THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 16 OCTOBER 1964

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005959487
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 16, 1964

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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16 OCTOBER 1964
-ror-aEGR.g.T_
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USSR
LATE ITEM
a. While the evidence is not
conclusive, we now think it more
likely that Khrushchev was ousted
rather than that he suffered a sud-
den physical collapse or died.
b. We can, however, pretty
well rule out the ostensible ex-
planation of "advanced age and
deteriorating health."
Ambas-
sador Kohler cables that Khrushchev
returned to Moscow that afternoon,
but no one reports having seen him.
(Cont'd)
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e. In any case, the total
absence of any note of compassion
in Moscow's announcement is a
compelling argument that he is out
of favor.
f. We can only speculate on
the reasons for Khrushchev's fall.
There are a number of well-known
intractable problems which face
the Soviet Government.
g. The China problem, however,
seems a less likely candidate than
domestic economic policy. We have
seen no signs of disunity in the
Soviet leadership over policy to-
ward Peiping.
h. In retrospect, it appears
conceivable that the seeds for the
change were sown in late September
during the Kremlin meeting on a
new long-term economic plan. Khru-
shchev's strong argument in favor
of accelerated production of con-
sumer goods may have precipitated
a reaction against him.
i. This meeting received no
advance publicity, although nearly
every significant Soviet economic
and political organization was
represented.
(Cont 'd)
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j. On the surface at least,
Brezhnev and Kosygin have appeared
to support Khrushchev's policies,
so there is little indication of
any contemplated changes.
k. Pravda this morning
coupled the official announcement
of the shifts in the Kremlin with
the assertion in bold type that
the party would "firmly and con-
sistently" carry out "the general
line worked out at the 20th and
22nd Congresses of the party,"
thus affirming adherence to Khru-
shchev's general program.
1. Nonetheless, we expect
some changes will not be long in
coming. We note rumors that, in
addition to son-in-law Adzhubei,
the editor of Pravda and ?the chief
of Soviet radio and television have
been sacked.
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1. UK Elections
2. South Vietnam
a. At 0900 EDT, Labor had
taken 291 seats to 271 for the Con-
servatives, but was quite uncertain
of a working majority in Parliament.
b. About 70 constituencies,
mostly in rural areas where the Con-
servatives are strong, were still
uncounted.
c. Harold Wilson says if he
gets a majority, however small, it
will be his duty to form a govern-
ment.
d. Patrick Gordon Walker lost
his seat, but could be named acting
foreign minister until returned by
an early by-election.
e. The Liberals lost seats
despite a gain in total vote, but
might still hold the balance of
power in Parliament.
a. The High National Council
now appears stymied by the Khanh-
Minh rivalry.
(Cont'd)
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b. The Council leans heavily
toward Minh as Chief of State with
strong powers in the new provisional
government. Khanh would be offered
a decidedly secondary position as
premier.
c. Khanh, however, seems to
have no intention of giving up con-
trol and still has the backing of
the young generals.
e. In this highly complex
situation, yet another resort to?
military force could occur with
very little warning.
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A.
NOTES
Congo The rebels are reported to have mounted
another assault on the key eastern town of
Uvira. ANC troops, apparently having had their
fill of pillaging, are now deserting.
C. East Africa East and Central African leaders
meeting in Dar-es-Salaam today may make some
far-reaching decisions. The chiefs of Kenya,
Uganda, Tanganyika, and Northern Rhodesia will
discuss military coordination, Mozambiquethe
Congo, and diplomatic action against Southern
Rhodesia. They probably will also consider
means for using Northern Rhodesia as a base for
subversive operations against southern Africa.
D. Argentina The government is bracing itself
for possible trouble during Peronist demonstra-
tions slated for 17 October, the anniversary
of Peron's 1945 return to power. The military
is expected to act quickly to suppress any
violence.
(Cont 'd)
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E. Yemen - Egypt - Saudi Arabia The Yemeni repub-
licans and royalists will soon meet to negotiate
a settlement of their two-year-old civil war.
The first session, which will be attended by
Egyptian and Saudi Arabian observers, will prob-
ably be devoted largely to sounding out each
other's position, although a temporary cease-
fire may be arranged.
F. Cuba-US Cuba intends to use the next UN
General Assembly meeting to increase pressure
on the US for a rapprochement. Havana will try
to get UN adoption of the recent Cairo resolu-
tions denouncing US economic pressures on Cuba
and calling for evacuation of Guantanamo.
hopes to stir up
enough favorable opinion to influence the US
toward changing its Cuban policy.
G. USSR-Mexico A large group of Soviet oil ex-
perts will arrive in Mexico on 20 October at
the invitation of PEMEX, the state-owned petro-
leum industry. The Russians may follow up on
a Soviet offer made last summer to provide
equipment and technical help to develop Mexico's
oil resources. PEMEX's main concern at present
is the development of Mexico's petrochemical
industry, however, and we doubt that the Soviets
can make an attractive offer in that area.
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