THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 APRIL 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005974365
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: April 5, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
?rorSec-xel_ 5 April 1968
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Soviet Union -
North Vietnam
LATE ITEM
The Soviets published a statement
this morning saying that they "fully
support the statement of the North Viet-
namese Government on 3 April." In a
summary which has been broadcast, Moscow
says "the further development of events
depends on whether the US will take the
following step: whether it stops bomb-
ings and other acts of war against North
Vietnam fully and unconditionally, and
whether it takes a positive view of the
well-known proposals of the North Viet-
namese Government and the Liberation
Front on the ways of settling the Viet-
nam problem." The statement says, "In
the opinion of the Soviet Government,
these proposals offer a good basis for
a lasting settlement in Vietnam."
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DAILY BRIEF
5 APRIL 1968
1. North Vietnam
2. South Vietnam
3. Panama
There are no clear indications yet
whether Hanoi intends to tailor its
military action to prospective diplo-
matic "contacts" with the US. The rela-
tive lull in enemy military activity in
South Vietnam continues. There are
signs, however, of enemy reconnaissance,
repositioning and logistic activity,
possibly in preparation for a step-up
in the pace of hostilities. Such action
is particularly evident in the central
highlands and along the central coast of
South Vietnam.
The Supreme Court last night nulli-
fied Robles' impeachment. This puts a
real crimp in Arias' chances for the
presidency. Some of the radicals behind
Arias may well take to the streets now,
but the guard is prepared to handle any
new outbreaks of violence.
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4. Jordan
5. Poland
6. Czechoslovakia
King Husayn is settling for a
trip to Cairo, and perhaps Baghdad, in
place of the Arab summit meeting he had
wanted. Husayn is scheduling a visit
to Cairo for Saturday now that it is
clear that Saudi King Faysal will not
agree to a summit meeting unless Jordan
and Egypt concede openly that Jarring
has failed.
Husayn now must try to do two
things; first, to get Nasir to show
some flexibility toward Jarring's pro-
posals; second, to get Nasir to help
control the terrorist groups in Jor-
dan. We doubt the King will have much
success.
A purge of middle-level officials
is now moving along in earnest. Recently
ousted functionaries include a deputy
minister of foreign trade and the head
man of the nuclear energy program. Nu-
merous party and government officials
with lower rank have also been sacked.
Most of the victims are Jews who
are traditionally the targets of party
hardliners. The hardliners will lose
no time seating their own choices be-
hind the empty desks.
Reports from Warsaw say the next
step--perhaps within the week--will be
removals in the upper reaches of the
government.
The party central committee has
elected a new leadership, and extensive
government changes are expected to fol-
low soon. Reformers within the party
now have a heavy majority on the policy-
making presidium and are well represented
on the new secretariat, which executes
policy. All the new leaders are presum-
ably committed to party secretary Dubcek's
action program.
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7. Rumania
Large amounts of Soviet-made armor
which the Israelis captured last summer
have been bought by Rumania. Moscow
has been reluctant to supply hardware
to the unreliable Rumanians recently.
That Bucharest has found a way around
the problem is going to be especially
irritating to the Russians.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
5-April 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
5 April 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi Comment on Johnson Speech: Hanoi radio's
domestic service -on-4-April-carried a commentary
giving for the first time an account of President
Johnson's 31 March speech. It covered most of the
main points, with some snide interpretative comments
added for the benefit of the North Vietnamese popu-
lace. The broadcast reported the President's order
stopping the bombing of North Vietnam "except in the
area north of the demilitarized zone," but it failed
to carry that part of the statement justifying the
continuation of some bombing operations. It quoted
the President's pledge of a full bombing halt in re-
turn for prompt and serious talks in which Hanoi
would not take advantage of US restraint. The broad-
cast concluded by noting without direct comment that
the President had announced he would not run for re-
election.
More 'on 4 April Editorial: Further analysis of
the editorial in Nhan Dan on 4 April suggests that al-
though it sticks rigidly to basic North Vietnamese po-
sitions most of the time, some of the language could
be designed to preserve tactical flexibility should
this prove desirable in future contacts with the US.
Nhan Dan covers basically the same ground as the
3 April government statement. It elaborates on the
point that President Johnson was forced to restrict
the bombing because of military "failure" in Vietnam
and rising opposition to US policy both at home and
abroad. The editorial says the US "remains obstinate,"
however, and cites continued bombings up to the 20th
parallel, reconnaissance flights "in every part of
North Vietnam," and the President's statements about
sending more US troops and keeping commitments to Sai-
gon as evidence of this attitude.
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The issue of reciprocal military restraint is
treated more fully than in the 3 April government
statement. The editorial does not specifically rule
out Communist restraint in the future, although it
does complain that despite continued bombing and
strengthening of US and South Vietnamese forces, the
US keeps asking the Communists to "slacken their
fight against aggression." The editorial says that
a demand for Communist reciprocity in return for a
bombing halt and for setting conditions for a US
troop withdrawal is still the "essence" of the US
position. This, it says, "has been categorically
rejected" by the Vietnamese Communists.
* * *
Liberation Front on US-Hanoi Exchange: The
Liberation Front in two separate broadcasts has
carried the text of the 3 April Hanoi government
statement. On 4 April the Liberation radio broad-
cast a 15-minute commentary which voiced "full sup-
port for the just stand and good will of the North
Vietnamese Government" as expressed in its 3 April
statement. The commentary criticized President John-
son's 31 March speech, calling it "shamelessly pre-
arranged" and a "manifestation of the aggressive and
cunning" propaganda of the US imperialists. The
commentary termed President Johnson's stand as that
of "a stubborn aggressor."
Citing the recent bombing of North Vietnam and
spy flights by US planes over North Vietnam, the com-
mentary said that President Johnson's speech was an
attempt to conceal the US imperialists' "dark scheme
of pursuing their aggression and domination of South
Vietnam." It concluded that as long as the US imper-
ialists do not give up their scheme of aggression
against South Vietnam, the Vietnamese people will
"never put down their weapons" and "will resolutely
fight until complete victory."
* * *
North Vietnamese Spokesman in London: A North
Vietnamese correspondent in London, Nguyen Van Sao,
appeared on a BBC television program on 4 April to
claim that Hanoi's stated willingness to talk with
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US officials was "just the beginning...to test Mr.
Johnson's sincerity." Sao is not a prominent offi-
cial, and his views may not carry much weight, but
he claims that his statements were cleared with
Hanoi's Paris office and in addition had been sent
back to Hanoi.
In his TV appearance, he was unusually garru-
lous for a North Vietnamese spokesman. In addition
to the usual line about talks starting after an un-
conditional bombing cessation, Sao volunteered that
such talks could be held in a "matter of days" in
Paris, Phnom Penh, or Poland. He also said that the
talks would be restricted to North Vietnamese and
American representatives and would be held at the am-
bassadorial level.
Hanoi Plays Up Continuing Air Raids: To bol-
ster its case for an unconditional end to the bomb-
ing throughout all of North Vietnam, Hanoi is pro-
viding detailed reporting on what it claims are
continuing, intensive, and "inhumane" US air raids
on the provinces south of the 20th parallel. It has
coupled these reports with replays of statements in
the Western press criticizing the US for ordering
only a partial bombing halt and urging that the ces-
sation include the entire country.
In broadcasts on 3 and 4 April, Hanoi listed a
number of areas in the southern provinces which it
claimed have received intensive bombings since the
President's announcement of the bombing halt. Par-
ticular attention was focused on charges that these
raids were directed against populated areas. The
broadcasts also condemned the use of reconnaissance
aircraft over provinces north of the 20th parallel
and an alleged bombing of a populated area in a north-
western province near the Laotian border, far above
the 20th parallel. Ambassador Sullivan says it is
unlikely that US or Laotian planes were operating
in this area. He suggests the possibility of a
Chinese provocation.
* * *
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* * *
Liberation Front Office in Sweden: Recent Viet-
namese Communist contacts with the Swedish Government
have apparently resulted in an agreement to allow the
Liberation Front to open an office in Stockholm. Ac-
cording to a 3 April Radio Sweden broadcast, the Front
will open an information office in the Swedish capital
in the next few months, and its representatives are
looking for quarters in the city.
The new office could become a clearing house for
Vietnamese Communist propaganda throughout Scandinavia
and Western Europe. In addition, it doubtless would
minister to the burgeoning Vietnam movement in Sweden.
This is the second agreement for establishing a Front
press office in Western Europe in recent months. The
Front received approval for such an office in France,
but it has never been opened.
* * *
* * *
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* * *
Bo Uninformed of Hanoi's Intent: Mai Van Bo,
the leading North Vietnamese diplomat in the West
and a very authoritative spokesman on the negotia-
tions issue, apparently did not anticipate either
the nature or the promptness of his government's re-
sponse to President Johnson.
According to the US Embassy in Paris, Bo
told French Foreign Ministry officials that he did
not put much stock in President Johnson's speech.
He claimed it was made for domestic political rea-
sons, and pointed out that the partial bombing re-
strictions did not meet Hanoi's requirement for full
cessation. He also charged that the US was still
sending reconnaissance planes north of the 20th parallel.
Bo told the French that these actions would not obtain
the desired result and that he personally believed
that the North Vietnamese leaders would "not rush in-
to any official reply."
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report.
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Top Secret
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