THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 FEBRUARY 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005974267
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 8, 1968

? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
The President's Daily Brief
--ror-Src-r-gt
8 February 1968
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4 ?
DAILY BRIEF
8 FEBRUARY 1968
1. Vietnam The combat base at Khe Sanh was
(as of 5:30 AM struck again this morning with a heavy
EST) barrage of artillery, rocket, and mor-
tar fire, but casualties and damage
were light. No major new attacks have
occurred elsewhere in South Vietnam,
but Communist pressure remains serious
in several urban areas--notably in
Saigon, Hue, and Dalat.
An idea of what the Communists
hoped to accomplish in the current of-
fensive is now beginning to emerge from
interrogations of captured Viet Cong.
They were banking on an upsurge of popu-
lar support in the cities, and some
claim they were told to organize new
front groups composed of dissident South
Vietnamese. The end result was to be a
coalition of these new groups with the
National Liberation Front which would
then form a new government capable of
challenging the present leaders in Sai-
gon.
This scheme fits with the Commu-
nist propaganda about new opposition
"fronts" springing up in South Vietnam.
Although the Communists did not achieve
all they had hoped initially, it is un-
likely that these plans have been aban-
doned.
50X1
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
50X1
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4 ?
2. Korea
3. United Kingdom
4. Soviet Union
5. Denmark
The government and press in Seoul
are moderating somewhat their earlier
strenuous protestations over US handling
of the Pueblo case. Perhaps they feel
that the lack of progress in Panmunjom
reduces the chances of a compromise
undercutting South Korean status.
The attempted lunar probe yester-
day morning failed early in flight. It
was intended either to go in orbit
around the moon or to softland a pay-
load on the surface. The Soviets have
tried only one other lunar operation
in the past 13 months, and that also
was a flop.
The new government has set out, as
its first order of business, to obtain
assurances that the US accepts Denmark's
policy banning nuclear weapons from
Greenland and its airspace. The foreign
minister informed Ambassador White yes-
terday that this does not have to mean
renegotiation of the 1951 base treaty;
a less formal exchange of notes would
do.
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
\ 50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
6. Belgium
7. Czechoslovakia
8. Jordan
The collapse of the government yes-
terday climaxed a bitter dispute between
French and Dutch speaking Belgians.
Foreign policy is not an issue in the
crisis. It will be very difficult to
put together a new government on the
basis of the present Parliament and new
elections may be in store.
All signs suggest that Dubcek re-
turned from his quick trip to Moscow
last week pumped up with confidence in
his plans to put the country on a new
course and to broaden his base of poli-
tical support. He evidently got at
least tacit acceptance in Moscow, though
Soviet leaders almost surely remain ap-
prehensive about the liberalizing ex-
periments he has in mind.
Dubcek's program is to be unveiled
at the party Central Committee meeting
scheduled for late this month.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
? 2-
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Top Secret
8 February 1968
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4 50X1
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
8 February 1968
. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Propaganda on the Current Offensive: Vietnamese
Communist propaganda is still stressing that the mili-
tary offensive will not be a short-term effort, and
that more difficult days are ahead. Earlier appeals
frequently characterized the fighting as "urgent" and
stressed the immediate objectives, whereas Front and
Hanoi statements in recent days have predicted that
the fighting would become fiercer and fiercer, but
that greater victories are yet to come. The French
Press Agency correspondent in Hanoi, whose material
is censored and sometimes inspired by the North Viet-
namese, reports he was told that the present fighting
is only, the beginning of a "new phase" of the struggle
and that there will be a "second phase" to prevent
the allies from recovering from the first blow.
In the absence of any genuine popular uprising,
the Communists have probably found it necessary to
bolster Viet Cong morale by stressing that the fight-
ing must continue in order to nail down the successes
achieved in the initial Tet thrust. Such propaganda
is also designed to encourage greater uncertainty
and fear among the already shaken populace and to mag-
nify and prolong the Communist threat.
* * *
Flight to Hanoi Still Stranded: The Interna-
tional Control Commission (ICC) aircraft scheduled
to bring out the three US prisoners from Hanoi is
still stranded in Saigon because of fighting near
the city. Flights from Saigon to Hanoi via Phnom
Penh and Vientiane were cancelled on 2 and 6 Febru-
ary and one scheduled for the 9th has also been
scrubbed.
The two Americans who are to receive the three
flyers have been stranded in Vientiane since 2 Febru-
ary. The US Embassy in Laos reports that the two
Americans approached the Chinese Communists in an
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
effort to arrange a flight through China, but were
refused. (The Chinese control the only other regu-
larly scheduled air route to North Vietnam.) The
North Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane was informed
of the Chinese refusal and suggested the ICC initi-
ate a flight from either Phnom Penh or Vientiane
using another aircraft to make the flight on 9 Febru-
ary. The North Vietnamese guaranteed that they would
provide the same security for the flight as that
given the regular ICC aircraft. The US Embassy in
Vientiane made a similar proposal to ICC officials
in Laos and South Vietnam, and this is now being ex-
plored.
* * *
"Front Spokesmen in Cairo: Vietnamese Communist
spokesmen continue to underscore their contention
that any moves to end the war must start with the
United States.
The head of the Liberation Front mission in
Cairo held a press conference on 6 February to make
this point and to present the Front's line on the
current Communist offensive. This was the approach
taken by his colleague in Moscow on the same day.
Both rejected a coalition government or negotiations
with the Thieu-Ky government, and both expressed de-
termination to continue the struggle as long as
necessary to achieve a settlement on Communist terms.
The Front ,spokesman in Cairo sidestepped a question
about voluhteers if the US "doubled" its strength
in Vietnam by saying there are plenty of Vietnamese,
both North and South, and they will "always be
able to defeat" whatever forces the US sends.
* * *
-2-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
50X1
* * *
Vietnamese Praise North Korean Support: In
what seems to have been a deliberate attempt to
link the Pueblo incident with the Vietnam con-
flict, a Ya-777-was held in Pyongyang at which
Vietnamese Communist representatives praised the
North Koreans for their support.
Although their Korean comrades apparently
eschewed any specific claim of capturing the Pueblo
in order to support the Communists in Vietnam, a
Liberation Front speaker described the action as
an "effective contribution to the struggle of the
South Vietnamese people." The North Vietnamese
ambassador was not so explicit, and only claimed
that Vietnamese Communist successes would be "un-
thinkable" without the support tendered by the
North Koreans. Earlier Communist propaganda seemed
to avoid making any direct connection between the
Pueblo and events in Vietnam.
* * *
II. ?NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Nothing significant to report at this time.
-3-
50X1
50X1
50X11
nx?I
50X11
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005800180001-4