DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN (SANITIZED) (2003-7402-IG)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6541713
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: April 27, 2005

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Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(S*ff) DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN
(2003-74024G)
John L. Helgerson
Inspector General
27 April 2005
(b)(1)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations
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(b)(6)
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Supervisory
bpeczat Agent
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SECRET gieFORNIftviR
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL...- This Information has been Authorized for
Release to...
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 1
SUMMARY 1
BACKGROUND 5
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 6
FINDINGS 7
(VINT) GLIL RAHMAN'S CAPTURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION.......... 7
(SH) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS AT
(VINT) POLICY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AT THE TIME OF
9
(SI INT) RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAHMAN'S INTERROGATION 18
(SH-NcF) RAHMAN'S TREATMENT DURING DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION 21 ?
(*INF) RAHMAN'S LAST THREE DAYS 41
(U/IFEW-0) THE INVESTIGATION BY THE DO INVESTIGATIVE TEAM-- 50
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct (v7 ,?.
OTHER TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED OR APPROVED
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(b)(6) B 54
(b)(7)(c) ?
(b)(7)(f) {-SWF) NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN'S DEATH TO CONGRESS 55
(U) APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES 58
CONCLUSIONS 61
RECOMMENDATIONS 64
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sEc-RE-T, 11-isieFew4H-IAR
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APPENDIX
Chronology of Significant Events
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EXHIBIT
Subject: Gul Rahman:
Chronology of Events
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(SIND DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN
(2003-7402-IG)
27 April 2005
INTRODUCTION
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(b)(1) 1. (St/4ff) On November 2002, an individual detained by
(b)(3) NatSecAct the CIA in Gul Rahman, died. Onr?November, the
Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Deputy ?
Inspector General that the DDO had dispatched a team to investigate
the death. In January 2003, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
initiated an investigation. This report reviews the events leading to
Rahman's death.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
SUMMARY (b)(3) NatSecAct
2. (SI /NP) Rahman, a suspected Afghan extremist associated
with the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) organization, who was
approximately 34 years old, was captured in Pakistan
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October 2002.1
November 2UO2,
(b)(1)
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(b)(1) aircraft rendered Rahman from
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On
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1
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Approved for
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to a detention
in
Rahman dead in
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rrogation facility,
security guards reportedly found
ce on e morning .of November 20n9
(b)(1)
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November 2002, Rahman
3. (S-/-/-14F) Between nd
underwent at least six interrogation sessions b Agency personnel.
, The interrogation team included th Site Manager,
(b)(1) an independent contractor (IC)
(b)(3) CIAAct Psychologist/interrogator, the Station's
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) and an IC linguist,
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
before his arrival in in July 2002. However he acquired
some on-thr ") training and experience during the (b)(1)-13-s he
(b)(1
had been (b)(3) NatSecActrior to Rahmart's death. (b)(3) NatSecAct
( )(3) NatSecAct 4. (Si Rahman was subjected to sleep deprivation
sessions of up to 48 hours, at least one cold shower, and a "hard
takedown" termed "rough treatment" as reported in pre-death cables
addressing the progress of the interrogation. In addition, Rahman
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct.:eportedly was without clothing for much of his time at
Oespite these measures, Rahman remained uncooperative and
provided no intelligence. His only concession was to acknowledge
(b)(1) his identity onrNovember 2002 and, subsequently, to explain what
(b)(3) NatSecActvill' age he came from; otherwise, Rahman retained his resistance
(b)(1) posture, and demeanor. The cable from on November 2002
(b)(3)
that Rahman had admitted his entity stated, "Rahman
NatSecAci.eP?Iting
spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold
(b)(1) conditions with minimal food and s;7,,,A psychological
assessment of Rahrnan, prepared b and reported in a cable on
(b)(3) NatSecAct November 2002, noted Rahman's remarkable physical and
psychological resilience and recommended, in part, "continued
environmental deprivations."
(b)(1)
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? (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
2 (U/ APR:ICI-Not all members of the interrogation team were involved in every int(b)(7)(01.
sessioit
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(b)(6)
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5. (aff-tiF) On the afternoon of November 2002, when
guards delivered food to Rahman, he reportedly threw his
food, water bottle, and defecation bucket at the guards. In addition,
he reportedly threatened the guards and told them he ha seen their
faces and would kill them upon his release. Wher was
informed of this incident, he approved or directed the guards to
shackle Rahmart's hands and feet and connect the shackles with a
short chain. This position forced Rahman, who was naked below the
waist, to sit on a cold concrete floor and prevented him from
standing up.
(b)(1) 6. (571.14f) The following morning, the guards reported that
(b)(3) NatSecAciRahman was slumped over in his cell. The ambient temperature was
recorded at a low ot17 degrees Fahrenheit. Rahman was still in the
(b)(1) "short chain position," wearing only a sweatshirt.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct(()GC)
) FStation reported Rahman's death that day in
cable to the DDO. The WO dispatched an
investigative team [the Directorate of Operations (DO) Investigative
Teaml consisting of a senior security officer assigned to the
(b)(3) CIAAct an Office of General Counsel
(b)(3) CIAAct attorney, and an Agency pathologist to
The DO Investigative Team conducted
interviews, and the pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.
The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that the death
was caused by hypothermia.3
8. (81-1-11F) On 22 January 2003, the General Counsel informed
the Inspector General (IG) that Rahman died as a result of the
conditions at a facility substantially controlled by Agency officers.
OIG initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding
this incident and reported the death to the Department of Justice
3 (U) Hypothermia is subnormal temperature within the central body. The term hypothermia is
used when an individual's body temperature is below 95 degrees Fahrenheit. This will occur
,when the loss of body heat exceeds heat production.
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(DoJ) by letter on 13 February 2003.4 On 29 Decembei2003, the Chief
of the Counterterrorism Section, DoJ reported by memorandum that
(b)(1) Do). would not pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges
(b)(3) NatSecAct regarding Rahman's death. The matter is under review by the U.S.
I Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 9. At the time of his assignment iri was
1 a first-to perations officer who had no training or
experience to prepare him to manage a detention facility or conduct
(b)(1) interrogations. At the time of Rahman's death had not
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActreceived interrogation training and was operating the facility with a
(b)(6) modicum of Headquarters guidance awl )(1) Station direct
(b
(b)(7)(c) supervision. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(f)
10. ($/-/-NF). This OIG investigation concludes that
(b)(1)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
? . ? is .i I ? S .111 oe us ?? H Fa' - ? ? :4 ? ??
waist in near freezing confinement conditions and this directly led to
Rahman's death by hypothermia. exhibited reckless
indifference to the possibility that his actions might cause injuries or
result in Rahman's death. (b)(1)
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11. (S/ /NF) OIG found that Rahman did not receive a
?
physical examination during his detention at and concludes
that
not attend to Rahman in the same manner and with the same
did
4 (SIM This referral is a requirement of Title 50 United States Code (US.C.), ?403q(b)(5) that
mandates OIG to report information concerning possible violations of federal criminal law to
DoJ. The General Counsel had orally advised the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ, of the
circum,stances of Rahman's death on 24 January 2003.
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(b)(6)
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standard of care as the other detainees.5 Further
was aware of the increasingly cold conditions
in during the period of time he and Rahman were both in
(b)(1)
Novemb..r /002) and did not advocate more humane
(b)(1)
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treatment for Rahman.(b)(3) NatSecAct
12 OIG also concludes that
(b)(1) ? d not provide adequate supervision for
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActactivities at Moreover, bears direct responsibility
(b)(6) for failing to include pertinent facts in his official written account of
(b)(7)(c) Rahman's death that led to material omissions and inaccuracies being
(b)(7)(f) provided to the Congressional oversight committees.
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
BACKGROUND (b)(3) NatSecAct
13. (-HIIF) Soon after the establishment of Station in
early 2002, the Station took the initiative to begin conducting
interrogations of detainees using Station linguists. (b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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15. (5771CrF) received its first detainee on (b)(1)
nSeptember 2002. After the first month of operation, thel(b)(3) NatSlecAct
population had grown to its maximum capacity of 20 detainees.
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) (b)(1)
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES (b)(3) NatSecAct
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18. (S/ /NT) Two OIG officers traveled to inspected
and conducted interviews there as a part of the
investigation. OIG reviewed the material collected during the Special
Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-
7123-IG), that is relevant to this investigation. Included within that
material are policy documents, cables, and internal and external
communications. OIG also drew material for this Report froni of
the interview reports prepared during the Special Review. CH
reviewed all materials assembled for the DO Investigative Team and
that team's final report, including a final autopsy report. (b)(3) CIAAct
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FINDINGS
(SWF) GUL RAHMAN'S CAPTURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION
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19. 45/ Rahman was a suspected Afghan extremist from
Lowgar Province, who was associated with the I:11G organization.7
CTC identified him as a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and
Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-Najdi, an alleged member of Al-Qa'ida.8
Rahman was an ethnic Pashtun who spoke Pashtu, Dari, and Farsi
- and was approximately.34 years old.
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.? :21. (SI Rahman was apprehended in Islamabad,
? PAcistan, on October 2002, during an early morning raid
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.(b)(3) NatSecAct
7 -(97, During an interrogation session after he admitted his true identity, Rahman said he
was from Kolangar Village, Pol-E-Alam Region, Lowgar Province. Lowgar Province is
immediately southwest of Kabul.
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
7
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cable
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22 (S/)
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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On
October 2002,
Station sent a
}interrogation session
(b)(1) his fellow detainees as Gul Rahman.
advised that during a
(b)(3) NatSecAct
had identified one of
requested that the
of the
apprehension. In a reflection of how important a detainee Rahman
(b)(1) was believed to be, Headquarters subsequently advised
(b)(3) NatSecActin0 Stations that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had
requested an update on t(b)(1) case.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23. (S/[
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
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November 2002, Rahman was rendered to
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On
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
24. IS/ Following Rahman's rendition to
generated six cables regarding Rahman, including two cables
following his death. Only one of these cables, which reported the
chronology of Rahman's death, provided a characterization of
Rahman, describing him as an "enemy combatant."12
12 (U/ /F191+3) The Department of Defense defines an "enemy combatant" as an individual
who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of the conflict. (Letter
from William J Haynes II to Senator Can Levin, 26 November 2002.)
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(SIflEF) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS AT
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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27. (S/ /NT) The detention facility
consisted of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells.
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1) 29. (5-/-/-14-F) was not insulated and had no central air
(b)(3) NatSecAct . .ti .
condiorung or heating; an Agen - urchased generator supported
its power requirements. When eceived its first detainee in
b 1) September 2002, by many accounts the temperature was hot and
()(
(b)(3) CIAAct remained generally hot or warm until November 2002.15 Individual
(b)(3) NatSecActells were designed with a recess for electrical space heaters;
(b)(6) however, electrical heaters were not placed in the cells.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f) 30.- (971,-/-11F) estimated there were between six and 12
gas heaters in the cellblock at the time of ?Rahman's death.
officer who participated in the DO Investigation
Team, reported there were five gas heaters in the detainee area of the
(b)(1) f-Ality before Rahman's death.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
31. (-S1-1-11Pf According t4:: he customary practice at
(b)(1) i,vas to shave each detainee's head and beard and conduct a
(b)(3) CIAAct
) NatSecAct medical examination upon arrival. Detainees were then given
(b(3)
(b)(6) uniforms and moved to a cell. Photographs were taken of each
(b)(7)(c) detainee for identification purposes. While in the cells, detainee's
(b)(7)(f) were shackled to the wall. The guards fed the detainees on an
alternating schedule of one meal on one day and two meals the next
day. In anticipation of the cold weather directed (b)(6)]
(b)(1) (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct-. According t
(b)(6) the excrement bucket.
the door had to be opened to deliver water bottles and access
(b)(7)(c)
15 (u) In November 2002, the temperature(b)(i )
ranged from a high of
o a low of
(b)(7)(f)
degrees Fahrenheit.
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(b)(6)
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assistant, to acquire warmer uniforms, heaters,
propane, and blankets. According te he was successful in
purchasing the uniforms, blankets an some heaters. It was difficult
to purchase heaters because they were in high demand. If a detainee
was cooperative, he was afforded improvements in his environment
to include a mat, blankets, a Koran, a lamp, and additional food
choices. Detainees who were not cooperative were subjected to
austere conditions and aggressive interrogations until they became
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
compliant.
32. (Si /ATP) for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons
BOP) to send a auung team to from Lito
ovember.16 team worked with the interior guard force
concentrating on techniques such as entry and escort procedures,
application of restraints, security checks, pat down and cell searches,
and documenting prescribed checks of detainees'.
33. -(61--/NF)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
described
cos
as a "high risk high gain intelligence facility."17
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
In an electronic message
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(e_maii) to the DDO two days after Rahman's death
part,
wrote, in
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) 17
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
served i( b)( 1) from August 2002 until July 2003.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 35. ( / NF) aici he_did not know what his duties
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActwould be when he arrived in He believed the primary factors
(b)(6) in his assignment as were the vacancy in the
(b)(7)(c) detention program and that
(b)(7)(d) had no formal instruction re
(b)(7)(f) interrogations until April 2003, months into his ounn
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
36. (Stfl'iF) Jn assigned
responsibility for alldetention-related functions
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 37. (S// NP) explained that he selected
(b)(3) NatSecAct several factors, including the fact
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
based on
that he watched
discharge his duties and was very satisfied with the job he
performed.
about issues.
ancl
? 38.
on CIA policies, and
believed tha
1tad free access to the
recalled consulting with
talked a lot
Station front office,
at least once-a day:
stated that he and briefed
earned from on-the-job training.
received whatever guidance was available at
CTC before he arrived, but did not know what that was.
said that the guidance he passed to included such issues
as 's prohibition on torture,
and the faCithat it is permissible to use certain
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct interrogations on
(b)(6) nterrogations on a case-b
(b)(7)(c) important detainee at
(b)(7)(f) interrogation ran its course.
tactics in debriefing that cannot injure, threaten with death, or induce
lasting physical damage to the detainees.
said he was briefed on particular
-case basis. If there was a new or
he was briefed every day as the
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
40. (SI
advised that he had discussions With
Station management---
when issues arose.
management visited
?every other day, or
stated that someone from Station
about once a month.
(b)(1)?
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
41. (57W44F-) The Director of CTC?in written comments on the
(b)(1) draft report endorsed by the DDO, who served as the previous
(b)(3) CIAAct Director of CTC?said that, by the fall of 2002, the shortage of veteran
(b)(3) NatSecAcberations officers had hit b)(1) Station hard. To accomplish critical
p
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) missions, (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
CTC often relied on talented young officers?such as
to take on responsibilities beyond their training and experience. In
case, he was asked to take on enormous responsibilities
rincipally because of his
and relative maturity, which qualified him better than
most for this entirely new DO mission.
(SIO4f) POUCY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AT THE TIME OF
RAHMAN'S DEATH
42. (S/ /NF) Prior to the time of Rahman's death, CTC and
OGC disseminated policy guidance, via cables, e-mail, or orally, on a
specific case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific
interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those
involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had
read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided;
nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals
who had been briefed on interrogation procedures.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
SECRET/
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-(b)(3) NatSecAct------- --
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?
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
1
440PORldttiVIR
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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SECRET! (NeFeRwtiviR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 49. (Si-ANT) According to he initial interrogations
(b)(3) NatSecAcfonducted at in September and October 2002 were more
custodial interviews, with the added psychological impact of being in
that facility with total darkness and separation from other detainees.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
17
SECRET NCEORN,L,LIIIR
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
51.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActarrived
(b)(5) in
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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SEC14447 NOPeiettiVIR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Accordingly, when
ovember 2002, for his first TDY assignment
eportedly advised
e detainees you can handle the
as you see fit." It was not apparent to
rules were.26
"You cannot harm or
interrogations
tha knew what the
(SIINE) RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAHMAN'S INTERROGATION
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
26
served ir
frorc November 2002 unti
January 2003.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
28 fa, According to a October 2002 CTC/UBL cable, was being sent ttc
"to conduct in-depth interrogations of several key Al-Qa'ida operatives recently detained in
Rahman was not captured until October 2002.
was in?( b)(1 ).omflOctober until ovember 2002.
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
29 6744:13
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
.(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
19
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(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
)
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.,
r. I / NIOPORN/ /MR
..
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(1)
(3) CIAAct
(3) NatSecAct
(6)
(7)(c)
(7)(d)
(7)(f)
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(b)(1)
.(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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?(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) ESIAW RAHMAN' S TREATMENT DURING DETENTION AND
(b)(3) CIAAct INTERROGATION
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) 61. (S//NF) said he did not specifically recall Rahman's
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d) treatment upon arrival at stated that Rahman's
(b)(7)(f) clothes would have been removed early in his detention, and most of
the time Rahman was naked or would have been wearing only a
diaper.
(b)(1)
?(b)(3) NatSecAct ,
(b)(1) 62. -(57711f said that Rahman was either in his cell or
(b)(3) CIAActin a see-
p 1 deprivation cell when he was not being interrogated.35
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) Old not know exactly how much time Rahman spent in the
(b)(7)(c) sleep deprivation cell but estimated it was about 50 percent of the
(b)(7)(d) time.
(b)(7)(f) Rahman and added there
contended that no sleep deprivation was conducted on
would have been no point in continuing it then because Rahman was
not bein interrogated.36 According to Rahman arrived at
in a diaper and it was removed at some
He was
(b)(1)
point.
(b)(3) NatSecAcfrobably put back in a diaper when he was put in a sleep deprivation
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
cell.37 Howeve said
there would have been no reason to use
not in a sleep deprivation cell.
characterized Rahman as stoic and very
detainees. He was the most stubborn
the facility.38 Although most of the other
)ilmost immediately, Rahman was hard-
NatSecAct
a diaper when Rahman
63. (S/4-NF)
stubborn, unlike the
individual they detained
detainees were "comp1i(b)(1
was
other
at
(b)(3)
35 (.SAWF) As mentioned
earlier of the 20 cells at
These cells could be used to force the
detainee to stand during sleep deprivation sessions.
36 (sALNE)
(b)(1)-
(b)(3) CIAAct 37 (5171P) During the OIG visit t CmEandlay 2003, two detainees were
(b)(3) NatSecAct undergoing standing sleep deprivation in these cells. Both were naked.
(b)(6) " 38 (517414.1F) At the time of Rahman's death,
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f) ?
SECRET
21
NAFeRN-ftivrtZ
(b)(1)een in operation for 69 days.
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) core Pashtun. He had been a combatant all his life and had been
(b)(3) CIAAct wounded many times. Rahman did not complain and simply said,
(b)(3)
(b)(6) NatSecActThanks to God, all is well." When reminded that in his videota ed
(b)(7)(c) 19 December 2002 interview with the DO Investigative Team
(b)(7)(d) stated that Rahman complained incessantly, said he just
(b)(7)(f) recalled Rahman being stoic.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
64. According to cables reporting Rahman's
interrogations, he did complainrlr about conditions. After the first two
b)(1)
days of interrogation, eported that Rahman "complained
b)(3) NatSecAct)out poor treatment, complained about the violation of his human
rights, and claimed inability to think due to conditions (cold)." The
subsequent cable reporting Rahman's interrogation sessions
(b)(1) described ilnpression that Rahman "continues to use 'health
(b)(3) CIAAct
and welfare' behaviors and complaints as a major part of his
((bb))((63)) NatSecAct
resistance posture." (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f) 65. (S//NF) The DO Investigative Team interviewed
guard commander four days after Rahman's death.
- According to the guard commander, Rahman wore pants for
approximately his first,three days at (b)(1) ---i. then spent the
? remainder-of his detention without pants. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 66. (5754114F) aid that Rahman's diaper and clothes
(b)(3) NatSecActwould have been removed at the interrogators direction: The guards
(b)(6) would not have removed them without direction. According to
(b)(7)(c) Ralunan was without his clothes more than he was with them.
(b)(7)(d) The interro ators gave Rahman some clothing after he admitted his
(b)(7)(f) identity orrom ) ovember 2002.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
Even when Rahman was
depleted psychologically, he would routinely respond that he was
(b)(1)
40 4.51-ANF) A cable reported that wasinvolved in six interrogation sessions with
(b)(3) CIAAct Rahman.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
"fine" when asked about his condition. The only concession Ralurtan
made was to admit his identity when it was clearly established and
irrefutable.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
24
sraeRrvj tcleFeierifticfR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
73. (S/
with
reporting,
Rahman's
Medical Care. According
cable that reported the chronology
death, Rahman was brought
physical examination. However,
to the
of events
(b)(3) NatSecAct-171November
2002
connected
Rahman's
and given a
t on
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Pjsslovember
official
despite this
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) ?
(b)(3) CIAAct
conducted physical examinations at
on Rahman or other
(b)(3) NatSecAct
detainees
who
were rendered there during
that period.
The
brief
(b)(6)
'
(b)(7)(c)
check
erformed on rendition detainees
could not
part, it ? 'd
(b)(7)(d)
be considered
a physical examination because, in
not
(b)(7)(f)
involve questioning the detainees jt their health history and
current cond"4
(b)(3--) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
74. -(61) L2n November 2002,
by cable that
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Station reported (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
75. (-57 The November reported that
during two monthly assistance visits to by the medics, all
(b)(1) detainees were taken from their cells to a room and given a private
(b)(3) NatSecActiedical evaluation where they were interviewed by an Office of
Medical Services (OMS) officer and a urine specimen was taken to
determine the specific nutrition and hydration levels. It reported that
(b)(1) the last routine visit was November 2002 and the urine testing
(b)(3) NatSecActetermined all of the letainees were receiving sufficient
nourishment and hydration. The cable further reported that all the
43 457L7ilrf When
(b)(1 )tation used the term "medic" it meant Physicians' Assistants.
?(b)(3) NatSecAct
25
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) ?
(b)(7)(c) ?
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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detainees were cooperative with the medical personnel regarding
their health and welfare except for Rahman, who simply stated,
"Thanks to God, all is well."44
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
44(()
appeared in this cable.
45 (5) As reported previously, Rahman arrived there oniNovember 2002.
stated that he provided
with some of the information that
-SECRET/ FiNopepa47144,4R
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SECIttEr-T /NOFORNHMR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) 8071S1 Reports of Ralunan's Interrogation.
(b)(3) NatSecAct first cable report of Rahm interrogation was issued three days
after his rendition t It reported thathad
(b)(1) interrogated Rahman over a 48-hour period and noted that e
(b)(3) CIAAct psychological and physiological pressures available for use were
(b)(3) NatSecActanlikely to make Rahman divulge significant information. The cable
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(9
GECRET NOPOR1CT77MR
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActrted that, although the other detainees who had been brought to
dropped their resistance within 48 hours, Rahman
remained relatively unchanged. It added,
Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total
darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, Rahman
remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and
demeanor.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
81. 8/
(b)(3) NatSecAct A second, post-rendition cable was sent from
November 2002. It reported that Rahman
appeared to be physically fatigued but defiant during interrogations.
(b)(1) It sought material to employ as psychological pressure and requested
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Litat prepare a videotape of
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
82. 48/ sent a third post-rendition cable on
ovember 2002, "Subject: Gul Rahman Admits His Identity." It
reported that interrogated Rahman
onnNovember 2002, and that Rahman had spent the days since his
last interrogation session in cold conditions with rctinimal food and
sleep.50 It further reported that Rahman was confused for portions of
the interviews due to fatigue and dehydration.51 The cable reported
that Rahman provided his true identity and biographical information
(b)(1) but provided fictitious and rehearsed responses about his
(b)(3) NatSecActelationship witl eported that
Rahman was afforded improved conditions and would be
reinterviewed or November 2002.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 49 (S71-7414 There is no indication that
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
met this request.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.51 .(s./ As previously reported, the November 2002 cable reported the Station's
medical support to detainees. The cable cited that, during the L November 2002 medical ?
assistance visit to (b)(1 ) it was determined that all detainees were receiving sufficient
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
0
hydration. (b)(3) NatSecAct
1TeRET/, Hefei:N/7LN%
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1) reported that Rahman had demonstrated a rigid and intractable
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct resistance posture and would not be affected by continuing
(b)(6) interrogations. The cable recommended continuing environmental
(b)(7)(c) deprivations and instituting a concentrated interrogation re:, en of
(b)(7)(f) 18 out of 24 hours. It also recommended that the Station (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve the optimum
balance and noted it was reasonable to expect two or more weeks of
the regimen before seeing any progress. Finally, it recommended
using the newly trained interrogators from Headquarters' recent
training class. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
83. (8-/ sent a fourth cable on LNovember 2002.
That cable was prepared by and reported a mental status
examination and a recommendedinterrogation plan for Rahman..52 It
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(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
84. (S/ On the reported day of Rahman's death,
November 2002 sent a cable to the DDO, H Gul
Rahman: Chronology o? vents." It reported that Rahman appeared
calm and controlled to his interrogators but had reportedly
(b)(1) fhreatenedl guards previously, vowing to kill them all or
(b)(3) NatSecAct
nave them killed following his release. 53 This was cited as the reason
that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle
(b)(1) restraints in his ce11.54 It algo reported that .ast saw
(b)(3) NatSecActahman on the afternoon of November 2002, and that Rahman
was found dead on the morning of ovember 2002. The Station
conduded it was not possible to determine the cause of Rahman's
death without an autopsy. The cable did not include the information
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecACi3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
52 (57 The mental status exam was requested by CTC/UBL onnNovember 2002.
CTC/LTBL noted "[Headquarters] UBL is motivated to extract any and all operational information
on from Rahman. . . [and] achieving Rahman's cooperation [is] of great
importance. We would like to work quickly to create circumstances in which he will cooperate."
53 (9./../..NF reportedly heard from
(b)(3) NatSecAct the guards were threatened to
ds mistreat Rahman.
before November 2002 that Rahman sensed
em, bu i said he never witnessed the
54 Despite the assertion that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle
(b)(1) restraints in his cell, the same cable repotted that Rahman's hand restraints were removed on
(b)(3) NatSecAct Vovember 2002:
SECRET NOFORN//MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
that Rahman was naked below the waist or that a series of chains and
restraints (the short chain position) was used on Rahman that forced
him to sit bare-bottomed on the concrete floor of his cell.55
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(S/,F7 This cable was the basis for the information provided in the 29 November 2002
Congressional Notification_9n Ralunan's death. It was not until a second Congressional -
Notification was made on IvUy 2003, three months after the DO Investigafive Team's report was
issued, that CIA informed Congress that Rahman was naked below the waist and shackled in the
short chain position that prevented Rahman from standing upright.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
30
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SECRET
31
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b)(3) CIAAct
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STCRET/1 /NeFeRitftivrir
(b)(3) NatSecAct
90 (S4-7LNIFT
b)(3) NatSecAct
b)(6)
b)(7)(c)
b)(7)(f)
It was during that period that
the temperature dropped precipitously; checks were normally
conducted in the morning, and also in the evening if the weather was
co ey had observed the detainees shivering around the period
November. Some detainees with blankets were shivering.
out blankets were those who were not cooperating.
of
b)(1) Those wit
b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
b)(7)(f)
91. 1`51-ttiF)-
They were concerned that the provision of blankets to all of
the detainees at that time could send the wrong signal; they tried to
use desired items like blankets as something to earn by cooperation.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
59 4-S44449-
60 (s4.4.71if)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
During an interview with the DO Investigative Team onnNovember 2002,
'ted that did not know at what temperature one would reach hypothermia.
2
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
94:?(-S71-71-NE.) Five days after Rahman's death, the DO
Investigative Team interviewed The one and one-half page
report that resulted from that interview contained the following:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
95. (FrtiNF) During an OIG interview, less than four months
later, when asked if he had concerns regarding the temperature at
at the time of Rahman's death,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
-SECET NCIFORicrr
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) Rahman's hypothermin-inriuced death, reported the following
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
regarding another (b)(3) NatSecAct
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14451Periticr77MR
SEeittrr
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
100. (43/ In December 2002, less than one month after
[The detainee] was submitted [sic] to sensory deprivation, cold, and
sleep deprivation within the parameters of [a referenced cable]
When moved to the interrogation room for interrogation sessions
[the detainee] was stripped and had to earn his clothing with
cooperation and information. When he demonstrated resistance,
[the detainee] was left in a cold room, shadded and stripped, until
he demonstrated cooperation.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
35
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
104. (Si /NF) Based on the length of time Rahman was at
(b)(1) estimated that Rahman would have received
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActtwo showers. only one shower and it was a
(b)(6) cold shower. Rahman did not like the shower, but the guards
(b)(7)(c) were able to get him dean.
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct cold showers. However, explained that if a detainee were
(b)(3) NatSecActooperative, he would be given a warm shower if possible.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
105. (S/ /NP) Several of the officers interviewed about the
possible use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water
heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SrseRET/
36
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stated that when a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators
accomplished two goals by combining the hygienic reason for a
shower with the unpleasantness of a cold shower.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
107. (Stfrdf)- Hard Takedown. During the course of
Rahman's autopsy, the Agency pathologist noted several abrasions
on the bodv.67
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
67 4.574/44F) The Final Autopsy Findings noted "superficial excoriations of the right and left
upper shoulders, left lower, abdomen, and left knee, mechanism undetermined."
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct 1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f) 109. (-SHNF) According te the hard takedown was
employed often in interrogations at as "part of the
atmospherics." It was the standard proce u lire for moving a detainee
to the sleep deprivation cell. It was performed for shock and
(b)(1) psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of
(b)(3) NatSecActthe interrogation. He said that the act of putting a detainee into a
diaper also could cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because
the floor of the facility is concrete.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
110 (S// )
This was
accomplished by running him up and down the corridor. As
Rahman was bein moved down the corridor, he fell and got a scrape
on his shoulder. ? d not remember where else' Rahman
received injuries. explained that the scraping was not
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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expected to be part of the process, and he was displeased with the
results because Rahman was injured, asserted that he had no
interest in hurting the detainees. He observed that abrasions cause
management problems because there is a need to summon the
physician to the facility to tend to the detainees' wounds to prevent
(b)(1) infection.m tated that neither he, Station management,
(b)(3) NatSecActor anyone else involved with the program ever authorized or
encouraged anyone to hit, slap, or intentionally inflict pain on a
(b)(1) detainee.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
111. (S1-1-11F) stated that this hard takedown was the
only time Rahman could have received the abrasions on his body.
He recalled only one instance when the hard takedown was used on
Rahman. According to the reference to rough treatment in the
November 2002 cable refe hard takedown, as well as
the insult slap given to Rahman by
112. (S/4114F noted there was an alternative to the hard
takedown that he called the "gentle takedown." It was reserved for
detainees who had been cooperative and were being transferred from
In those instances, the detainee is advised what to expect
in advance and instructed to lie on his stomach and not fesiSt(b)ci
(b)(3) NatSecAct
113. stated he did not discuss the hard
takedown with Station managers; he thought they understood what
techniques were being used al(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
70 (9-frict,w)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
treated Rahman for those abrasions, it was not reported to OIG
during the contact with the three medical care providers present during Rahman's detention.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
-sEetitrr NeFewayitspiR ?
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
40
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b)(1)
b)(3) NatSecAct
119. (5/ Despite the visible presence of abrasions on
Rahman's body,77Station reported M the F?November 2002
(b)(6) cable that constituted the official report of Rahman's death to the
(b)(7)(c) DDO, "The Statio inspected the body and noticed no obvious
contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific
cause of death." This same language was incorporated in the
29 November 2002 Congressional Notification of Rahman's death.
(b)(1)
(SI/NF) RAHMAN' S LAST THREE DAYS (b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
120. (S7'-N4) In the November 2002 cable sent to the DDO,
Station reported a chronology of the events regarding Rahman,
with specific reference to the last days of his detention and his death.
No other cables documented Rahman's activities or status after
November 2002.
41
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
122. 1S7"7'iNfj November 2002. The
chronology cable reported:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
November 2002
The last time Rahman was seen b officer prior to his death
was on the afternoon of Monday ovember 2002. At that time
Rahman was assessed to be in good overall health. Station noted
that Rahman had small abrasions on his wrists and ankles as a
result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened and his
hand restraints were removed when Rahman was returned to his
ce11.74
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
74
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
This is the only passage in the cable that addressed the events of
would have made this assessment of Rahman's health.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
November 2002.
42
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t.,L(...M. 1 / NOrvn.IN / MK
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)-1126. (S/ November 2002. TheJJov?er 2002
(b)(3) NatSecActlogy cable reported:
At 1530 local onIovember 2002, the ommander
told station that when Rahman had been given oo at 1500 local,
he had thrown it, his plate, his water bottle and defecation bucket
at the guards who had delivered the food. Station requested that
(
(b)(1) b)(1)
(
, (b)(3) NatSecAct b)(3) NatSecAct
? 43.
SECRET/
NOPOIM7FAR
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1).
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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SEC?REV i'ieFORN7-7/OR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
the commander to replace [sic] Rahman's hand
restraints to prevent this from reoccurring, or prevent him from
undertaking any other violent actions.76
127. (SWNF)
The guard(s) reported that Rahman
had been acting violently and had thrown his food and defecation
bucket at the guards. Rahman had also threatened the guards, noting
that he had seen their faces and would kill them when he got out of
(b)(1) the facility, confirmed it is likely that Rahman had seen the
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActguards' faces, because they were sometimes lax about using their
(b)(6) kerchiefs to cover their faces.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 76 (G) This is the only passage in the cable that addresses the events of vember 2002. It
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
has been established that the term "station" in this paragraph means
44
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 131. (54/451F) tated he did not know what might have
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct prompted Rahman to act in this manner. He was the only detainee
(b)(6) who had ever threatened the guards or thrown food at them. As a
result of this conduct ordered the guards to shackle Ralunan's
hands. was not certain who proposed the idea to short chain-
Rahman. Uspected the guard (s) recommended it and he -
approved. Regardless of the origin acknowledged that he
would have authorized Rahnian's short chaining on j\lovember
2002. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
132. (5154N1F) explained that the short chain was
necessary to prevent Rahman from throwing things.77
reasoned if only Rahrn, an's hands had been shackled together, he still
would have been able to throw objects. That is, manacling one hand
to the other still permitted the limited range of movement that would
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
-SEetE-T-
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActallow Rahman the ability to throw something.78 In
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
view,
trying to harm others when they entered the cell crossed the line; a
detainee who acted in this manner needed to be restrained.
did not want Rahman throwing things even though the tray was
constructed of cardboard and the bucket and water bottle were made
of plastic. did not know if the defecation bucket was empty at
the time it was thrown.79
(b)(1) 133. (SI-/NP) According t
(b)(3) CIAAct the result of the verbal threat to the guards.
(b)(3) NatSecActarsthand knowledge of the threat; the guards to
(b)(5) did not appear very worried or frightened by the threat.
(b)(6)
found this surprising because
the short chaining was not
d not have any
about it. They
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
threatened the guards previously.
being punished for the previous threats;
recall if Rahman had been punished.
(b)(1) 134. ( / / .) stated it never occurred to him that short
(b)(3) CIAAct ,
(b)(3) NatSecActchanun? g Rahman while wearing no pants would have consequences.
In retrospect aid he can see there were problems caused by
that action.: At the time, he viewed short chaining as just a
mechanism to safely secure Rahman. ?'d not think he had
crossed the line in ordering the short g. It was not done to
induce pain or suff7ing.,_1His only thought at the time was to make
Rahman immobile, stated they are not in the punishment
game at(
NatSec
(b)(3)
tare in the business of getting information.
-Ac'
Rahman had reportedly
did not recall Rahman
thought he would
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAc
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
78 (t/71ff) Despite this view, therewas no need for the guards to enter the cell to deliver food.
The doors for each cell were constructed with a small slot near the bottom of the doors. The
purpose of the slot was for the safe delivery of food to the detaineewithout opening the doors.
The same slot was used by the guards to inspect the cell and monitor detainees during security
checks. .
79 (&//NP) Four of the officers who responded to Rahman's cell on
did not see or smell urine or excrement in or around the cell.
November 2002 said they
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAc
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
137. ($7L7LNF)
The original
technique involved chaining both the hands and the feet tb the w?.
The wall hook was less than two feet from the floor. The detainee
would have to sit on the floor of the cell with his arm elevated and
bent.81
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
138. (S-71 NIovember 2002; Tha November 2002
_hronology cable reported: (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
Interviewed separately orJ November 2002, each of the tw
guards reported that during normal cell checks at 2200,2300,
and 0800 on (b)(1)i?lovember, they saw Rahman was alive in his
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Si (6./.74,11) The difference between the two techniques is that, with the original technique, the
detainee is chained to the wall, and there is no third chain connecting the hands to the feet.
CRET N FORN//mi(
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
b)(1)
b)(3) CIAAct
b)(3) NatSecAct
b)(6)?
b)(7)(c)
b)(7)(d)
b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
cell. Rahman was visually inspected through the door cell slot but
no guard entered his cell. Both of the two guards on the 0900 cell
check said independently that Rahman was definitely alive, with
his eyes open, seated in his cell at 0800 hours o November
2002. . . . Shortly after 1000 hours on Nove er 2002, Station
personnel then present at the facili ct an interrogation of
another individual were notified by ards that Gul-
Rahman was sleeping in his cell but there was some problem.
These officers were escorted to the cell by the guards. These
officers realized Rahman was deceased and they subsequently
requested via secure radio that Station medic visit the facility.
Officers reported that a small amount (palm-sized pool) of dried
blood was present in and around the mouth and nose of subject.
Rahman was observed still shackled, and slumped over in the
seated position . . . .
At approximately 100 hours, Station medic arrived at the location.
The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious
contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of
specific cause of death. He noted that the blood in evidence was
dark, not in keeping with a wound to the nose or mouth area. The
medic's notes on Rahman's condition are filed at Station. His
estimation was that Rahman had been dead less than a few hours.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) 140. (-975`117) stated he was unaware that Station
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActofficers tried to contact on the morning ofrThlovember 2002
(b)(6) when Rahman's death was discovered. He indicated the radio was
(b)(7)(c) not always on. said he was not certain where he was at the
(b)(7)(f) tirn.e the Station Rahman's bod was found.r thought perhaps he was at
(b)(7)(d)
but he acknowledged that had he been at
1
the Station an f a trio c ed, someone would have located lum.82
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) (b)(1) ?
(b)(3) CIAAct 82 (6174.1f) None of the personnel, including who were presei(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecActd became aware of Rahman's death that date could account for whereabouts '
(b)(6) throughout the morning when Rahman's death was reported to the Station.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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When e officers subsequently returned to the Station from
they informed selected Station personnel of Rahman's
(b)(1) death. One of them, identity unrecalled, informe they had
(b)(3) CIAAct ,
(b)(3) NatSecAct.ound Rahman dead in his cell.83 Wher went to see he
(b)(6) was already aware of Rahman's death.84
(b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
141. (si acknowledged that the account of the
guards checking on an at 2200 and 2300 and 0400 hours, as
reported in the cable, was odd and inconsistent with the policy of the
rounds conducted every four hours. He maintained, however, that
this was what the guards told him aid he thou ht it was
(b)(1) unusual that the guard commander was not present at
(b)(3) NatSecActwhen Rahman's death was reported. Other officers also cited that
this absence appeared unusual.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
142. (5/ From what he heard said he was
confident Rahn-ian died of hypothermia. Being on the bare floor was
likely a factor. tated he had no more experience than the
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecA
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(
ct average person with hypothermia. From life experience
recognized that if the ground is colder than your body, it is prudent
to have something between your body and the ground.
assumed
that other detainees did not die because they were more warmly
dressed. Rahman was the only prisoner short chained in his cell at
? the time; he was different from the other prisoners. When asked if he
thought Rahman would have been alive on November 2002 if he
CIAAct had cooperated responded that if an had been
NatSecAct cooperative, he would probably still be alive.
c)
(b)(7)(d) ?
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
8 When interviewed by the DO lnvesti tive Team three days after Rahman's death,
stated he learned of the death fro confirmed this during his OIG
(b)(1) interview. ?
(b)(3) CIAAct 84 (5/71e) No photographs were taken of Rahman or the condition of his cell. The only
(b)(3) NatSecAct?LPhotographs of Rahman were the photographs taken in conjunction with the autopsy on
_
November 2002.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) SteRE-T
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) all/F-Alle) THE INVESTIGATION BY THE DO INVESTIGATIVE TEAM
(b)(3) NatSecAct
144. -(S//NF) Statiorireported Rahman's death in an
(b)(3) NatSecAct cable to the DDO on LiNovember 2002, the day of
Rahman's death. Shortly thereafter the DDO dispatched three
(b)(1) A gency officers (the 'DO Investigative Team") tOon a
(b)(3) NatSecAct' to investigate the circumstances of the death.85 The
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
DO Investigative Team, consisting of who was the
senior security officer assigned to
(b)(7)(c)
conducted interviews, and the
pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.86
145. (S/ /NF) 4dvised the DO. Investigative Team that
(b)(1) detainees were examined and photographed upon their arrival to
(b)(3) CIAAct protect the Agency
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
However, when ,on
January 2003, two months after Rahman's arrival in
requested the identity of the medical officer, the results of Rahman's
ies of the rendition photographs
medical examination, and co
did not produce them reported that no medical documents
were retained from the renditions, ad the Station did not retain
(b)(1) medical documentation of detainees aid he could not
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(6)
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(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
identify the medic who reportedly examined Rahman and also said
the digital photographs of Rahman had been overwritten. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
146. {S-/-fisTFTThe DO Investi
ative Team interviewed CIA
employees and contractors and thnside guards. was
interviewed a second time when he returned to Headquarters while
on leave from and by an e-mail message that was sent to
later attempting to locate additional information. On
January 2003, ompleted a 33-page report with 50
(b)(1) ftachments, including the post-mortem photographs.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 148. (5/ On November 2002, sent an e-mail
(b)(3) CIAAct message to several OGC attorneys assigned to the DO that was
(b)(3) NatSecAct ?
intended to be a preliminary report of his findings.87 Included in the
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) e-mail message was the following:
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(5)
(b)(1) - 87 (1j//Fe130)
(b)(3) CIAAct ?
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
said he did not prepare any other report on this matter.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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151.(...5MVF) The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of
exclusion, that Rahman's death was caused by hypothermia.88 The
Final Autopsy Findings reported the cause of death as
"undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the
clinical impression as hypothermia.
152. TSTINF-}- The DO Investigative Team concluded:
? There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death was
deliberate.
? There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman was beaten,
tortured, poisoned, strangled, or smothered.
? Hypothermia was the most likely cause of death of
Rahman.
? Rahman's death was not deliberate but resulted from
- -incarceration ma cold environment while nude from the
? waist down and being shackled in a position that
prevented him from moving around to keep warm.
Additionally, this kept him in direct contact with the cold
concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through
conduction.
Rahman's actions contributed to his own death. By
throwing his last meal, he was unable to provide his body
with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his
violent behavior resulted in his restraint, which
prevented him from generating body heat by moving
around and brought him in direct contact with the
concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through
conduction.
88 (U) A diagnosis of exclusion in a death case is one where all other causes of death are
excluded and the clinical environment in which the victim was found is examined along with the
immediate history developed during the investigation. However, no definitive tests or findings
establish that diagnosis.
c?
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(C) OTHER TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED OR APPROVED BY
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 155. -( NF) Four other officers and ICs who were
(b)(3) CIAAct interviewed admitted to either participating in such an incident or
(b)(3) NatSecAct .
itearmg about one of them.89
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) 156. ( admitted that he participated in a "mock
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct?.cutron at when the first detainees arrived. He
(b)(6) contended the detainees were there only one day, and he hoped to
(b)(7)(c) shake them up quickl
(b)(7)(f) safe marmer while an
. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
explained he discharged a firearm in a
fficer lay on the floor and
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 89 (S/ /NP) It is difficult to determine how many mock executions were staged during this
(b)(3) NatSecActiod. There appear to be at least two. admits to participating in only one.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
IcleFORN/1MR
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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chicken blood was splattered on the wall. The technique was
idea and was based on the concept of showing
something that looks real, but is not. According to in that case
it was not effective because it appeared to be staged.
157. (S771NE;
stated that
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
toyed the mock execution techni
informe ? about it afterwards. The
(b)(1) the technique secause the detainee knew it was
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActand the officer wanted to induce the belief tha
(b)(6) anything. contended that he did not know when this incident
ue once; the officer
re ortedly tried
facility
ould do
(b)(7)(c) occurred or if it was successful.
(b)(7)(f)
TS/Mr NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN'S DEATH TO CONGRESS
(b)(3) NatSecAct ? ?
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f)
?
160. {-6-/--tr
As discussed
in
?
previously,
a ovember
e
? orted
Rahman's death to Headquarters
2002
(b)(3) NatSecAct.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
90 (E",F7was interviewed
February 2003.
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) ClAAct-
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
? SEC-T
NOFORNI-livfft
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""SEERET// //Mx (b)(1)
(b)(1) ih)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
cable to the DDO. (See Exhibit.) OnnNovember 2002
(b)(1)
rorlorted ?F7Station Medical Support to Detainees in
(b)(3) NatSecAct
to the DDO. This addressed the medical care
provided to detainees in general along with a comment about the
medical treatment provided to Rahman.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
161. (SI On 29 November 2002, the Director of
Congressional Affairs (D/OCA) provided the Chairman and ranking
member of each Intelligence Committee and the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees on Defense a background paper entitled "Death of
Detainee Gul Rahman." The paper identified Rahman as "an Al-
Qa'ida operative and Hezbi-Islami Gulbuddin/Hekmatyar associate
who was also a close contact of senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu
Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi." It reported CIA was sending a team of
officers to to conduct an inquiry into Rahman's death,
(b)(1)
tS ;inctcluding an autopsy to determine the cause of death. The
(b)(3) NaecA
oackground paper reported, "Rahman arrived at the etention
facility onnNovember [2002] and was given a physic examination
(b)(1) which indicated no medical issues orpreexisting medical MO )
(b)(3) NatSecActditi (b)(3) NatSecAct
conons.?91 ?
162. On 23 January 2003, the IG reported to the DCI (b)(3) NatSecAct
by memorandum that the General Counsel had informed the IG on
22 January 2003 of the death of Gul Rahman. Further, the IG stated
that the OIG was investigating the issue. On 30 January 2003, the
DCI forwarded the IG's memorandum to the Congressional oversight
committees and reiterated the DCI had notified the committees of
this matter by formal notification on 29 November 2002. The DCI's
letter added that the DO Investigative Team's report was nearing
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
cable reporting the death of Rahman. As explained earlier, this information is inaccurate.
91 (s./ The first portion of this statement appears to be drawn from the ovember 2002
There is no evidence that Rahman received a physical examination upon his arrival at
or at any time following his arrival in It cannot be determined where the Office o
Congressional Affairs obtained the information that Rahman did not have any medical issues or a
preexisting medical condition because that conclusion was not reported in either the or
ovember 2002 cables. ? .(b)(1) ? (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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completion and CIA would be sending the committees a follow-up
notificatic- c r-iture.
(b)(3) NatSeAct
163. (S/ On 2 May 2003, the D/OCA provided an
update to the Intelligence Committees of Congress and Chairman
and Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense in the form of a background paper entitled
"Death of Detainee Gul Rahman." The background paper,
"Investigation by the Directorate of Operations," which included an
autopsy and toxicology, disclosed that Rahman's death was
accidental and most likely resulted from hypothermia."92 The
background paper reported that Rahman was nude from the waist
down and that "an autopsy disclosed several surface abrasions which
he obtained within the first few days of his incarceration."93 The
background paper reported, 'Dunn: his incarceration, Rahman
(b)(1) threatened several times to kill guards.% . . . At 1500
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Lnours] onn\lovember 2002. . . Rahman again. threatened to kill the
guards and threw his food, water bottle, and waste bucket at the
guards." Finally, the background paper reported, "As a result of his
violent behavior, and following procedures recommended by the
U.S. BOP, Rahman was shackled to the wall in a short chain position
which prevents prisoners from standing upright."95
(b)(3) NatSecAct
92 Ts/ As reported above, in actuality, the autopsy reported the cause of death as
"undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as
(b)(3) NatSecAct hypothermia. The investigative report concluded, 'There is no evidence to suggest that
Rahman's death was deliberate."
93 naked The initial report to Congress on 29 November 2002 did not report that Rahman
wase ow the waist and chained in a position that forced him to sit on the concrete floor.
The autopsy did not address the age of the abrasions. As explained earlier, the pathologist
opined to OIG that the abrasions to the shoulders and hips occurred from one to three days, at
most, before Rahman's death.
94 frii-in According to Rahman reportedly threatened the guards two times only,.
(b)(3) NatSecActduring ?
the week of ovember and on November.
95(5/ As reported previously advised OIG that he did not recall bunishine
(b)(1) Rahman for the first alleged verbal threat.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(f).
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(U) APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES
164. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. ?112, Manslaughter, provides in
pertinent part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of two kinds:
Voluntary - Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
Involuntary - In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or
without due Caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which
might produce death.
165. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. ?2441, Torture, provides penalties for
"who[m]ever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit torture." The statute defines the crime of torture, in pertinent
part, as:
an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
Control.
? 166. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. ?2441, War Crimes, provides penalties
for "whomever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits
a war crime" wherein "the person committing such war crime or the
victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States or a national of the United States." The statute defines a
war crime as any conduct defined as a grave breach of the Geneva .
Conventions [or any protocol to such convention to which the United
States is a party].96 The proscribed conduct indudes the following
96(U) The United States is not yet a party to either of the two "Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions."
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relevant offenses: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering to
body or health.97
167. (U) On 7 February 2002, President Bush issued a
memorandum noting that the "provisions of Geneva will apply to our
present conflict with the Taliban" [in Afghanistan] but would not
apply to Al-Qa'ida.98 Neither the Taliban nor Al-Qa'ida would be
entitled to enemy Prisoners of War status, however. Nonetheless, the
President ordered, "As a matter of policy, the United States Armed
Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner
consistent with the principles of Geneva."
168. (S-/-/-14F) On 24 January 2003, the General Counsel orally
informed the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ of Rahman's death.
On 13 February 2003, OIG reported Rahmart's death in detention to
the U.S. DoJ by memorandum.
169. (S7'7'-1t.IF) On 29 December 2003, the Chief,-
Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, DoJ, reported by letter
that it declined to pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges in
this matter. As of April 2005, the matter is under review by the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the
direction of the Attorney General.
97 (U) Grave breaches are defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Persons in Time of War are listed in Article 147. (Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention
? Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War lists these same offenses as "grave breaches.")
98 (U) Memorandum from the President tothe Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees," dated and signed 7 February
2002.
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
170. (u/iFeue) Agency Regulation 13-6, Appendix L
Standards for Employee Accountability provides:
a. Consequences will follow an employee's failure to comply with
a statute, regulation, policy or other guidance that is applicable
to the employee's professional conduct or performance.
b. The lack of knowledge of a statute, regulation, policy or
guidance does not necessarily excuse the employee. However,
lack of knowledge may affect the level of employee
responsibility and the extent to which disciplinary action is
warranted. Therefore the following factors will be considered
prior to holding an employee accountable for a particular act or
omission:
? (1) Agency efforts to make employees aware of the statute,
regulation, policy or guidance;
(2) The extent of employee awareness of the statute,
regulation, policy or guidance;
(3) The importance of the conduct or performance at issue;
.(4) The position or grade of the employee.
c. Any finding of deficient performance must be specific and may
include omissions and failure to act in accordance with a
reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence.
d. Determinations under the above standard will be based in part
on whether the facts objectively indicate a certain action should
have been taken or not taken and whether the employee had an
opportunity and the responsibility to act or not act.
e. Managers may be held accountable in addition for the action(s)
or inaction of subordinates even if the manager lacks
knowledge of the subordinate's conduct. Such accountability
depends on: ?
(1) Whether the manager reasonably should have been
aware of the matter and has taken reasonable measures
to ensure such awareness.
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(2) Whether the manager has taken reasonable measures to
ensure compliance with the law and Agency policies and
regulations.
CONCLUSIONS
171. (S//NF) CIA had not issued any applicable custodial
interrogation guidelines by the time of Rahman's detention. The
(b)(1)
CIAAct practice at that time was for interrogators to propose interrogation
(b)(3)
(b)(3) NatSecAci:echniques to CTC for pre-approval. did not take
(b)(6) this step prior to the interrogation of Rahman. Further, a CTC legal
(b)(7)(c) advisor said Headquarters would not have knowingly approved
(b)(7)(f) several of the techniques that employed, including cold
showers, cold conditions, hard takedowns, and the short chain
restraint.
(b)(1) 172. (S1-/-114F) treated Rahman harshly because of
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActRahman's alleged stature, his uncompromising reaction to the
(b)(6) interrogation and, lack of cooperation, the pressure on to
(b)(7)(c) 'break him," an lack of experience with a committed
(b)(7)(f) interrogation resister. MO )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
173. (S /NF) On November 2002 ordered or
(b)(1) approved the guards placing Rahman in the short chain position
(b)(3) CIAAct whereby he was compelled to sit on the concrete floor of his cell.
(b)(3) NatSecAct Rahman was only clothed in a sweatshirt. This act directly led to
(b)(6) -
(b)(7)(c) temperature had fallen sharply in November. Two
Rahman's death 1_2Mi rpothermia. was fully cognizant that the
(b)(7)(f)
individuals said that they raised the subject of the cold temperatures
with On ovember directed that actions be taken to
help other detainees ward off the cold. Other officers and contractors
present at November 2002 stated they recognized it was
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct very cold and some detainees were inadequately protected against
the cold. They stated they were personally aware of the possibility of
hypothermia, but some said they assumed it was the responsibility of
someone else to address.
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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174. (S-H-NF) exhibited reckless indifference to the
possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's
death. There is no indication that tended that Rahman
(b)(1) should be severely harmed or kille
(b)(3) NatSecAct
175. (5-/INF) The initial account of guards that
Rahman died in the mid-morning ofnNovember 2002 is unreliable
(b)(1) and sell-serving. It is likely that Rahman died during the night and
(b)(3) NatSecActhe guards waited until Station officers were present a to
report his death. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the
(b)(1) guards assaulted or independently mistreated Rahman.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
176 (S/ /NF) Rahman did not receive a physical examination
(b)(1) following his rendition fron or at any time while detained
CIAAct
(b)(3)
(b)(3) NatSecAce despite report to the contrary. Although
(b)(6) the physician's assistant at that time, reported that
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c) he examined
(b)(7)(f) examine
well to supplant
all the other detainees
held
Rahman's
at he did not
was
NatSecAct
Rahman.
allowed
statement
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
that all
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
a physical
examination.
(b)(1) 177. (S-//NF)
who was ii
hiring the first
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct_lays of Rahman's detention,
did not attend
in the same
to Rahman
(b)(6)
manner
and with the same standard of care as the other detainees.
(b)(7)(c)
as aware of the cold conditions; indeed the temperature in
(b)(7)(f)
on
d reached a low of 31 degrees the day before he departed
have
November. 1-te should
advocated
more humane treatm(b crrif for Rahman that would ensure
)(6)
(b)(1) his health and safety. (b)(7)(c) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
178. (S,4L14F) Station's reporting of the details of
Rahman's detention and death in Station cables contained false
(b)(1) etatements and material omissions. Consequently, the Congressional
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
notification drawn from the cable information bore inaccuracies and
material omissions. The inaccurate reporting obscured or minimized
the circumstances of the death, the involvement of in the
mistreatment of Rahman, and the absence of adequate supervision by
A follow-up report to the Congressional oversight
Kr)
SECRET/ NeFeRt+/-/-MR-
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541713
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541713
-SECRET / r P4OtiJ1tN77 MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
committees was prepared on 2 May 2003. That report, drawn from
the DO Investigative Report, accurately reported salient
circumstances that contributed to Rahman's death that were initially
(b)(1) omitted.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct 179. (.9,444F) ears direct responsibility for failing
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) to include pertinent facts in his ovember 2002 official written
(b)(7)(f) account of Rahman's death. The cable specifically withheldwithheld
information known toP7and that directed the (b)(1)
guards to place Rahman in the short chain position while he was (b)() NatSecAct
naked below the waist, thereby forcing him to sit bare bottomed on (00))((7))((fc))
(b)(1) the bare concrete floor of his cell in what were known to be very cold
(b)(3) NatSecAct
temperatures.
^1
180. (97'7'-1/10)
providing adequate supervision of
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
ars responsibility for not
63
?SECRET
(b)(3) NatSecAct
activities at
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541713
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(f)
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541713
-SEC?PcE-T/ Nerentiv-tm
? (b)(3) NatSecAct
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. (S//NF) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
should convene an Accountability Board to review the performance
of
in
regard to the events that contributed to the death of Gul Rahman.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(5)
CONCUR:
L. Hel -rson
Inspector General
Date
SECRET/ NCIFORINT-trigir
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06541713