
reaction to the President's reply to the French note,
spent most of his time with Yost probing for the US po-
sition. He did, however, agree that a major objective
of the four-power talks should be agreement on the nature
of a contractual arrangement assuring Israel it will have
security but in a form acceptable to the Arabs. He said
this coincides with the Soviet approach.
EUROPE
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A Belgian official has told our embassy in Brus-
sels that the agreement on obligatory consultation
reached by Britain and the five Community members is
not open ended but is limited to specific issues. The
list has not yet been agreed on, but he said it obvious-
ly will include Eastern Europe, the US, and the Third
World.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing significant to report.
VIETNAM
The Soviet sounding of the US position on several
key points during the conversation between Mr. Blake
and Mr. Oberemko on 4 February doubtless reflects not
only Moscow's interest but also Hanoi's, at least in
general terms. Oberemko made it clear that the Soviet
Union intends to stay right on top of the substantive
talks and that we should regard the Soviets as a chan-
nel through which to pass Hanoi our views. In this
meeting, however, there was nothing to suggest that this
will be a two-way street, at least for the present.
Without knowing who initiated this particular con-
versation, it is difficult to judge whether Oberemko's
pointed questions reflect a direct and fairly urgent re-
quest for Soviet action from Hanoi or whether it is
simply the first in what could become a series of general
efforts on the part of the Soviets to sound out our po-
sition. We tend to believe the latter is the more likely
2
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explanation. It does, however, open up the possibility
of an indirect exchange of views between Hanoi and
Washington without either having to back down from its
initial position on how the talks should proceed.
Regardless of whether the Soviets were acting under
a specific or a general request from Hanoi, the points
raised by Oberemko probably were intended to be taken
as an indication of the subjects of prime interest to
Hanoi. Both the Soviets and the North Vietnamese have
tried on various occasions to draw out the US position
on a political settlement. This, however, is the most
direct and pointed effort to date.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
There is nothing significant to report.
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PUR 1 HE PKES1DEN1 UN LY
I, MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
The Soviets have taken a significant step to-
ward improving their credibility and leverage in
Israel by allowing renewed emigration of Jews from
the USSR to Israel. Mos-
cow reopened the gates to emigrants last September,
at the same time it began its diplomatic campaign
for an Arab-Israeli settlement. All such emigration
had been halted after the Arab-Israeli war in June
1967. Up to mid-January, some 600 Soviet Jews with
relatives in Israel had already departed. More than
200 of these left during the first two weeks of Jan-
uary. All ages apparently are represented, includ-
ing at least 170 children.
The Israelis view Moscow's change in policy as
another indication that the Kremlin desires to inch
toward normalizing Soviet-Israeli relations and that
it expects in return a certain amount of Israeli flex-
ibility toward its proposals for a Middle East set-
tlement. As a matter of fact, the Moscow move will
probably achieve this goal, and in addition, because
so much emotion is involved, will probably cause the
Israelis to hesitate before they take any action
which might jeopardize the flow of emigrants.
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EUROPE
Somewhat to our surprise, the latest effort
to forge closer political links in Western Europe
has not produced an outright veto from De Gaulle.
This initiative, an Italian plan for consultation
among the members of the Western European Union
(WEU) on important issues, was accepted for study
by the WEU Council yesterday. In addition, Britain
and the five Community members (France excepted)
apparently have gone ahead and bound themselves to
some kind of obligatory consultation.
The French reserved their position on this lat-
ter point, but they did not veto the idea outright.
They also made clear their unhappiness with the pro-
posal that the consultation notion itself be given
further study, but in the end they went along with
the rest of the members--perhaps because they thought
it would be better to use delaying tactics later than
to impose a flat negative now.
Rome's initiative, heavily backed by Foreign
Minister Nenni, grew out of the attempts by the Five
to outflank the French veto of Britain's application
to join the European Communities. The idea was that
political consultations would forge new links between
Britain and the Six, and implicit in the proposal was
the notion that if France refused to go along, the
other five might start talks with the British. France's
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1-1UK 11-1h FKLYIDhINI 1 UAL Y
reluctance to veto the Italian proposal suggests
that Paris may indeed have felt constrained to
give a little ground.
, We do not expect any short-term improvement
in Britain's chances for Community membership as
a result of this maneuvering, and we do not think
any of the participants do either. Nevertheless,
the British are trying to exploit the opening.
Foreign Secretary Stewart has invited the
the person of their ambassadors in London--to talks
aiming toward a common position on the Middle East.
If the French decline the British invitation, Paris
risks imputing to Britain the role of spokesman for
"Europe" in the four-power talks.
The recent spate of press stories
concerning a possible new effort to set up
a supranational European political community may be
related to the WEU efforts. The resurgence of talk
along these lines bears some earmarks of a campaign by.
Jean Monnet and other supporters of a federal Europe--
apparently supported by Nenni. The federalists may
be trying to give an institutional structure to the
loose consultative framework now being pressed for in
WEU.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing of significance to report.
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VIETNAM
The only noteworthy point we found in the Commu-
nist presentations at yesterday's Paris session was
Tran Buu Kiem's continued emphasis on the "peace cabi-
net" theme. His prediction of no progress in the talks
until the present Saigon government is overthrown may
be only rhetoric, but it seems clear that the Commu-
nists have no intention of giving any ground in Paris
until they have determined if this idea can be trans-
lated into political results in South Vietnam.
The "peace cabinet" idea has been the main Commu-
nist theme since the bombing halt. In our view, it is
based on real conviction that widespread sentiment for
peace in South Vietnam can be more effectively mobilized
in support of Hanoi's objectives.
The Communists regard the peace issue as one on
which a:wide spectrum of politically active elements in
South Vietnam can be united. They know that most South
Vietnamese would be reluctant to endorse a coalition
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PUK 11-1h PKESIDEIVI UiNL Y
government with the Communists. By putting their de-
mands in the form of broad, nationalist generalities,
however, the Communists hope to convince politically
significant elements in South Vietnam that changes in
the present regime would lead to fruitful discussions
with the Communists and would eventually open the way
to an acceptable political settlement and an end to
the fighting.
In pursuing these objectives, the Communists are
using both the carrot and the stick. Military pres-
sure and hardline propaganda frequently are accompanied
or followed up by displays of "flexibility" and "real-
ism" both in public and in private. Tran Buu Kiem,
the Front representative whose uncompromising stance
at yesterday's Paris session made headlines, took an
entirely different tack in an interview published in
a French journal on Monday. There he went out of his
way to give the impression of softening the Front's
stand, especially toward the GVN, and to stress the
Communists' willingness to bargain on such fundamental
matters as a coalition government, elections, and even
working with the present South Vietnamese leadership.
We are not able to measure adequately what inroads
the Communists have made in this campaign to date.
5
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the current concern
in South Vietnam about peace sentiments and signs of
intrigue about changes in the composition of the gov-
ernment are playing right into the hands of the Commu-
nists. They are trying hard to foster the theme of a
"peace cabinet" in the Buddhist movement and to sell
the same idea in labor, student, and intellectual Circles
in South Vietnam.
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
An Iranian delegation will leave for Moscow tomorrow
for the purpose, we believe, of negotiating a second arms
purchase agreement.
purchases would be financed from the more
than $1 billion Iran hopes to earn from the delivery of
natural gas to the USSR in the period from 1970 to 1987.
In January 1967, the Shah signed his first arms agree-
ment With the Soviet Union for $110 million worth of ve-
hicles, including armored personnel carriers and antiair-
craft .guns. The Shah was piqued at the time over what he
thought to be the slowness of the US in meeting his arms
needs. More important, he saw in Soviet equipment one way
to spend the money Iran would earn from theogas pipeline to
the Soviet Union now under construction'.
VENEZUELA
In the wake of Wednesday's ambush of an army patrol,
the Venezuelan armed forces have launched a major offensive
against pro-Castro guerrillas in the eastern part of the
country. Reports that a number of guerrillas have been
killed and one guerrilla leader captured are still uncon-
firmed.
THAILAND
Balloting for the lower house of the National Assembly--
the first nationwide elections in more than ten years--will
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take.place on 10 February. Under the new constitution,
promulgated last year by the militaryleadership to legit-
imize its rule, the upper house is appointed and the power
of the legislature is in addition carefully circumscribed.
These elections therefore pose no threat to the establish-
ment.
The government nevertheless fears embarrassment.- A
current reading suggests that the newly formed government
party, still considerably disorganized, will fall short of
a majority even though winning the largest bloc of seats
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As an
experiment in democratization, the -elections have generated
high publid interest in most areas of the country, particu-
larly in Bangkok. Although the Thai people have been reason-
ably happy under the military regime, there are a number of
grievances which may now become more significant under the
new political liberalization.
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