THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977403
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 15, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
15 April 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
- 15 April 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS ,
In South Vietnam, the Communists are maintaining the
momentum of their spring offensive. (Page 1)
Cambodian military units in ?the eastern border prov-
inces have suffered further setbacks. (Page 2)
Communist forces in Laos, are moving to neutralize re-
cent government gains southwest of the Plaine des
Jarres. (Page 3) .
Chinese road construction activity in Laos seems
centered on completion of already begun segments,
rather than expansion of the network. (Page 4)
North Vietnamese
(Page 5)
On Page 6 we discuss Brezhnev's recent speeches.
Soviet
Iraqi troops
Egypt. (Page 7)
Jordan. (Page 8)
Cuba's policies toward the US and Latin America have
been reaffirmed. (Page 9)
The Hungarians have unaccountably canceled their
Lenin centennial celebrations. (Page 10)
The Revolutionary Council in Libya is debating its
policy toward the United States. (Page 10)
At Annex, we discuss the over-all situation in Indo-
china as we think it appears to Hanoi.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Maintaining the momentum of their spring offen-
sive, enemy sapper and infantry forces continue to
penetrate and overrun allied field positions. Two
more outposts in the upper delta, one manned by South
Vietnamese regulars and another by territorial forces
and armed civilians, fell in recent days with losses -
of morethan. 100 dead and wounded. In the highlands,
Communist troops temporarily seized several small
outposts around the Dak Pek Special Forces camp, and
other allied positions located just below the Demil-
itarized Zone have been heavily shelled.
The Communists appear to be having some
success following the military guidelines
spelled out by General Giap and other North
Vietnamese leaders during the winter.
Stressing the use of sapper and guerrilla
forces in surprise attacks, the enemy has
been able to deal the allies a number of
tactical setbacks while limiting his own
losses.
It is still too early ?to assess the full
impact of the enemy's spring offensive,
but heavy South Vietnamese casualties could
badly damage the morale of the army and the
government. It also appears that the pac-
ification program has been stalled in a few
provinces because of the increased fighting.
The South Vietnamese nonetheless can point
to a few brighter spots. They are success-
fully defending the Special Forces camps in
the highZands, a number of elite government
units have again performed well in contacts
with the enemy, and much of the recent fight-
ing has been confined to the more remote
regions well removed from the major popula-
tion centers.
At Annex, we discuss the over-all situation in
?
Indochina as we think it appears to Hanoi.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CAMBODIA: Current Situation
4
176
THAILAND
Samrone
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14-
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Pursat
ompong Thom
Khemarak
Phouminville
Phnom Penh
nser VC contr
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c.
GULF
, OF
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,
\ VC cut Route 7
SOUTH
AR VN raid
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avay PratoX
Si/AY
iengRINs?ore VC attacks
*Saigon
V IETNA
MILES
50
1(114 106
SOUTH
CHINA SEA
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CAMBODIA
On 13 April heavy Communist attacks forced goy-7
ernment defenders at the Krek army garrison in Kompong
Cham Province to abandon their post. Viet Cong troops
in that general area are building up their forces and
have gained control of at one section of Route 7.
They have also destroyed bridges and put roadblocks
on other sections of this road, effectively severing
the government's lines of communication0 Government
reinforcements, including elements of three battalions,
are being sent to the area.
In the neighboring province of
Communists apparently have captured
The provincial military command has
forcements. Farther south, in Svay
Mondolkiri, the
a border outposts
asked for rein-
Rieng Province,
the Viet Cong made four
brief but unsuccessful surprise attacks on the town
of Prasot on the night of 12 and 13 April.
Citing Vietnamese Communist attacks, Prime Min-
ister Lon Nol announced on 13 April that the govern-
ment now will accept all unconditional foreign aid
from all sources. He indicated that such aid could
include arms.
Phnom,Penh may believe that this appeal
will. induce non-Communist and neutralist
Asian nations to be more forthcoming, at
least in political terms, with positive
support. Lon Nol did not call, for foreign
troops, but unlike his earlier public com-
ments on foreign aid, he. did not specifi-
cally rule out such a possibility.
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AREA OP
MAIN MAP
Vientiane
Nam Khan
ala
hou
houn
13
LAOS: Current Situation
LAOS
? Xien
Dat
,
Muong
Phalene
?
Communist
attacks
71
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Khou
ANNItiong Pot
Enem uildup _ VA ba ion moving
continue Tha Tam to
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atn
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ang Vieng
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--
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reoccupy area
6
Ban Ban
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Khouangville - -
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10 20 M es
10 20 Kilometers
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LAOS
The Communists are moving to neutralize recent
government gains southwest of the Plaine des Jarres.
Over the last few days, the enemy has pushed back
into the region between Long Tieng and Tha Tam Bleung.
One important government hilltop position has been
overrun, and several enemy battalions are closing in
on other key positions in the area. There also ap-
pear to be new enemy troop movements near Sam Thong,
which came under renewed ground attack yesterday.
A North Vietnamese battalion is moving toward
Tha Tam Bleung, which was recaptured by Vang Pao's
guerrillas last week. Enemy control of the Tha Tam
Bleung area had greatly facilitated operations south-
ward against the Long Tieng - Sam Thong sector.
In central Laos, two North Vietnamese battalions
on 13 April overran several government positions
southwest of Muong Phalane, a village on the western
edge of the enemy's infiltration corridor.
These actions significantly increase the
threat to the villages whose defenses had
already been weakened by the sending of
several battalions of government regulars
to the Long Tieng area. The attacks may
be in response to government operations
into the infiltration corridor.
3
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BURMA
AREA CHINA
OF
MAP
LAOS
THAILAND
,NORTH
VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
Northern Laos: Chinese Road Construction Continuing
So.
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LAOS
Chinese road builders appear to be concentra-
ting on finishing road segments already under con-
struction rather than expanding the network further
? this dry season. Aerial photography
shows that the road extending south of Muong
Sai has not progressed beyond the point it reached
some two months ago--one mile north of Muong Houn,
The Chinese apparently are trying to put the segment
under construction between Muong Sai and Muong Houn
in all-weather condition before the rainy season be-
gins in early June.
Although no construction activity was noted
south of Muong Houn, there has been a significant
increase in antiaircraft artillery sites immedi-
ately north of the village.
The buildup is near a ford crossing the
Beng River, suggesting that the Chinese
may plan to construct a bridge at this
location in coming months. A similar
strengthening of air defenses occurred
prior to bridge construction at other
key points.
The road under construction northeast of Muong
Sai toward Route 19 is now motorable 14 miles past
Muong La, according to photography of late March.
The rugged terrain appears to be the major obstacle
to more rapid construction in this area.
Recent photography also shows that trails east
of Muong Sai ax.e being widened, but no construction
equipment was noted in the area.
This suggests that, if the Chinese intend
to build a road to the Lao Communist head-
quarters at Nam Bac, they may wait until
the next dry season. (
4
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DUA I
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NORTH VIETNAM
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USSR
Party boss Brezhnev's pre-eminence has once
again been underscored in connection with ceremonies
related to the Lenin centenrlial. The speeches he
delivered in Kharkov on 13 and 14 April were given
extensive publicity in most, if not all,of the Soviet
media. Moreover, Pravda's account yesterday of his
visit to a factory, where he is said to have talked
with workers and dispensed advice, seemed to stress
his personal interest in local problems. Coverage
of the other leaders' participation in similar cere-
monies elsewhere in the USSR, however, is likely to
approximate Brezhnev's and thus maintain the image
of collective leadership.
In his statement on foreign poliCS7, Brezhnev
made his first public reference since the beginning
Of SALT to an arms agreement, saying that one is pos-
sible provided that the US is as reasonable as the
USSR on this subject. It marked Moscow's most au-
thoritative endorsement of the talks, He said that
the USSR would welcome a "sensible" agreement and
would do its utmost to make the talks "useful." He
warned of Moscow's determination to prevent anyone
from achieving "military superiority over the USSR,"
thereby serving notice that the Soviets intend to
talk from a strong position in Vienna. Having Made
this point, however, the Soviets might believe them-
selves to be on more solid ground should they choose
to be flexible when talks resume.
Brezhnev's remarks on the economy were limited
to a familiar recital of the country's ills. He
identified the short-run difficulties as the severe
weather and "complications in the international situ-
ation",--probably the Sino-Soviet border dispute, pos-
sibly also Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and the Middle
East,--which "imposed a certain additional load on the
Soviet economy."
He also acknowledged the more serious, long-run
difficulties as "problems connected essentially to
our growth," such as the need for more efficient use
of production capacity. Brezhnev also noted the lag
in the introduction of advanced technology. In ac-
tuality, although it is effectively employed in the
space and defense industries, it usually fails to
percolate down to the civilian economy. He gave no
hint of change in the timid reforms that thus far have
failed to improve the administration of research or
to encourage managerial efficiency and innovation.
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USSR-EGYPT
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IRAQ-JORDAN
The Iraqi forces in Jordan
carefully stood aside during last Febru-
ary's confrontation between the Jordanian
Government and the fedayeen, although they
routinely furnish the fedayeen with arms
and other support. Husayn cannot be cer-
tain that Iraq's hands-off policy will
continue, however. He may well be more
chary of future attempts to crack down on
the fedayeen, who are already reported to
be largely disregarding the "settlement"
arrived at last February.
8
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CUBA
Cuba will continue to support revolutionary
liberation movements in Latin America and will
also grant asylum to any refugee militant seeking
it. At a recent. luncheon at the UN, Cuban minis-
ter Carlos Rafael Rodriguez rejected the possi-
bility that his government might rejoin the Or-
ganization of American States but said it consid-
ered Cuba's reintegration into the Latin American
community on other terms another matter. He in-
dicated, however, that Cuba would not be prepared
to change its policies in return for acceptance
in the hemisphere.
Rodriguez indicated his government was consider-
ing the US proposals for a bilateral agreement on
the hijacking of aircraft. He reaffirmed, however,
that Havana has no interest in using the contacts on
this issue as a wedge for the development of official
relations with the US.
All this means that Cuba's policies toward
the US and Latin America have not changed.
Rodriguez' pronouncements are the first
made for foreign consumption by a high-
ranking Cuban official in some time. He
probably meant to answer recent proposals
by some Latin American leaders for recon-
sideration of Cuba's continued isolation
from the Latin American community.
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NOTES
Hungary: The Hungarians have unaccountably can-
celed their Lenin centennial celebrations planned
for 18, 21 and 22 April. A Foreign Ministry spokes-
man called Ambassador Puhan yesterday to inform him
that because of "an administrative problem" there
would be no celebrations. There is no evidence of
a serious problem in Budapest, but it is likely that
only one of an unusual nature could precipitate such
a move. There is as yet nothing to indicate that
other East European capitals have taken similar steps.
Libya: Ambassador Palmer believes that the
questiaria whether or not to maintain relations
with the United States is currently being hotly de-
bated in the ruling Revolutionary Command Council.
The issue is so clouded by pro-Arab and anti-Israeli
ideology, as well as by domestic political faction-
alism, that it is difficult to predict whether it
will ever come to a head, or how it would be resolved
if a vote were taken. We think that a decision will
probably be put off at least until after US forces
complete the evacuation of Wheelus Air Base, sched-
uled for 30 June. The only immediate issue which
the Libyan Government might seize upon as a pretext
for breaking relations.would be the request for ad-
ditional F-5 aircraft originally sought by the mon-
archy and still wanted by the new rulers.
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HANOI LOOKS AT INDOCHINA
Hanoi has called Le Duc Tho home from Paris,
perhaps for some kind of strategy review. We have
attempted in the following paragraphs to consider
how the Communists might now see the situation in
Indochina.
. The picture before Hanoi is mixed. There are
new dangers, but also new opportunities. How, for
example, should the Communists play their cards in
Cambodia? Phnom Penh has not bowed to Hanoi's
bluster, and the Communists seem reluctant to risk
settling the issue by force alone. Their growing
military and subversive pressures may keep the Cam-
bodians at bay, but the problem of South Vietnamese
attacks on Communist sanctuaries is likely to grow,
and no resumption of supplies through Cambodia is
in sight. Hanoi has the raw military assets to
march on Phnom Penh and reinstall a Sihanouk govern-
ment. If this could be accomplished swiftly and
neatly, Hanoi might find itself enjoying all the ad-
vantages that a Communist Cambodia--or at least one
beholden to the Communists--could confer on its long-
term effort in South Vietnam.
But although such a move might be swift, it
probably would not be neat. The Communists could
find themselves riding a new tiger--perhaps a civil
war in which they had the strongest military forces,
but which was beyond their capabilities to contain
or to bend to their advantage. At this point, the
Communists must make their calculations around one
significant unknown. They cannot be sure how the
US would react; in a Cambodia dominated by the Com-
munists the US would be freer to bomb or to sustain
a guerrilla force, and at relatively small political
cost.
Even if Hanoi assumes that the US would seek to
avoid entanglement, Communist assets now targeted
mainly on South Vietnamese objectives would be di-
verted, if not expended. This could leave the Com-
munists thrashing about in Cambodia while their main
effort in Vietnam languished. (One of our fundamen-
tal assumptions is that the main arena for the Viet-
namese Communists is in Vietnam, and that their tac-
tics in Laos and Cambodia are largely shaped by the
requirements of the Vietnam struggle.)
(continued)
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The choices Hanoi faces in Laos are less pain-
ful. The immediate question is how much more effort
to put into the current offensive before the rains
take their toll and the fighting washes away for
another season. By retaking the Plaine des Jarres
and offering a new proposal for a settlement, the
Communists have substantially improved their mili-
tary and political position. Now that their offen-
sive has lost momentum, to get much more than this--
in particular to get rid of the threat from yang
Pao's guerrillas--may call for more effort than they
are willing to expend on what is, like Cambodia,
still a sideshow.
In South Vietnam, the Communists recently
launched another window-rattling spurt of military
attacks, and they seem bent on maintaining a higher
level of activity than they have for nearly a year.
In some ways they have cause for satisfaction: al-
lied casualties are up sharply; the war is once
again in the headlines; and they have shown that
accounts of steadily declining Communist fortunes
are incomplete at best.
But unless an increased military effort can be
sustained, the setbacks dealt the allies are not
likely to last very long or run very deep. More-
over, flashy displays of military prowess can be
costly in terms of the manpower and material re-
sources the Communists need for the lower key mili-
tary, political, and subversive tactics they hope
will pay off over the long haul. These efforts al-
ready show some signs of blunting the momentum of
allied progress in the countryside and thus improv-
ing the longer-term outlook for the Communists. It
seems almost certain that some members of the Hanoi
leadership, especially those who also argue that
more attention must be devoted to tidying up the
situation in the North, are reluctant to undercut
these long-term efforts by chasing after more spec-
tacular but less durable results now.
Nevertheless, Hanoi may conclude that something
new is called for. In Laos, the Communists could
decide that the extra effort required to emascUlate
the threat from yang Pao's forces is necessary to
prevent a repetition of last year's Communist re-
treat from the Plaine. If Communist military at-
tacks in South Vietnam seem to be shaking the con-
fidence of the government there and undermining the
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premises of the Vietnamization program, Hanoi might
decide to keep up the pressure there for some time,
even if the costs are high. Hanoi could also reason
that increased military action in South Vietnam is
one of the best ways to dampen Saigon's enthusiasm
for going after Communist forces in Cambodia.
The likeliest locale for more military pressure
by the Communists may be Cambodia, where their deci-
sions probably hinge on how much they are squeezed
by the current situation. We are confident that if
the pinch from South Vietnamese border operations
becomes intolerable, the Communists will move more
forcefully against Cambodia, but we cannot judge the
limits of their tolerance.
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A whole new approach by Hanoi, involving the
use of some of the diplomatic cards it has long held
but has always been unwilling to play, is also a
possibility. This might, for example, take the form
of a qualified acceptance of the French proposal for
international consultation on Indochina, or perhaps
some Communist counterproposal. Hanoi might perceive
many advantages in moving the conflict in Southeast
Asia into a broad diplomatic arena, not the least of
which would be the hostility this notion generates
in Saigon.
The main argument against this course is a tell-
ing one, however. Any encouragement the Communists
give to diplomacy at this stage almost certainly
would appear to reflect weakness and lack of resolve
to stay the course.. Fear on this score has long in-
hibited the North Vietnamese and hamstrung their
diplomatic tactics.
(continued)
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In our view, the leadership situation in North
Vietnam also suggests that bold new military or po-
litical initiatives from Hanoi are unlikely. The
post-Ho leadership is not in perpetual deadlock, but
we believe the repercussions of earlier policy set-
backs and continuing disagreement over basic issues
will limit Hanoi's willingness to embark on new mil-
itary or political adventures. From time to time we
think we can detect voices in the Communist hierarchy
calling for new or different tactics, but we see lit-
tle evidence of these being translated into action.
On balance, then, we think that Hanoi is not
ready to add any really new ingredient to the current
situation in Indochina. In Laos, the Communists prob-
ably are looking forward to a rainy season devoted
largely to holding on to what they have now. In
South Vietnam, they seem to have settled some time
ago on taking the long road back by riding out more
American troop withdrawals and trying to get them-
selves in a position to exploit future opportunities.
The forces at work in Cambodia are too complicated
and unpredictable to guess with assurance how the
Communists may move next, but they probably are still
banking on pressuring the new government into an ac-
commodation that will avoid any need for extreme meas-
ures.
A-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008200130001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008200130001-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008200130001-2