EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIA COUNTERTERRORIST INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Documents Related to the Former Detention and Interrogation Program
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 6542324
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02400
• Publication Date: March 2, 2005

. .
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
li?-))l ) '1"'"41MNNR-
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOP SUCTIETI
MEMORKNDUM FOR: Steve Bradbury
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
FROM:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Legal Group
DCI Counterterrorist Center
2 March 2005
(fish trw) Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques
1. (419/ kNF) Action Requested: None. This
memorandum respon s to your request for the intelligence the
(b)(1) Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations,
(b)(3) NatSecAct --re not providing any information of intelligence.
2. (P64 //NF) Background: The Central
Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and
the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence.
We assess we would not have succeeded in overcoming the
resistance of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), Abu Zubaydah, and
other equally resistant high-value terrorist detainees without
applying, in a careful, professional and safe manner, the full
range of interrogation techniques. Prior to the use of enhanced
measures against skilled resistors like KSM and Abu Zubaydah--
the two most prolific intelligence producers in our control-.-CIA
acquired little threat information or significant actionable
intelligence. Both terrorists clearly believed that the United
States lacked the capability and willingness to apply
psychological and physical pressures to compel them to
cooperate. KSM and Zubaydah also expressed their belief that
the general US population was "weak," lacked resilience, and
would be unable to "do what Was necessary" to prevent the
terrorists from succeeding in their goals. Indeed, before his
interrogation using enhanced techniques, when KSM was asked
about future attacks planned against the United States, he
coldly relied "Soon, you will know."
4. PPS/,
(b)(5)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOr'SECRET/
/isieFeRN-7L71-Mik
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
-Tep?fteRer,m(1) /149F-4911/44-41R
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (116/ /NP) Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques
(b)(5)
According to Zubaydah, brothers w o are
captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide
information when they believe they have "reached the limit of
their ability to withhold it" in the face of psychological and
physical hardships.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
5. (-lmeli 'AWF-) Results CIA's use of DOJ-approved
enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive
interrogation approach, has ,enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots,
capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical
intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired
from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has
failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September
2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after
applying interrogation techniques:
? The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks against the
US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was
uncovered during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin
Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM, who
provided additional information on the Karachi plot and
confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani
extremists. KSM provided information on the Karachi plot
after we showed him "capture" photos of Ammar and Khallad,
and he confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local
Pakistani extremists.
? The Heathrow Plot: Initial interrogations of Ammar and
Khallad resulted in information on this plot to hijack
commercial airliners in Eastern Europe and fly them into
Heathrow Airport. Using the information from Khallad and
Ammar, we confronted KSM and uncovered details on the.
plot's evolution and the potential operatives involved.
Khallad admitted that he had directed Saudi leader Hazim
al7Sha'ir to begin locating pilots for the attack.
(b)(1) 2
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Tep?seeRET/
70FORM-rmR
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
, Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324 ?
,
TO .(b)(1) /NOFORN//MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (PS/, tiff-) Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques
? The "Second Wave": This was a KSM plot to use East Asian
operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest
building on the US West Coast (Los Angeles) as a follow-on
to 9/11. We learned this during the initial interrogation
of KSM and later confirmed it through the interrogation of
Hambali and Khallad.
? The Guraba Cell: We learned of this 17-member Jemaah
Islamiyah cell from Hambali, who confirmed that some of the
cell's operatives were identified as candidates to train as
pilots as part of KSM's "second wave" attack against the
US.
? Issa al-Hindi: KSM first identified Issa al-Hindi as an
operative he sent to the US prior to 9/11 to case potential
targets in NYC and Washington. When shown surveillance
(b)(1) photos provided by HVDs confirmed al-
(b)(3) NatSecAct Hindi's identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the British
resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the
arrest of other operatives.
? Abu Talha al-Pakistani: Khallad and Ammar identified Abu
Talha as the leader of the Karachi cell and the Heathrow
Plot. The combined intelligence gathered from Khallad,
Ammar, KSM, Hassan Ghul, and other HVDs resulted in Abu.
Talha's recent arrest in Pakistan and the disruption of
ongoing plots to target Western interests in London.
? liambali's Capture: During KSM's interrogation we acquired
information that led to the capture of Hambali in. August
2003 and to the partial dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah
leadership in SE Asia. KSM first told us about Majid
Khan's role in delivering $50,0000 to Hambali operatives
for an attack KSM believed was imminent. We then
confronted Khan with KSM's admission and email intercepts
confirming the money transfer and Khan's travel to Bangkok.
Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative named
"Zubair," whom we subsequently identified and captured.
Zubair's capture led to the,identification and subsequent
capture of an operative named Lilie who was providing
forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the house in
(b)(1) 3
(b)(3) NatSecAct
-91;,?S-Hefterl
ANGWOR:N74-71-MR
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
? (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
. I
TOP-tEe171:7) ( ) /NOFORN/ /1IR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: P4-g-/ ?c4;F) Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques
Bangkok where Hambali was hiding. When we confronted
Hambali with details of what we knew from other detainees,
he admitted that he was grooming the Guraba cell for US
operations at the behest of KSM.
? Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was
conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11,
according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he
recruited Tayyar--who is still at large--to conduct a major
operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as
the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and
we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting
on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar's
true name and aggressively followed up with his family and
friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the
United States. and we are actively
pursuing his capture. (W(1 )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
? Dirty Bomb Plot: Abu Zubaydah provided significant
information on two operatives, Jose Padilla and Binyam
Mohammed, who planned to build and detonate a "dirty bomb"
in the Washington DC area. Zubaydah's reporting led to the
arrest of Padilla on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003 and
to the identification of Mohammad, who was already in
Pakistani custody under another identity.
? Shoe Bomber: We learned from KSM and Ammar that Sajid
Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous
shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
? Shkai, Pakistan: The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided
detailed tactical intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan
(b)(1) 4
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOP OECRET/
/NOFORN//MR
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324
(b)(1) iNGFeRld-ftilft.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) SUBJECT: (a/ IMF) Effectiveness of the CIA
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
was a major Al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal areas. Through use
of during the Ghul interrogation,
we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ
leaders in Shkai. This intelligence was provided
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
5
NOFORN-HtlIk-
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C06542324