THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 SEPTEMBER 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967879
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: September 8, 1965

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003900330001-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
8 SEPTEMBER 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
8 SEPTEMBER 1965
1. India-Pakistan
The military situation remains
confused, but Indian forces evidently
have run into heavy going in their of-
fensive in the Punjab area.
The attack New Delhi says it has
launched toward the Sind area of Paki-
stan, 500 miles south of the Punjab
fighting, has not yet been confirmed.
A naval engagement is also forecast
by New Delhi, which says it has sent
ships to cut off from a base a Pakistani
force which shelled an Indian coastal
radar station.
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Both sides are hypersensitive to pres-
tige considerations, and foreign obser- 50X1
vers are barred from the fighting areas
and from military headquarters.
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6-151,
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The strategic aims of the two sides
remain well reported, however.
Ayub made it clear again that he does
not want an all-out war with India, but
does want Kashmir.
call-
ing on India to take its troops out of
all of Kashmir and agree to a plebiscite
there.
The Indian posture is to resist
these demands, and to make whatever
thrusts--propaganda or military that
it can in order to ease the Pakistani
pressure. So far, the Indians are keep-
ing East Pakistan as an ace in the hole.
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Indian air attacks there yesterday were
ordered by a local commander and are seen
by New Delhi as a mistake.
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2. Communist China
3. Vietnam
Peking's gestures to support Paki-
stan and intimidate India are becoming
more threatening
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5. Dominican Republic
6. Panama
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There has been little or no relaxa-
tion in the situation.
The rebel side is excited by rumors
that persons leaving the rebel zone are
arrested or even killed. The rebels have
turned in no arms,but have closed their
guerrilla school. The rightist military
are still upset over the fact that they
have not been confirmed in their jobs and
by the return of leftist exiles.
Our ,embassy in Panama warns that
the Robles government will be subjected
to severe attack if it cannot show evi-
dence of progress in the canal negotia-
tions by ,1 October.
Panama's National Assembly recon-
venes on that date, and leftists, ultra-
nationalists, and other "outs" will be
thirsting for Robles' blood. Robles has
already made general statements that the
atmosphere of the negotiations is good,
thereby heightening expectations.
If a joint US-Panama statement can-
not be made by 1 October, the embassy
believes that at the least Robles will
have to issue a more specific statement
of his own which may well commit him to
more inflexible positions than he has
taken heretofore.
So far, Robles has been able to
keep at a standoff the extremists who
want to exploit the situation. Between
1 October and 9 January, the anniversary
of the onset of anti-US rioting in 1964,
the situation is likely to grow progres-
sively more dangerous.
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7. Singapore
8. France
9. Cyprus
The British have concluded the Lon-
don talks on the future of the Singapore
bases (reported in the Brief of 4 Sep-
tember) by observing that they and the
other participants--the US, Australia,
and New Zealand--agreed Britain should
not open negotiations with Sukarno and
that there was "considerable concern"
over any early British withdrawal from
Singapore.
Our London embassy comments that al-
though the financial costs of staying in
Singapore were hardly mentioned in the
formal talks, they evidently loom large
in British calculations. The next move
very likely will be to get the US to
share this burden.
French Foreign Minister Couve de,
Murville has indicated that the scenario
for De Gaulle's press conference tomor-
row is relatively bland. De Gaulle sup-
posedly intends to be "kindly" toward
the US and Britain, but critical of the
Germans.
The French meanwhile continue to
underline the point, made earlier to Un-
dersecretary Ball, that they want any
discussions with the US on the future
of the North Atlantic alliance to be
strictly bilateral. Their latest argu-
ment is that it is much more difficult
to keep multilateral talks secret.
?The regular six-month rotation of
the Turkish military contingent, scheduled
for 14 September, may again be the occa-
sion for a flurry in the Cyprus situation.
there are still serious problems in con-
nection with the rotation. The Greek
Cypriots now say the rotation is "ac-
ceptable," but pose a long list of re-
strictions on supplies the troops may
bring in.
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