THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 DECEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976493
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: December 3, 1968

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
The President's Daily Brief
3 December 1968
50X1
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1 50X1
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
3 DECEMBER,1968
1, France
2. South Korea
. Philippines
The franc:is maintaining its own
on international markets, but domestic
holders continue converting to gold.
There are other clouds on the horizon,
too. Workers at the big Renault plant
are threatening tO strike if manage-
ment refuses new Concessions when
their labor contract comes up .for re-
newal the end of this month. Student
unrest also has increased in recent
days.
Marcos, disturbed over what he
feels is an "air of hostility" toward
the Philippines ?in Washington, may
seek to meet with President-elect Nixon
before the inauguration. Marcos did
some preliminary brick and mortar work
on his relations with the US last week-
end when he reshuffled his cabinet and
put strongly pro-American Carlos Romulo
in as? foreign affairs? secretary.
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1 50X1
4. Soviet Union
5. Mexico
6. Ecuador
The men who threw out Khrushchev
in 1964 were united in little more
than their desire to get rid of him.
Their differences and disagreements
persist. Today at Annex we discuss
some of these strains in the collec-
tive leadership.
Barring an incident that could
rekindle tempers, there is a good
chance the students will be back in
their classrooms by the end of the
week. Aware that a year's credits
could be lost--and that the govern-
ment is prepared to shut down the uni-
versities--the students' strike coun-
cil has voted to end the four-month-
old strike.
The cabinet resigned last night
and President Velasco began making new
appointments. At least two of his new
ministers are extreme leftists.
Velasco is three months into his
fifth try, at governing a nation so be-
set with economic and social ills that
it is almost unmanageable by anyone
There is mounting urban violence.
Slum-dwelling peasants are appropriat-
ing private land. The Communists are
increasing their strength in the labor
movement. And the economy continues
its inflationary spiral. Velasco just
cannot seem to come to grips with these
problems and the army--although wary at
the moment--may finally move in to re-
lieve him as it has done in three of
his four previous presidencies.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
50X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1 joxi
7. Panama
Relations between Panama and Costa
Rica are becoming strained as the Pana-
manian National Guard clashes with
Arias Costa Rican - based guerrillas.
Last night the Costa Ricans closed
their border with Panama.
There have been several fights be-
tween the Guard and infiltrating guer-
rillas over the past few days. In one
Instance, guardsmen crossed into Costa
Rica to gun down an Arias man. The de-
posed president is reported planning to
go to Costa Rica himself and, perhaps,
enter Panama. This might rally his fol-
lowers, but it would not improve his
chances of successfully overthrowing the
junta.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1,.:1
ANNEX
Tensions Within the Soviet Leadership:
Some Recent Indications
The group of leaders which ousted Khrushchev in
1964 was united in little beyond its desire to be rid
of Khrushchev himself. It contained, in fact, men
who felt he was not modernizing the Soviet system fast
enough and those who felt he had already made too many
changes. These disagreements have persisted down to
the present, constantly straining the collective lead-
ership's facade of unity.
The most recent report of tension among top Soviet
officials
50X1
50X1
Brezhnev and his 'fellow hard-liners lacked a clear . 50X1
majority in the Soviet Politburo when policy toward
Czechoslovakia was being hammered out in August and had
carried their Case only by appealing to provincial par-
ty leaders.
We have another report that candidate members of
the Politburo--who do not ordinarily vote-were called
to Moscow On the critical weekend to, break a deadlock
among the regular members. Thus it seems likely that
? there was indeed a serious split in the Politburo at
the time of the invasion, but we are reasonably sure
that all factions outwardly accepted the decision once
it was made.
Another dispute--one in some ways with even more
far-reaching implications than the one over Czechoslo-
vakia?has been simmering since early last year. It
involves a veiled but clearly discernible public debate
between Brezhnev and Kosygin, and it is triggered in
part by a fundamental difference over the relative ef-
fectiveness of Communist and Western forms of economic
organization. The debate centers on the extent to
which Moscow should make use of "foreign" (i.e. Western)
technological innovations. Kosygin claims that Western
"monopolies," in their competition for profits, are re-
fining their production and management techniques much
faster than the Communists. He warned last February
that the Soviets "can be left behind" unless they study
A-1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1,c1
what the West has learned. ?Brezhnev in rebuttal has
extolled the superiority of "socialist" methods and
emphasized what is to be learned from ?other Communist
countries.
This debate has persisted, with some semantic
variations by each side, up to the present. In an im-
portant speech on 6 November, Politburo member Mazurov
made references to the problem and treated it--in a
way which resembles other attempts of the present
leadership to avoid head-on conflicts--by throwing
both points of view into the stew and leaving every-
one free to pick out what suits his taste.
While the formal dispute thus remains unresolved,
Kosygin's point of view was embodied in three decrees
in October dealing with economic reform, agricultural
science, and research and development in general. In
each case, although the language is sometimes circum-
spect to avoid stepping too heavily on any toes, clear
emphasis is given to the importance of learning from
"foreign" innovations. The next test of strength--the
implementation of the decrees--presumably is under way
now.
A-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
?
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
Political Attitudes
Top Secret 50X1
16
3 December 1968
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1 50X1
? Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
3 December 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi's Postwar Intentions for the South: 501Jx1
Tfhe
North Vietnamese are convinced they can eventually
topple the Thieu government. 50X1
50X1
the
Hanoi leaders believe that "sooner or later" the Sai-
gon government would be replaced by a "new democratic
government disposed toward the North." 50X1
the Communists have drawn up a list of "traitors" 50X1
and their families in South Vietnam numbering about
100,0 ? ding 20,000 in Saigon and 10,000 in
Hue, some party officials believe these 50X1
people should be herded into concentration camps fol-
lowing the expected Communist takeover, there to await
a final decision as to how they will be handled as
"traitors to the motherland."
* * *
-On Talks: Hanoi propaganda is becoming shriller
on several issues connected with the Paris talks.
The Communists lose few opportunities to exploit is-
sues which they think will sow dissension between
Washington and Saigon, and in a Foreign Ministry
statement of 28 November, Hanoi used language which
was deliberately designed to raise Saigon's tempera-
ture. In countering Saigon's claims that it would
talk only to Hanoi and not the Front, the Foreign
Ministry statement said that "there was no question
of talks between Hanoi and Saigon to solve the Viet-
nam problem."
This new language may be essentially a para-
phrase of the usual Communist demands that to solve
the war the US has to talk to the Liberation Front,
a demand which assures the Front of a pre-eminent
role in the new stage of the negotiations. The new
language, despite the tough tone, does not, however,
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1 50X1
preclude the anticipated discussions including all
parties and would appear to leave room for maneuver
on who talks to whom on lesser issues.
* * *
-Infiltration: Recent intercepts have confirmed
earlier indications that at least six infiltration
groups are en route south between Thanh HOa and Vinh.
The six groups most recently observed have been
moving by train. Their numerical designators indi-
cate that their destination is the III Corps area of
South Vietnam.
Sick and Wounded Personnel: During the past
week there have been additional indications that the
Rear Services manpower system is still devoting major
effort to the evacuation of sick and wounded troops.
This northward movement is being undertaken with the
troop trains which take infiltration groups south. It
is apparent, however, that not enough trains are avail-
able to accommodate the large numbers of disabled per-
sonnel who need to be moved.
On 25 November a message referred to the require-
ment for railroad cars "with roofs" at Cua Giat in
order to transport wounded. Another message on the
same day noted that there had been no cars at Hoang
Mai for the past few days. On 28 November an uniden-
tified Rear Services commander ordered that the move-
ment of sick and wounded personnel was not to be held
up and indicated that he was requisitioning vehicles
to keep them moving. Other messages have revealed the
backlog of sick and wounded is so great at several
points in the pipeline that trucks, ambulances, auto-
mobiles, and human bearers are being used to compen-
sate for the lack of rail transportation.
-2-
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
50X1
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Connecticut Student Rally Noted: Hanoi Radio
has publicized a student rally at the University of
Connecticut held on November 26 to protest the war
and to harass the recruiting efforts of the Dow
Chemical Company. The broadcast claimed that more
than a hundred students participated in the demon-
strations.
-3-
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600120001-1