THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 MAY 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976162
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: May 23, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
--74-677--Stzr,geL 23 May 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
23 MAY 1968
1, France
2, Soviet Union-
Czechoslovakia
Acceptance by union leaders of
Pompidou's offer to open a "dialogue"
with labor could be the first step
toward a negotiated settlement. The
obstacles are impressive, however.
For one thing, there is no assurance
that the rebellious workers can be
brought back under control of the union
leaders. For another, the powerful or-
ganization of French employers says it
will oppose any government-union agree-
ment calling for higher wages.
Moreover, a new outbreak of stu-
dent demonstrations in Paris early
this morning has further complicated
the picture.
Defeat of the opposition's censure
motion yesterday does strengthen the
government's hand, but even in the easi-
est of circumstances France will never
be quite the same again_ A leading
Gaullist deputy confided to a US Embassy
officer this week that the General will
be obliged to make important modifica-
tions in his social and economic pro-
grams--and even his foreign policies--
in order to reunite the people behind
him.
De Gaulle will do his utmost to
preserve intact his force de frappe pro-
gram--but this, too, may have to suffer.
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3. Italy
4. Panama
5. India
Communist gains in this week's
election came in the face of relative
economic prosperity and despite devel-
opments on the international Communist
scene which had seemed to undercut the
Italian party's propaganda position.
Many Italians evidently wanted simply
to oppose the government; the-Commu-
nists--the only major opposition party--
got the votes. Communist strength went
up 11 seats for a total of 177 in the
630-man parliament.
Premier Moro, whose Christian Dem-
ocrats won 266 seats, is the leading
candidate to head a new center-left co-
alition government. The demoralization '
of his Socialist coalition partners,
however, will make that party more dif-
ficult to deal with. They had hoped
to win back some of the seats taken ear-
lier by a Moscow-oriented splinter party,
but actually they met with an over-all
loss, winning only 91 seats.
Postelection tension rose several
more notches last night after a pitched
battle in the capital between gangs
supporting the rival presidential con-
tenders. Several were injured before
the National Guard restored order.
The official vote count is moving
ahead slowly, with Arnulfo Arias in
the lead. Some administration offi-
cials continue casting about for ways
to head off an Arias victory.
The Congress Party has made some
progress in recent state and local
elections. It still has a long way to
go before it recovers from the disaster
of last year's general elections, but
Mrs. Gandhi must feel encouraged.
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6. Afghanistan
7. Communist China
8. Central African
Republic
The old way of doing things is
coming under attack even in this out-
post of traditionalism. Students and
workers have been leading demonstra-
tions and strikes in recent weeks and
even parliament is showing unaccustomed
aggressiveness in its criticism of the
conservative prime minister. So far,
the King has stayed in the background,
but the old establishment is now press-
ing for an end to the careful "experi-
ment in democracy" he launched a few
years ago.
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The Soviet Leadership's Reaction to the
Czechoslovak Situation in Early May
We have pieced together
a chronology of early May when 50X1
the Soviet leadership made and implemented its de- 505e1)(1
cision to step up the pressure on Czechoslovakia. We
think we can discern a "make-haste-deliberately" atti-
tude within a well coordinated team of three. Brezh-
nev clearly assumed the lead. We also believe the
record shows that the Soviets took a measured approach
to the use of power and avoided sharp reflex actions,
much as they did in the Middle East crisis last summer.
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We think we can see in all this activity an ap-
proach strongly reminiscent of the Soviet modus oper-
andi in last summer's Middle East crisis. Brezhnev
TaTed the key role, but apparently only after getting
the general agreement of Kosygin and Podgorny. Once
the three had decided to act, they moved quickly to
get the proper stamp of approval from their colleagues.
Avoiding rash actions, they took a line which per-
mitted the gradual application of political, mili-
tary, and economic pressure. This "gradualist" ap-
proach has come to be a hallmark of the leadership's
approach to many problems, foreign and domestic.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
23 May 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
23 May 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
More from Hanoi on "Friction" in Saigon: Hanoi
propaganda continues to play up the government reor-
ganization in Saigon as another sign of friction be-
tween Thieu and Ky, and as an unraveling of the South
Vietnamese political fabric, A Hanoi international
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service broadcast in English on 22 May claimed that
the friction between the two South Vietnamese leaders
had been smoldering a long time and was now erupting
into the open. The broadcast also emphasized other
alleged signs of disintegration in Saigon, such as
the debate of government policies in the National
Assembly. It concluded that no reshuffling of the
cabinet would be able to "shore up the tottering
Saigon regime."
The Genesis of the Tet Offensive? The Viet Cong
who rallied to the government in
April claims that the Communists began to revise their
basic strategy for the takeover of South Vietnam last
spring. He claims that their decision to take a new
look at the war in the South was triggered both by US
Operation Junction City and by conflicting advice and
pressures from the Chinese and the Soviets on how to
conduct the war. This rethinking eventually evolved
into a new policy calling for a "general offensive
and general uprising" later in the year.
The defector claims he received this information
from his superior. Although his reporting in the
past has frequently drawn on intraparty gossip and
speculation, he is probably generally correct on the
timing of Hanoi's policy reconsideration. He may al-
so have put his finger on some of the factors which
necessitated such a revision--a combination of US mili-
tary pressure and less than satisfactory cooperation
and support from the two senior Communist allies.
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Antiwar Rally in US: Hanoi Radio on 22 May pub-
licized an antiwar rally held on 19 May in Madison
Square Garden in New York. The Hanoi broadcast claimed
that the rally was attended by artists and writers who
demanded that the US stop its war in Vietnam.
This same rally apparently was also referred to
by Xuan Thuy in his prepared statement of 22 May,
when he said that nearly 20,000 Americans had organ-
ized a meeting in New York to demand a change in the
US attitude in Paris. The meeting, he added, was an
example of "progressive opinion in the US" which op-
posed the administration's policy on Vietnam.
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