THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 4 NOVEMBER 1962

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005996020
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 4, 1962

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NOVEMBER 1962
T4"-St-C-RET._
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. Cuba/Bloc
? a. Little of significance was
produced by the Six low-altitude
missions flown on Saturday. Two air-
fields, two ports and one former MRBM
launch site were covered. There was
no clarification of the situation at
La Isabella dockside nor was our know-
ledge of the status of the IL-28s ad-
vanced.
b. We have no readout yet of
yesterday's U-2 mission.
f. A fourth delivery of IL-28s
apparently was made to Cuba about 20 Oc-
tober, just a few days before the US
quarantine measures were enacted.
(Cont'd)
Frw That Praw:Aws4, ("1rd
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o. Among the Latin American dele-
gates at the UN, the feeling is wide-
spread that even though the missile
threat be removed, the problem of Castro
remains. Although some believe he has
lost heavily in prestige, there is growing
concern that a commitment from us not
to invade in exchange for removal of
the missiles would be like winning a
battle and losing the war,if Castro
remains.
c_._ TL_. c
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2. Cuba-Military
3, Cuba-USSR Propaganda
a. The Cubans may try to mount
round the clock fighter patrols and
attempt to intercept our reconnais-
sance flights.
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c. It may have been training,
but early yesterday two Cuban MIGs
were scrambled after an "enemy air-
craft" which flew near the Santa Clara
base. We had no planes in the area
at that time.
e. We do not know what it is
all about yet, but a 29-member Cuban
military mission was dueto arrive
Moscow yesterday from Havana via Czech
civil air carrier.
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a. Moscow has, issued (on 2
November) its firstcommentary on a
UN supervisory role in the Cuban crisis.
The treatment suggests the USSR will
try to hold any UN verification and
Cont 'd)
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supervision of dismantling and re-
moval of missiles to the absolute -
minimum, not only because of Castro's
adamant opposition but also because
of the dangerous precedent this would
create.
b. One of the participants in
a round table discussion on Moscow -
radio declared that "certain US policy-
makers have a distorted view of the
UN role in solving salient problems"
and "would like to repeat the Congo
experience."
c. He then agreed with another
participant that these people would
like to ?use the UN as a shield to
interfere in Cuba's domestic affairs.
d. The third participant, in
purporting to review the role of the
UN in settling the conflict, makes
no reference to UN inspection and
appears to envisage no further tasks
for the UN in regard to Cuba following
U Thant's trip.
e. A related commentary beamed
to Latin America asserted that "the
indispensible condition for conversa-
tions aimed at peaceful settlement...
should be noninterference in the in-
ternal affairs of Cuba."
.f. Moscow is still putting out
the line that with continuation of the
"blockade" and continued aerial sur-
veillance, we are not living up to our
half of the bargain.
FrIr Thai Pracirharif
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4. Cuba/OAS
a. Venezuela's Foreign Minister
is in Washington today planning to ad-
dress the OAS Council on Cuban inspired
subversion and sabotage in his country.
He has some "proof" which he will pre-
sent
saboteurs at-
tacked
in Venezuela
oil fields
3 November:
E- r?k_l_. 7- _ C_
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5. Bloc armed
forces
6. USSR
Soviet bloc armed forces ap-
parently have relaxed somewhat the
status of defensive readiness they
have been on for the past week. East
European forces are engaged in normal
field trainin and small unit trainin
is resumin
a, Strange things have begun ap-
pearing in Pravda's pages in the last
few weeks,
b. We have already noted that on
21 October Pravda reprinted Yevtusheno's
poem. "Stalin's Heirs" warning of the re-
surgence of Stalinism in the USSR. Its
appearances in Pravda is most unusual.
c. Little more than a week later,
Pravda republished the full text of an
editorial from the Mongolian party pa-
per concerning the ouster in September
(for fostering nationalism, wrecking
party unity, excessive zeal in deni-
grating the cult of personality, etc)
of Mongolian party secretary and po-
litburo member Tumur-Ochir,an in and
Out nobody not of himself worthy of
such attention
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d. If one chooses to do so, this
piece can be read as a devastating in-
dictment of Khrushchev. It can also,
however, be construed as an attempt to
steal the thunder of his enemies in
the Chinese Communist camp.
e. As if to set things straight,
Pravda yesterday published an un-
qualified endorsement of Khrushchev's
leadership signed by none other than
old warhorse Kliment Voroshilov, who
was denounced last year as a member of
the Stalinist-oriented "antiparty group."
Obviously written at Khrushchev's behest,
its appearance at all and its praise
for Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban
crisis look defensive.
f. Manifestations of the eye-
gouging that sometimes goes on in the
Kremlin are rare and their interpre-
tation is risky. Even so, we are mind-
ful that it was a party paper (in East
Germany) which gave us an early clue
that Malenkov was in trouble.
g. We are still puzzling this mat-
ter out (comparing texts and transla-
tions, etc.). It is at least safe to
say, however, that the evidence, con-
flicting though it seems, shows that
Khrushchev knows he is vulnerable to
an opposition which not only is still
around but has recently taken heart.
b. If there is a showdown it may
come at the forthcoming central commit-
tee plenum
Frit- TkDr.einictsni?
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7, USSR-Eastern Europe
a. Khrushchev's consultations
with East European bosses this past
week have taken the? unusual form cd
a series of separate bilateral talks
b. There is a sense of urgency
in the situation.
c. The latest to make the trek
was Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov who
has his own trouble with Stalinists
at home and who had to interrupt ur-
gent preparations for a party congress
scheduded to open tomorrow in order,
all of a sudden, to make a one-day
trip to Moscow.
d. Under' the circumstances, it
looks to us as though something more
than just an explanation of the Cuban
affair is afoot, but we cannot put
our finger on it yet.
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9. South Vietnam
10. Yemen
a. A number of high military
officers in South Vietnam feel a major
political shake-up, including the
ouster of Diem and his brother, has
to take place before security can be
restored.
b. They resent Diem's failure
to act against high civilian officials
tainted by a lottery scandal, and at
least one of them is actively planning
a coup.
a. The royalist tribes (some
are more anti-republican than they
are pro-Imam) control a number of
strong points -in the hills in the east
and northeast part of the country.
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c. Now, armed with light weapons,
Badr has mounted an attack on republi,.:
can positions near Harad, in the north
Which heAlopes to capture preparatory
to an eventual push southward along
the coast,
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11. Algiers-USSR-Cuba
d. He had hoped for a coordi-
nated strike by forces under Hasan'
son in the east near Har lb along the
Marib-Sana road. We have no word that
this materialized, nor are we aware
of any coordination among the dispar-
ate tribal forces.
had
doubt
does,
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Badr
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better
stick
to the hills. We
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he will
he will
press
fail.
on with it; if he
f. The royalist force is small,
probably capable of holding for some
time much of the area it now occupies,
but we rate its chances of going any-
where from there very low.
a. We believe Ben Bella may
have offered Algerian facilities
(probably the modern Maison Blanche
airfield near Algiers) to the Soviets
for staging flights to Cuba.
b. If they do use Algiers in
place of Conakry, the Soviets would
be able to use only their largest
aircraft for the flight all the way
to Cuba.
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NOTES
A. UN-India-China: The neutralists at the UN have
decided not to take any initiative there on the
Sino-Indian conflict.
B. USSR: Mikoyan's wife died in Moscow yesterday
after an illness of several weeks; he has said
he will continue his talks in Havana.
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